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COMPENSATION FUND OF 
UTAH and EASTERN UTAH 
BROADCASTING. 
CaseNo.20040977-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Defendants are not satisfied with Wood's Statement of the Issues and/or Standards 
of Review in the particulars discussed below: 
Issue 1: Contrary to the issue stated by Wood at page 1 in her brief, the 
overriding issue is whether there is "substantial evidence" in the record to support the 
Labor Commission's denial of her claim for additional medical and permanent total 
disability benefits.1 
Standard of Review: 
The Commission's factual findings should be affirmed by the Court of Appeals 
whenever they are "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g). Findings that are supported 
*Woodfs Issue is: "Whether the Labor Commission applied the correct standard for 
legal causation as established by Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3- 106(d)?" She stated the 
incorrect standard: "An agency's application of the law to the facts of the case is 
reviewed for correctness unless the agency is given a measure of discretion. (Citations 
omitted.)" See Wood's brief at page 2. The correct standard is stated in WCF's Issue 1 
above. 
2 
by "substantial evidence" will not be overturned even if another conclusion from the 
evidence is permissible." Hurley v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm % 767 P.2d 524, 
526-27 (Utah 1988). The burden is on the party seeking to overturn the Commission's 
factual findings to "...marshall [sic] all of the evidence supporting the findings and show 
that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, 
the findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of 
Review of Indus. Comm % 116 P.2d 63, 68 (UT App 1989). See also Whitear vs. Labor 
Commission; Brown & Root, Inc., Highlands Insurance, and Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund, 973 P.2d 982 (UT App 1998). 
Issue 2: Whether the Labor Commission Appeals Board applied the correct 
standard for legal causation as established by Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-106(2). 
Standard of Review: Considering all of the evidence and arguments presented by 
Wood, the Appeals Board made a factual determination as required by Utah Code Ann. 
§34A-3-106 that the stress to which Wood was subject was not "extraordinary when 
objectively compared to the demands of modem employment and nonemployment life." 
(R. 141)2. Wood erroneously contends that the Appeals Board used an incorrect legal 
causation standard by comparing the stress of Wood's employment with the stress 
2
 The record of the hearing is identified in the record as page 149. The original transcript 
number is then used to identify the pages within the transcript. For ease of reference the 
hearing transcript will simply be identified as "R." in this brief. 
3 
sustained generally by those in her own profession of radio advertising sales. While the 
Appeals Board does refer to Wood's own testimony, 'that all radio sales positions involve 
the same types of demands and pressures that she faced," the Appeals Board's single 
reference to Woqd's comments about her own profession in no way evidences that the 
Board failed to use a contemporary national employment and nonemployment life 
standard in arriving at its conclusions of law and order. (R. 141). To the contrary, in the 
Board's "Discussion and Conclusions of Law," the Board states that Wood "must also 
prove that the stress was extraordinary when objectively compared with the normal stress 
of modem employment and non-employment life," and concludes as follows: "While 
Wood's work involved substantial demands, the Appeals Board cannot conclude from the 
evidence presented that these demands were extraordinary when compared to the 
demands of modern employment and nonemployment life." (R. 141). Thus, the Board 
used a general, national "modem employment and nonemployment life" standard, and did 
not merely compare "her employment to her own profession" as Wood contends. (R. 
141). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-702. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid. 
(Appendix 7) 
Utah Code Ann. §34A-3-106. Physical, mental, or emotional diseases related to 
mental stress arising out of and in the course of 
employment. (Appendix 8). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statement of the Nature of the Case 
This is a workers compensation claim by petitioner Nancy M. Wood for permanent 
total disability compensation3 and additional medical benefits4 for employment related 
i 
mental stress. She was employed at the time by defendant Eastern Utah Broadcasting 
("EUB"). EUB's workers' compensation insurance company was Workers Compensation 
Fund ("WCF").5 Hereinafter EUB and WCF will be referred to jointly as "WCF". 
Statement of the Course of the Proceedings 
This is a Petition for Review seeking review of the final order of the Appeals 
Board of the Utah Labor Commission. The issue presented is one of first impression in 
this Court. 
Petitioner, Nancy M. Wood, filed an Application for Hearing with the Utah Labor 
Commission on February 26, 2001 seeking disability compensation for employment 
related mental stress. (R. 1). 
Administrative Law Judge Debbie Hann held a hearing on Wood's claim for 
disability on March 6, 2002. (R. 149). ALJ Hann issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law & Interim Order on August 20, 2002, finding that Wood suffered a compensable 
3Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-413 
4Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-401 
5See Application for Hearing dated February 12, 2001. (R. 1) 
5 
occupational disease in the course and scope of her employment at Eastern Utah 
Broadcasting. (R. 50-51). The ALJ also dismissed the Employer's Reinsurance Fund 
from the case finding that Wood's claim did not arise until after July 1, 1994, the last date 
on which the Employer's Reinsurance Fund could have had liability on this claim.6 (R. 
76). Finally, the ALJ referred the claim to a medical panel to determine the portion of 
Wood's current medical condition attributable to the industrial disease claim. (R. 53-54). 
The Medical Panel issued a report dated November 12, 2002, finding that 50% of 
Wood's current medical condition was attributable to the industrial disease claim and 50% 
was attributable to non-work related causative factors (R. 56-61). ALJ Hann issued a 
decision that incorporated the findings from her Interim Order and the medical panel findings 
on July 30, 2003. (R. 65-78). 
Respondents filed a Motion for Review with the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor 
Commission on August 29, 2003. (R. 83-130). On October 18, 2004, the Appeals Board 
issued its decision reversing the ALJ's decision and granting the respondents Motion for 
Review. (R. 138-143). The Appeals Board found that Wood had not shown that the 
mental stress she had experienced was extraordinary when objectively compared with the 
normal stress of the modem work environment. (R. 141). The Appeals Board decision 
was the final decision of the Labor Commission in this case. 
6
 Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-702 provides that the Employers' Reinsurance Fund has no 
liability for industrial accidents occurring after July 1, 1994. 
6 
Wood filed a Petition for Review with this Court on November 15, 2004, seeking 
review of the Labor Commission's final decision. (R. 145 & 147). 
Statement of the Facts 
Fact 1. Wood was employed by Eastern Utah Broadcasting ("EUB") beginning 
in 1980. (R. 23). She stayed with the company until March 16, 2000 (except for a hiatus 
during 1986-87 that lasted a little less than a year), when she was forced to leave because of a 
nervous breakdown. (M. 22, 33-34).7 
Fact 2. Wood's initial position at EUB was as a salesperson. (R. 24). Her duties 
included selling radio spots, gathering information to write the spots, and collections and 
billing. (R. 24). Wood was given 50 accounts when she began working for EUB (R. 25). She 
was responsible for every aspect of these accounts and was the key person responsible for all 
contact with the client as well as all administrative duties. (R. 24). 
Fact 3. In 1981 Wood was sent to her first sales training seminar required by 
EUB. (R.s 24-25). The training was intense. (R. 25). She attended this training nearly once 
each year during the time she worked at EUB. (R. 25). 
Fact 4. Wood's responsibilities at EUB increased over time. Once she 
learned the ropes she was given additional accounts to handle. (R. 28). 
The medical records exhibit is identified in the record as page 148. The original 
numbering of the medical records exhibit used at the administrative level is then used to 
identify pages within the medical record. For ease of reference the medical records 
exhibit is identified as "M." in this brief. 
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Fact 5. EUB downsized in the early '80s when a landslide closed the main 
road between the Wasatch Front and Price and adversely impacted EUB's business (R. 
87-88). Wood was laid off for six months during this period (R. 88). During the late 
1980's and early 1990's, the number of sales persons working for EUB ranged between 
one and three (R. 37-38). 
Fact 6. In 1986 Wood took a medical leave of absence that lasted several 
months. Wood then worked for another radio station for five to six months through the 
beginning of 1987 (R. 33-34). Wood returned to work for EUB in 1987 (R. 34). 
Fact 7. In 1996 or 1997 Wood became the sales manager for EUB and 
assumed the responsibilities of hiring and training new salespeople as well as handling 
her own accounts. (R. 55-56). EUB made Wood the sales manager so she could teach new 
sales people the skills needed in small-market radio sales and because her back was 
giving her a lot of problems and she could not get in and out of a car as easily as she once 
did, which made visiting customers on a regular basis difficult (R. 55). 
Fact 8. While Wood was a hard worker, she did not necessarily put in more 
hours than other employees at EUB (R. 58). Even though EUB's company policy was that 
Wood be available from 8:30 A.M. until 5:30 P.M. (R. 61), Wood typically started her day at 
EUB at 7:30 A.M. and ended it at 5:30 P.M. (R.s 55-56, 59-60). However, Wood did not 
leave work on many nights until after 6:00 or 7:00 p.m., and occasionally as late as 10:00 
p.m. (R. 59). Even though Wood typically did not work weekends, she often took calls from 
8 
customers on the weekend (R.s 47-48). 
Fact 9. Tom Anderson, Wood9s boss at EUB, was an intense person (R. 84) and 
occasionally yelled at Wood (R. 97-98). But Anderson also complimented Wood on 
numerous occasions and told her she was wonderful and that he wished all his employees 
were like her (R. 95). 
Fact 10. Wood had a hysterectomy in 1986 and has been receiving estrogen 
therapy ever since, beginning with pills and progressing to injections in recent years (R. 79-
80). She has a history of menopausal syndrome (M. 60). Beginning in 1995, Wood suffered 
several serious ailments. Wood sustained a back injury in 1995 and has "multiple levels of 
degenerative disease" (R. 73, M. 13, 67). She contracted spinal meningitis/encephalitis in 
1999 (R. 74, M. 13). From 1995 on Wood began having major headaches and EUB allowed 
Wood to be off work for four or five days at a time to deal with the headaches (R. 92). She 
also began having anxiety attacks and started taking medications to help her with them and 
spent considerable time in relaxation activities. (R. 63-64). She did not seek therapy or 
psychiatric care. (R. 64-65). 
Fact 11. On March 16, 2000, Wood had a nervous breakdown. (R. 44). She 
began crying and was unable to stop. (R. 44). Because Wood was non-functional, her 
husband called EUB to let them know she would not be coming to work. (R. 77-78). All of 
the parties agreed at the hearing that Wood continued to be unable to work from the date of 
her nervous breakdown through the time of the hearing (R. 13 & 17). 
9 
Fact 12. Wood saw several physicians to treat her anxiety and other physical 
ailments. She began treatment in April 2000 with Dr. Max Morgan, a family physician in 
Price, Utah, who prescribed her medications and took her off work for a few weeks. (M. 23-
25). Dr. Morgan's specific diagnosis of Wood indicates osteoarthritis, disc syndrome LS 
spine, thoracic spine, S/P encephalitis syndrome, and generalized anxiety, and indicated that 
"[pjatient is not able to work at her occupation or any occupation presently, due to back pain 
and anxiety resulting in fear of crowds. Also chronic headache pain." (Medical page 13). On 
October 14, 2000, Dr. Morgan took Wood off work for an undetermined period of time 
because of her "[m]ajor anxiety depression, [sjtatus post fracture, left foot, [s]tatus post viral 
encephalitis with residual emotional liability, [m]enopausal syndrome. (Medical page 17). 
Fact 13. Wood began seeing Dr. A.L. Carlisle, a clinical psychologist in Price, 
Utah in September 2000, who noted that Wood "talked about working for the radio station 
for 20 years and about getting viral encephalitis and Epstein Barr" (Medical page 46). Dr. 
Carlisle concluded in a November 2,2001 note that "I don't anticipate she will ever be able 
to work full time again unless it is with a relatively stress-free job. Even then, she may only 
be able to do it part-time.95 (M. 48). 
Fact 14. Wood also saw Karl Kraync, a rehabilitation counselor with the Utah 
State Office of Rehabilitation, for vocational rehabilitation (I. 34-35)8. Mr. Kraync 
8 The original documents, exhibits and other instruments exhibit is identified in the record 
as pages 1-147. For ease of reference this exhibit is identified as "I." in this brief. 
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concluded that Wood was "not employable at the present time or in the foreseeable future." 
(I. 35). 
Fact 15. Wood met with George Mooney, Ph. D. of the University Hospital & 
Clinics for an independent psychological evaluation of her work-related mental stress claim. 
Dr. Mooney noted: 
"In addition to the stresses of work, Ms. Wood also experienced the death of her 
mother at age 29. A few years ago, she also worried about one of her sons who was going 
through a divorce. Her husband's work-related injuries and subsequent disability was also 
stressful. Ms. Wood also had multiple medical problems, including a few years ago, when 
she apparently developed viral meningitis. Finally, in 1995, Ms. Wood sustained a back 
injury, which resulted in a long-term pain problem which was stressful for her... On May 2, 
1997, Dr. Colledge indicated, 'She can no longer live with this pain.9 As recently as March 
20, 2000, which coincidentally was a few days after her last day worked, Dr. Colledge 
indicated the ongoing presence of chronic back pain.... Finally, adding to her stress were 
possible changes after a hysterectomy in the late 1980's, which appeared to have lowered 
her threshold for experiencing anxiety." (M. 3). 
In response to whether Wood met the criteria necessary for a compensible mental 
stress claim as required in the Utah Occupational Diseases Act, Dr. Mooney concluded: 
"Probably not. Although the Utah Occupational Disease Act has a lower standard 
than the Workers Compensation Act, the Utah Occupational Disease Act still requires that 
any alleged mental stress be of an extraordinary nature when judged according to an 
objective standard in comparison with contemporary national employment and 
nonemployment life. Ms. Wood's work circumstances probably do not meet this definition." 
(M. 9). 
Further, in response to the question, if the criteria in the Utah Occupational Disease 
Act have been met, what portion of her stress is related to her work with Eastern Utah 
11 
Broadcasting and what portion is related to her nonemployment life, Dr. Mooney concludes: 
"The criteria for the Utah Occupational Disease Act probably have not been met. Ms. 
Wood's anxiety appears to be multifactorial in nature and related to preexisting anxiety 
disorder, personality characteristics such as somatization, chronic back pain, stress 
intolerance due to meningitis, and routine stresses from work. Of these factors, the routine 
stresses from work are probably only a percentage of the total cause of her generalized 
anxiety disorder." (M. 9) 
Fact 16. The Medical Panel authorized by the ALJ agreed with Dr. Mooney that 
only a portion of Wood's current disability was due to work related stress. (R. 61). The 
medical panel cited evidence of severe back pain and a possible predisposition to stress and 
anxiety as other sources for her current mental difficulties. (R. 61). The medical panel 
apportioned 50% of the current disability to her work at EUB and 50% to non-work related 
causal factors (R. 61). 
Fact 17. The ALJ determined that Wood was disabled and had met both the legal 
and factual causation standards of the Utah Occupational Disease Act. (R. page 76). 
Fact 18. The Appeals Board determined that Wood did not meet the legal 
causation standard of Utah Occupational Disease Act. The Appeals Board first determined 
that the term "stress" referred to a causative stimulus as it is used in the statute. (R. 140). The 
Appeals Board held that Wood had to show that the stress she suffered was extraordinary 
when objectively compared with the normal stress of modem employment and non-
employment life. (R. 141). The Appeals Board then looked at several factors concerning the 
12 
stress at Wood's work including the heavy workload, the long hours, and her intense 
supervisor. (R. 141). The Appeals Board cited Wood's testimony that all other sales people at 
her station were under the same stress as she was. (R. 141). The Appeals Board also noted 
that the statute requires that the mental stress must arise, "predominantly and directly from 
employment," a requirement the ALJ completely ignored. (R. 140). Based on these facts, the 
Appeals Board concluded that "Mrs. Wood must prove that the mental stress which allegedly 
caused her illness arose predominantly and directly from her employment at Eastern. She 
must also prove that the stress was extraordinary when objectively compared with the normal 
stress of modem employment and non-employment life... The Appeals Board concludes that 
Mrs. Wood has failed to meet the requirement of legal causation incorporated in §34A-3-106 
of the Act. For that reason, she is not entitled to benefits under the Act." (R. page 141). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Wood raised essentially one issue at the administrative level and for this 
appeal: Did the Labor Commission Appeals Board apply the correct standard for legal 
causation as established by Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-106(2) to the facts of this case. In 
particular, Wood contends that the Appeals Board failed to objectively compare the level 
of stress Wood's sustained in her work environment at EUB to contemporary national 
employment and nonemployment life. Wood's claim requires as a foundation evidentiary 
determinations. On each issue, the Appeals Board as finder of fact found that her 
evidence was not persuasive. The Appeals Board found Dr. Mooney's opinion along 
13 
with those of the medical panel more persuasive than those expressed by Wood's treating 
physicians and Mr. Kraync. 
The Appeals Board found foundation for the opinions expressed by the medical 
panel not only within the four squares of their report, but also in the medical evidence 
submitted by the parties for their review. 
The Appeals Board analyzed its role as compared to that of the medical panel. The 
Appeals Board has the discretion to accept all, part or none of the medical panel report as 
persuasive. The Appeals Board chose to accept the panel members' opinions and those of 
Dr. Mooney and not those supportive of Wood's claims. 
The Appeals Board acted totally within the bounds of the discretion granted it by 
the Legislature. 
The Appeals Board determined that Wood did not prove that the stress to which 
she was subject at EUB was extraordinary when objectively compared with the normal 
stress of modem employment and non-employment life and therefore concluded that 
Wood failed to meet the requirement of legal causation incorporated in §34A-3-106 of the 
Act. 
Wood failed to marshal the evidence against her. She failed to then show that the 
evidence against her position does not rise to the level of "substantial evidence". There is 
"substantial evidence" supporting the Appeal's Board's findings. 
Wood's appeal should be denied. The Labor Commissions' Findings of Fact, 
14 
Conclusions of Law and Order should be sustained in all its particulars. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: WOOD FAILED IN HER BURDEN OF PERSUASION. 
WOOD'S CLAIMS OF ERROR AMOUNT TO NOTHING MORE THAN 
ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. SHE 
FAILED TO FULLY MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE AGAINST HER AND 
THEN SHOW THAT THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS ARE NOT 
SUPPORTED BY "SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE". 
As presented in Statement of Issue 1 earlier, the Commission's factual findings 
should be affirmed by the Court of Appeals whenever they are "supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court." Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-16(4)(g). Findings that are supported by "substantial evidence" will not be 
overturned even if another conclusion from the evidence is permissible." Hurley v. Board 
of Review of Indus. Comm % 767 P.2d 524, 526-27 (Utah 1988). The burden is on the 
party seeking to overturn the Commission's factual findings to "...marshall [sic] all of 
the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in 
light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence." Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm 'n, 116 
P.2d 63, 68 (UT App 1989). While involving the review of a civil trial court's findings 
instead of an administrative agency's decision, the opinion of the Utah Supreme Court in 
Parduhn v. Natalie Buchi Bennett, etal., 2005 UT 22, ^25, is illuminating: 
"To successfully challenge an ultimate finding of fact, 'an appellant must first 
marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the 
evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a 
15 
light most favorable to the court below.1 Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f76, 100 P. 
3d 1177 (internal quotations omitted). An appellant 'must present, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists.' Id. at f^77 
(internal quotations omitted). Moreover, an appellant may not simply review the 
evidence presented at trial, nor may she 're-argue the factual case [she] presented 
in the trial court.' Id If an appellant argues that no evidence supports a factual 
finding, the burden to marshal does not then shift to the appellee; rather, the 
appellee may prove that the appellant did not meet her marshaling burden by 
presenting a 'scintilla1 of evidence supporting the district court's finding. Wilson 
Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, f22, 54 P.3d 1177." 
The Legislature has given us direction regarding the discretion of the Commission 
and what constitutes "substantial evidence": 
(1) ...The commission may make its investigation in such 
manner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain 
substantial rights of the parties and to carry out justly the 
spirit of the chapter. 
(2) ...The commission may receive as evidence and use as 
proof of any fact in dispute all evidence deemed material and 
relevant including, but not limited to the following: 
(b) reports of attending or examining physicians, or of 
pathologists; 
(e) hospital records in the case of an injured or diseased 
employee.9 
Therefore, the Commission properly admitted Dr. Mooney's independent 
9Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-802(l), (2)(b) &(e). Appendix 10. 
16 
psychological evaluation of her work-related mental stress claim. That evaluation alone 
is sufficient evidence to support the findings of the commission. The Commission also 
relied on the Medical Panel Report. The Legislature was specific regarding the Labor 
Commission's discretion in admitting and weighing the report of a medical panel as 
evidence: 
(2) (a) The medical panel...shall make such study, take such 
X-rays, and perform such tests...as it may determine to be 
necessary or desirable 
(b) The medical panel...shall make: 
(i) a report in writing...; and 
(ii) additional findings as the administrative law judge may 
require 
(e) The administrative law judge may base the 
administrative law judge's finding and decision on the 
report of the panel...but is not bound by the report if other 
substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a 
contrary finding. 
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ 
(g) The written report of the panel..may be received as an 
exhibit at the hearing, but may not be considered as 
evidence in the case except as far as it is sustained by the 
testimony admitted.10 
'Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-601. Appendix 9 
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The Commission has two roles in administrative hearings before it. The first role 
is to be the gatekeeper for the admission of evidence. In this instance, performing that 
role, the Commission admitted Dr. Mooney's report. The panel report is sustained by 
other admitted evidence including the medical records and Dr. Mooney's well-reasoned 
opinion. Therefore, exercising its statutory discretion, the Commission also properly 
admitted the panel report. 
Once evidence is properly admitted, any further argument applies to the weight of 
the evidence. That is the Commission's second role, fact finder. In that capacity, it is 
charged with determining whether the parties have met their respective burdens of proof. 
In this case, it was Wood's burden of persuasion to show by the preponderance of the 
evidence that the work related cause is the medical cause of the compensable 
occupational disease for which she sought benefits.11 
Also, after the reports were properly admitted, both the panel report and Dr. 
Mooney's report individually and together become "substantial evidence" to be weighed 
against the evidence presented by Wood in support of her claims. The Commission 
weighed the substantial evidence on both sides. It found the evidence against Wood more 
convincing. That there is "substantial evidence" supporting the denial of occupational 
disease benefits to Wood cannot reasonably be argued. 
11Allen v. Industrial Commission, 929 P.2d 15 (UT 1986). 
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POINT II: THE LABOR COMMISSION APPEALS BOARD APPLIED 
THE CORRECT LEGAL CAUSATION STANDARD TO THE FACTS OF 
THIS CASE. 
Considering all of the evidence and arguments presented by Wood, the Appeals 
Board made a factual determination as required by Utah Code Ann. §34A-3-106 that the 
stress to which Wood was subject was not "extraordinary when objectively compared to 
the demands of modem employment and nonemployment life." (R. page 141). Wood 
erroneously contends that the Appeals Board used an incorrect legal causation standard by 
comparing the stress of Wood's employment with the stress sustained generally by those 
in her own profession of radio advertising sales. While the Appeals Board does refer in 
one instance to Wood's testimony, "that all radio sales positions involve the same types of 
demands and pressures that she faced," the Appeals Board's single reference to Wood's 
comments about her own profession does not evidence that the Board failed to use a 
contemporary national employment and nonemployment life standard in arriving at its 
conclusions of law and order. (R. page 141). To the contrary, in the Board's "Discussion 
and Conclusions of Law," the Board states that Wood "must also prove that the stress was 
extraordinary when objectively compared with the normal stress of modem employment 
and non-employment life," and concludes as follows: "While Wood's work involved 
substantial demands, the Appeals Board cannot conclude from the evidence presented that 
these demands were extraordinary when compared to the demands of modem 
employment and nonemployment life." (R. page 141). Thus, the Board used a general, 
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national "modern employment and nonemployment life" standard, and did not merely 
compare "her employment to her own profession" as Wood contends. (R. page 141). 
Moreover, even if the Appeals Board had chosen to compare the stress of Wood's 
employment with the stress sustained generally and nationally by those in her own 
profession of radio advertising sales, the Appeals Board would have had the support of 
substantial legal precedent in doing so. While the issue of the proper legal causation 
standard to use in Utah Code Ann. §34A-3-106 mental stress cases has not been 
addressed in published opinion by Utah's appellate courts, there is persuasive case law in 
other states that presents relevant rationales for using a national average of the same or 
similar work experience as the standard for causation. In Dunlavey v. Economy Fire & 
Casualty 526 N. W. 2d 845 (Iowa 1995), the Iowa Supreme Court analyzed the wide 
array of state opinions on whether to apply a generic national employee model or to apply 
a more specific national model of similar employees. The Dunlavy Court chose to follow 
the model of similarly situated employees, reasoning that "[i]t is impossible to determine, 
except in the broadest fashion, the stress to which the working world at large is exposed . 
. . the standard would be too amorphous to be practical." Id. at 858 (citations omitted). 
The Missouri Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in Williams v. DePaul 
Health Center, 996 S.W. 2d 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). "This standard allows 
consideration of the employment conditions of others in the industry when an employer is 
too small to have other similarly situated employees or when the stress levels of a 
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particular employee are high." Id. at 628. 
The United States Department of Labor's Occupational Outlook Handbook 2002-
03 describes working conditions for the advertising industry as follows: 
Most advertising employees work in comfortable offices; however, long hours, including 
evening and weekends, are common. There are fewer opportunities for part-time work 
than in many other industries . . . Advertising work is fast-paced and exciting, but it can 
also be stressful Being creative on a tight schedule can be emotionally draining. In 
addition, frequent meetings with clients and media representatives may involve 
substantial travel. Among all full time advertising workers, one-sixth work 50 or more 
hours per week. 
Accordingly, the Appeal's Board did not use an incorrect legal causation standard 
in determining that the stress to which Wood was subject was not extraordinary. 
CONCLUSION 
Wood's appeal should be denied. The Appeal's Board's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order should be sustained in all their particulars. 
DATED this / / day of May, 2005. 
Ajfctbrneys for Workers Compensation Fund 
and Eastern Utah Broadcasting 
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Outpatient Psychological Evaluation by George Mooney, Ph.D. 
Dated January 7, 2002 (Medical Record, Pages 2-10) 
STAFF NOTE 
NAM*: WOOD, NANCY 
MRN: 8606352 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL & CLINICS &OB: 11/21/49 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84132 DATE: 01/07/02 
OUTPATIENT PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION 
IDENTIFYING INFORMATION: Nancy Wood is a 52-year-old, right-handed, married, 
English-speaking white female from Price, Utah. Ms. Wood was referred for outpatient 
psychological evaluation by Mr. Stuart Clark of Workers' Compensation Fund, for an independent 
psychological evaluation of her work-related mental stress claim. 
RELEVANT BACKGROUND INFORMATION: The following information was obtained from 
Ms. Wood, as well as records provided by the referral source. 
Childhood: Ms. Wood grew up in Texas until age 13. She lived briefly in California and Colorado, 
and then her family moved to Moab, Utah, where she lived for a few years, until becoming married. 
Ms. Wood indicated that in childhood she was in good physical health. She was able to make and 
keep friends, and enjoyed school. She did not have any childhood traumatic experiences, and 
described her childhood as good. 
Education: Ms. Wood attended school until the eleventh grade, when she quit school to get 
married. During the early school grades, she had amblyopia, which caused a reading delay for a 
while. She eventually overcame her reading problem. She described enjoying school. 
Family History: Ms. Wood's father worked in the oil fields, and after that worked as a miner. Her 
mother was a homemaker. 
Marital History: Ms. Wood has been married once. She and her husband have been married for 
35 years. Her husband is a medically retired coal miner. He is disabled, and has not worked for 
approximately three years. He was injured in an accidental mine explosion, which resulted in back 
and shoulder injuries. 
Ms. Wood has two adult sons, age 34 and 31, whom she reported are doing well. 
Leisure Activities: Leisure activities previously consisted of making quilts and crocheting. She 
indicated that, since the development of her anxiety problem, she no longer is able to partidpate in 
leisure projects on a sustained basis. 
Occupation: Ms. Wood was a long-term employee of Eastern Utah Broadcasting Company. She 
has not worked since March 16,2000. Prior to that, she worked for approximately 20 years in 
radio, advertising sales.. . 
According to Ms. Wood, the essential functions of her job involved selling advertisements, 
collecting payments, and handling most other asoects of the accounts. She was expected to 
contact each account by telephone on a wsekly basic. 
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Her most recent position was that of sales manager. Prior to that, she worked exclusively as a 
sales person. During the time she was a sales manager, she also handled her own accounts. 
Ms. Wood worked for the same company for approximately 20 years, doing advertisement sales 
for the entire time. In a letter from her employer, Mr. Anderson, to Mr. Holm, of Workers1 
Compensation Fund, on April 30, 2001, Mr. Anderson indicated that Ms. Wood worked a 48-hour 
work week. 
According to Ms. Wood, she initially started out with a responsibility for 50 accounts, but over the 
years the number of accounts gradually became more numerous. The number of coworkers in 
radio sales apparently fluctuated over the years. As coworkers left, she was sometimes expected 
to absorb the work load of the other workers. 
In the 1990s, she, at one point, had her home phone number on her business cards for 
approximately an eight-year period. She also carried two cell phones. She considered herself to 
be on call 24 hours a day. 
According to Ms. Wood it was not so much the type of work she was doing, as it was the 
perception of the overall work load. Radio sales is somewhat inherently stressful, according to 
Ms. Wood, and also according to Mr. Anderson's April 30,2001 letter. However, her work never 
involved any unusual or extraordinary stresses. 
Ms. Wood felt that, particularly in the 1990s, there was a decrease in genuine time away from 
work. As information technology changed with the incorporation of fax, ceil phones, and the 
internet, the pace of information transmission increased, and she found this stressfuL There were 
no critical incidents that ever occurred in the course of her work, which were extraordinary, and of 
a sudden nature, such as an extremely traumatic experience. 
Prior to working for the radio station, Ms. Wood worked briefly in a butcher shop. 
History of Stresses: In addition to the stresses of work, Ms. Wood also experienced the death of 
her mother at age 29. A few years ago, she also worried about one of her sons who was going 
through a divorce. Her husband's work-related injuries and subsequent disability was also 
stressfuL Ms. Wood also had multiple medical problems, including a few years ago, when she 
apparently developed viral meningitis. Finally, in 1995, Ms. Wood sustained a back injury, which 
-resulted in a long-term pain problem which was stressful for her. The pain from this back injury 
apparently went on for quite some time. In a progress note by Dr. Momberger on October 10, 
1996, he indicated that "she puts in a da/s work, and by evening she is essentially lying in bed. . . 
She denies any intervening trouble. Her back is the primary problem." The pain apparently 
continued for even much longer than that. On May 2,1997, Dr. Colledge indicated, "She can no 
longer live with this pain." As recently as March 20, 2000, which coincidental^ was a few days 
after her last day worked, Dr. Colledge indicated the ongoing presence of chronic back pain. 
Finally, adding to her stress, were possible ctianjes after a hysterectomy in the late 1980s, which 
appeared to have lowered her threshold for experiencing anxiety. 
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Past Health History: At age 12 or 13, Ms. Wood was in a motor vehicle accident, in which she 
experienced a whiplash injury, reportedly with a full recovery. In 1977, she apparently had a 
mechanical back strain with a nerve root irritation. 
At age 36, Ms. Wood had a hysterectomy. This apparently occurred in 1986. 
In 1995, Ms. Wood sustained a work-related back injury. She had picked up mail at the post office, 
stepped "off a curb, slipped, and injured her back. She reportedly was off work for one month due 
to this accident. Apparently this back injury continued to bother her on a chronic basis. She was 
followed clinically by Dr. Morgan, her family doctor, as well as by Dr. Momberger and Dr. CoIIedge 
for her back problems. 
On January 2,1997, Dr. CoIIedge indicated that she "Complains of continued back and right leg 
symptoms... having more struggles with her pain." The pain has continued up until the time she 
could no longer work, as indicated by Dr. Coiledge's progress note previously referred to on March 
20, 2000. 
Ms. Wood has also had headaches. She indicated experiencing headaches since 1995. She was 
quite clear that the headaches began before the above-mentioned back injury, and that, in the 
patient's opinion, they worsened with stress. 
More recent headaches have also been attributed to an episode of viral meningitis. Ms. Wood was 
hospitalized at Castle View Hospital on May 23, 1999, until she was discharged on May 27,1999. 
Initially, severe headaches led to a suspicion of meningitis. She had a lumbar puncture performed 
on May 26, 1999, resulting in norma! cerebrospinal fluid studies. While hospitalized, her condition 
improved, and she was discharged from the hospital. 
Approximately one week later, she had a head CT scan completed on June 2,1999, which was 
interpreted as normal. In a subsequent progress note of Dr. Morgan, on August 5, 1999, he 
indicated that Ms. Wood had headaches, extreme fatigue, that her memory had decreased, and 
that she had developed an inability to function. Dr. Morgan expressed in his progress notes the 
conclusion that these problems were probably the result of the viral encephalitis. A subsequent 
letter written by Dr. Morgan on October 24, 2000, indicated that Ms. Wood continued to have viral 
encephalitis, with residual emotionai lability. 
Mental Health History: According to Ms. Wood, she has had mental health problems for the past 
two years only, and otherwise has not had any mental health conditions or mental health 
treatment. The records actually reflect that she was treated for anxiety on a prolonged basis 
after her hysterectomy. Progress notes from her family doctor indicated that she was regularly 
taking Xanax, beginning at least in late 1991. A progress note from Dr. Morgan on November 25, 
1991, refers to a refill of Xanax for 100 tablets. Regular Xanax refills appear to have been 
occurring up until February 3,1999. According to Ms. Wood, she continues to take Xanax up until 
the present. The earlier history of anxiety iB^uirMg treatment with antianxiety medications was 
attributed to irritability and anxiety resulting after the 1986 hysterectomy. There does not otherwise 
seem to be a past history of mental health conditions or mental health treatment 
Habits: There is no history of aicohoi or drug use, or or substance abuse problems. 
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Financial Circumstances: Ms. Wood has not worked since March 2000. Prior to that, her 
husband was already receiving disability income for his own work-related injuries. Since some 
point in the year 2000, Ms. Wood has been receiving Social Security disability for a nervous 
disorder. She is also a client of the Division of Rehabilitation Services, which is helping her with 
vocational rehabilitation planning and possible work re-entry. 
HISTORY OF THE CURRENT PROBLEM: The problems with anxiety and difficulty tolerating 
stresses began gradually, and apparently progressed insidiously. As 1 understand the history of 
the problem, it is not possible to precisely indicate a date of onset. 
The problems with anxiety began as a result of a variety of factors. These probably include 
numerous things, including general stress at work, reduced stress tolerance and anxiety following 
a hysterectomy, stresses at home concerning family members, the previous viral encephalitis, 
which resulted in emotional lability, the stresses of having a chronic pain problem resulting from 
her 1995 back injury, and a personality tendency to over-value the idea that she should be able to 
handle all things that came in her direction. In combination with a somewhat paternalistic 
relationship with her employer, she was unable to curtail or manage the stresses that came her 
way. She also had a tendency for a while to deny emotional distress when it first occurred. 
There was no critical incident that occurred in the course of her work. There was no mental stress 
of an extraordinary or sudden nature, such as would be required for the diagnosis of posttraumatic 
stress disorder. Indeed, there was nothing extraordinary about any of the stresses that Ms. Wood 
experienced at work. This is something that she herself appeared to agree to in her deposition, 
which was taken on May 30, 2001. 
Ms Wood has had various stresses in her life, combined with a reduced ability to handle them. 
Ms. Wood has had headaches, developed medical problems, had persistent anxiety, with a feeling 
of fear, her heart would frequently pound, she had shortness of breath, and appeared to have 
panic attacks. She developed agoraphobia, and became fearful of going out in public. She 
developed insomnia. For a period of time, the generalized anxiety problems that Ms. Wood 
developed were complicated by a comorbid condition of depression. Apparently the depression is 
under somewhat better control recently. 
Ms. Wood has been in treatment for anxiety and depression over the past year or so. She began 
treatment with Dr. Carlisle, who is a psychologist. Treatment began in September 2000. In a 
- progress noted dated November 27,2000, Dr. Carlisle indicated that work was the only significant 
stressor in Ms. Wood's life. However, in a later progress note on November 2,2001, Dr. Carlisle 
stated that, "I feel that her breakdown came from accumulated stress over a period of several 
years.* Ms. Wood continues to be in treatment with Dr. Carlisle. The treatment frequency has 
appeared to be one session every two to four weeks. 
In a letter written by Dr. Morgan on November 14,2001, Ms. Wood was given the diagnosis of 
generalized anxiety disorder and adjustmont disorder. It was Dr. Morgan's opinion that these 
conditions were "directly related to her stress from her working environment." 
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Current medications include Prozac SR, Xanax, amitriptyline, Sonata, Lortab, Vioxx, and a 
medication for muscle relaxation. She is also taking another medication to control her blood 
pressure, which she could not recall the name of. 
Ms. Wood is able to perform all basic activities of daily living independently. She is not 
independent with instrumental activities of daily living, particularly those that require her to interact 
with the community. She has made too many mistakes with money management due to 
inattentiveness, such that her husband has taken over this responsibility. She has curtailed her 
automobile driving because she does not trust herself. She has not returned to work since March 
2000. She has difficulty following through on leisure projects. 
Ms. Wood feels that the overall course of her problems has been one of improvement. In 
particular, she identified her level of depression as being significantly better. She also felt that her 
anxiety has improved, and this is gradually translating into improvements in functioning. 
Ms. Woods' therapy with Dr. Carlisle is now taking place on a once per month basis. The 
objectives of therapy are to re-prioritize things in life, and learn how to put her family ahead of her 
work, to control the symptoms of anxiety, and to learn how to train herself to calm down, using 
breathing techniques. Ms. Wood indicates that she is compliant with medication taking. 
BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATIONS: The patient indicated that there had been a mixup with how her 
appointment was made, and the first indication she had of her appointment today was when she 
received in the mail this morning an appointment reminder card. She nevertheless arrived in a 
fairly punctual manner to her appointment today given the circumstances. She indicated that the 
lateness of finding out about her appointment was stressful. 
The patient's general behavior was quite notable for overtly observable signs of anxiety. She was 
extremely tearful, tremulous, and shaking. Initially she was even rocking back and forth, which is a 
level of behavioral regression not frequently encountered, except during an extreme anxiety attack. 
The patient was eventually able to be calmed down, and actually was able to participate in and 
complete a valid psychological evaluation. 
PSYCHOMETRIC TESTS ADMINISTERED: 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-II 
Beck Depression Inventory 
-Symptom Checklist 
PSYCHOMETRIC TEST RESULTS: 
Ms. Wood completed the MMPI-IL She answered all of the questionnaire items. Her responses 
were both reliable and valid, and she neither over-reported nor under-reported psychopathology. 
Accordingly, the clinical portion of the MMPI can probably undergo valid interpretation. 
A number of clinical scales were elevated. There were significant elevations on scales 3 ,1 , and 2, 
conforming to the so-called "conversion V profile. Scale 7 was also significantly elevated. 
Overall, these clinical elevations suggest that Ms. Wood may be a person who converts 
psychological problems into physical complaints, such as headaches. These defenses may be 
somewhat tenuous from a psychological point of view, because they are obviously not protecting 
her from anxiety. 
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The patient completed the Beck Depression Inventory. Her score of 40 would ordinarily be found 
in severely depressed individuals. She indicated the presence of suicidal thinking, but denied 
suicidal intent. 
SUMMARY AND IMPRESSIONS: Previously this individual had experienced a work-related back 
injury in 1995. The pain and other symptoms from this injury persisted beyond the time Ms. Wood 
finished working in March of 2000. The painful symptoms were described by Ms. Wood's 
physician as difficult to tolerate and as having a significant impact on her functioning. 
The patient took anti-anxiety medication on a consistent basis through much of the 1990s. This 
was in response to irritability and anxiety believed to be related to a previous condition associated 
with her hysterectomy. 
In recent years the patient has had headaches. She apparently had at least a couple of kinds of 
headaches. One type had been quite severe and required her to be off work on numerous 
occasions, as documented by her employer. Some of her headaches were believed by her 
physician to be the result of an episode of viral encephalitis for which she was hospitalized in May 
of 1999. The encephalitis was believed by her personal physician to have caused headaches, 
memory problems, and difficulty handling stress. 
The patient apparently has had personality characteristics of a preexisting nature, which resulted in 
denial of emotional distress on her part and the possible conversion of unacceptable psychological 
distress into physical symptoms such as headaches. She also appeared to have a strong need to 
please other people. In particular, she has had somewhat of a paternalistic relationship with her 
employer. The combination of these two factors, including her need to please others and a 
paternalistic relationship with her employer, may have made it difficult for her to criticize her work 
hours or work conditions. 
The patient described nothing about the work she did that was traumatic or of an extraordinary 
nature. She did indicate that gradually over a period of time the amount of work for which she was 
responsible increased. Her time away from work to rest up and renew herself was seen by her as 
decreasing, although this perception seems to be contradicted somewhat by her employer, who in 
his April 30, 2001 letter indicated that Ms. Wood worked Monday through Friday from 8:30 to 5:30, 
which would probably not be considered to be an excessive work schedule. 
Ms. Wood has never experienced at work anything of an extraordinary and sudden nature such as 
might result in acute stress disorder or post-traumatic stress disorder. She has never had any 
experiences at work that have been characterized by experiencing or witnessing an event that 
involved actual or threatened death or serious injury to herself or others. Therefore, her condition 
probably does not meet the definition for post-traumatic stress disorder. 
For some time Ms. Wood has had a significant level of anxiety. She appears to have most of the 
symptoms of generalized anxiety disorder, including excessive anxiety lasting for more than six 
months, inability to control her anxiety, restlessness, fatigue, difficulty concentrating, and sleep 
disturbance. The anxiety has consistently caused significant distress and impairment in 
functioning in important life areas. 
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For a period of time, Ms. Wood probably also had major depressive disorder. According to her, 
this is under much better control lately, although her responses to a questionnaire about 
depression suggest that significant levels of depression may still be present. 
Because of her generalized anxiety disorder, Ms. Wood has reduced ability to function with regard 
to social and occupational functioning. It is unlikely at the present time that she could participate in 
competitive employment because of her mental health conditions. 
Ms. Wood's generalized anxiety disorder and subsequent depression appear to be the result of a 
number of factors. These are, therefore, multifactorial conditions. The factors which appear to 
contribute to her anxiety disorder include preexisting chronic anxiety, somatization and a tendency 
to convert emotional problems into physical symptoms, chronic back pain, stress intolerance due to 
encephalitis, and routine stresses at work. 
DIAGNOSES: 
Axis I: Generalized anxiety disorder 
Major depressive disorder, single episode, in partial remission. 
Axis III: back pain, hysterectomy, encephalitis 
RECOMMENDATIONS: At the present time, this individual does not appear fit for competitive 
work or school activities on the basis of her mental health conditions. 
Ms. Wood continues to have active mental health disorders, primarily consisting of anxiety and 
depression. It is appropriate that she continue in treatment for these conditions. She probably 
needs both medication for anxiety and depression, as well as psychotherapy. Because her mental 
health condition is still so clinically active, I would suggest that the amount of psychological therapy 
she is receiving be intensified and that she meet with her therapist on a once-a-week basis rather 
than once a month as is presently taking place. Psychological therapy should continue to include 
training in relaxation and self-calming methods. She should also be trained in stress reduction. 
One source of the patient's anxiety consists of her irrational beliefs that she should be able to 
handle any level of stress and that she needs to sacrifice herself excessively for others. These 
topics could be treated within a psychotherapeutic context using cognitive behavioral therapy 
methods. Psychotherapy should be coordinated with medical therapy and her psychotherapist and 
medical doctor should be in direct communication with each other at whatever frequency is 
necessary. 
The patient may be approaching readiness to have increasingly challenging experiences such as 
community reentry. This should take place under carefully managed circumstances so that none 
of these experiences are overwhelming to her. As she regains confidence in carrying out everyday 
activities in the community, she could gradually advance her participation in more challenging 
activities. This type of desensitization probably needs to take place before work reentry could be 
considered. 
QUESTIONS FOR RESOLUTION: 
1. Has Ms. Wood met the criteria necessary for a compensible mental stress claim as required in 
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Answer: No. The Utah Workers Compensation Act requires proof of mental stress from a 
stimulus that is both extraordinary and sudden in nature, such as a traumatic event in which 
the person is exposed to risk of serious injury or death, and where they experience fear, 
terror, or helplessness. Ms. Wood's work circumstances never included an event consistent 
with this definition. 
2. Has Ms. Wood met the criteria necessary for a compensible mental stress claim as required in 
the Utah Occupational Disease Act? 
Answer Probably not Although the Utah Occupational Disease Act has a lower standard 
than the Workers Compensation Act, the Utah Occupational Disease Act still requires that any 
alleged mental stress be of an extraordinary nature when judged according to an objective 
standard in comparison with contemporary national employment and nonempioyment life. Ms. 
Wood's work circumstances probably do not meet this definition. The content of her work was 
of a routine nature for her occupation and for her industry. She never had to perform any 
work activities of an extraordinary nature. Ms. Wood indicated that her involvement in work 
was on an around-the-clock basis. However, her employer indicated that she worked a fairly 
routine workweek without excessive hours. Therefore, she probably does not meet the Utah 
Occupational Disease Act criteria for an occupational mental health claim. 
3. if the criteria in the Utah Occupational Disease Act have been met, what portion of her stress 
is related to her work with Eastern Utah Broadcasting and what portion is related to her 
nonempioyment life? 
Answer: The criteria for the Utah Occupational Disease Act probably have not been met. Ms. 
Wood's anxiety appears to be multifactorial in nature and related to preexisting anxiety 
disorder, personality characteristics such as somatization, chronic back pain, stress 
intolerance due to meningitis, and routine stresses from work. Of these factors, the routine 
stresses from work are probably only a percentage of the total cause of her generalized 
anxiety disorder. 
4. If Ms. Wood does have a compensible stress claim under either of the two acts, when was 
she or when will she be able to return to any form of employment? 
Answer: Currently Ms. Wood is not fit for competitive employment because of her mental 
health conditions. She has been a Social Security Disability recipient. These factors suggest 
that her future prospects for employment are quite guarded, although this should not be ruled 
out. 
5. What treatment will be necessary for her to return to gainful employment? 
Answer The treatment necessary to restore her to fitness for work is as described above in 
the section on recommendations. If she is to successfully return to work, it will probably need 
to be to a fairly low-stress job. 
6. Has the treatment that Ms. Wood has received to date been appropriate for her diagnosis? 
MR#: 0000000008606352 
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Answer Generally speaking, the treatment so far has been appropriate. The only possible 
exception to this is that the frequency of psychotherapy visits or the overall intensity of 
treatment has been less than might be optimal, given the fact that her generalized anxiety 
disorder continues to be clinically active. This is probably not the fault of her psychologist. 
Ms. Wood herself has advocated for less frequent sessions in order to avoid the discomfort of 
treatment. 
George Mooney, Ph.D. 
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Medical Panel Charging letter by Administrative Law Judge Debbie L. Harm 
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*** NOTE: Any expenses incurred by the petitioner in attending the medical panel 
appointment are the sole burden of the petitioner. Any exceptions to this are to be made by 
counsel through the insurance provider. 
September 19, 2002 
Dr. Alvin J. Wirthlin 
324 10th Avenue Suite 225 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Re: Nancy Wood 
Injury Date: occupational disease 
Employer Eastern Utah Broadcasting 
Case No.: 2001208 
Dear Dr. Wirthlin: 
Petitioner's attorney, Brad Myler, will advise you immediately if petitioner's address 
and telephone number is other than: 
4476 E 2750 S 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone 435-637-5058 
case. 
You are hereby appointed to conduct an impartial evaluation of the medical aspects of this 
Please select the specialists you deem appropriate to assist you in your evaluation. 
The petitioner suffers from an anxiety disorder and depression. The medical dispute is 
over what portion of her condition was the result of the mental stress caused by her working 
conditions at Eastern Utah Broadcasting and what, if any, was the result of other factors. 
Enclosed you will find the medical records and my Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Interim Order. Permission is granted for you to have any diagnostic testing performed you 
feel is appropriate. 
Please note that you are not bound by my discussion of the medical evidence. You are 
bound by the Findings of Fact with regard to the facts of this case. The facts are the historical 
and other legal data regarding how the injury occurred, dates and times, places, persons involved, 
and other related information commonly thought of as the situational drcumstances surrounding 
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the alleged injury. If you discover additional facts which are not contrary to the facts I found, and 
you use them in your examination and evaluation, it will be necessary to include them in your 
report and explain how the additional facts affected your analysis and conclusions. 
In answering the following questions, please consider the Findings of Fact enclosed with 
this letter. 
1. What portion of the petitioner's current mental condition was 
medically caused by her industrial exposure and what portion, if 
any, is the result of non-industrial cause(s)? 
Thank you in advance for your assistance in resolving the medical disputes in this matter. 
If I can be of any assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me at 801-530-6866. 
Sincerely, fdmu 
Debbie L Han 
Administrative Law Judge 
enc: Medical records, disclosures, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Interim Order 
cc: Brad Myler, Attorney w/o enc except disclosures 
Nancy Wood, w/o end except disclosures 





Medical Panel Report i-v t< •.»...%> man, M.D. (Neurologist) and 
Dr. Robert H. Burgoyne, Ml). (Psychiatrist)(O.D.E.I.R 56-62) 
Dated November 12, 2002 
Neurology 
Mvin J7. "Wirtklin, M.<D. 
%. Trofissimud Corporatum 
324 £ "tenth Avenue, Ste.Z25 
Salt Laf$ City UT 84103 
Tel. (801)408-2555 
Fax (801) 408-5225 
Honorable Debbie L. fiann 
Administrative Law Judge 
Labor Commission of Utah 
160 E. 300 So./P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114^661 S 
Date of Panel Novembtj 1J S\ » \i 
Re. Nancy Wood 
Emp. Eastern Utah Broadcasting 
Inj. Occupational Disease 
LC #2001208 
MEDICAL PANEL REPORT 
A medical panel consisting of Drs. Robert H. Burgoyne, M.D., and Alvin J, Wirthlin, M D , willi 
the latter as chairman, met to evaluate the rase of Nancv Wood with reference to an occupational 
disease. 
The file made available to the panel was reviewed by the panel members The history v"ip 
reviewed with the applicant, and she was examined by the panel members. X-rays were review il 
as well 
The records which were reviewed consist of the following: 
Records from George Mooney, Ph.D. 
Records from Max G. Morgan, M.D 
Records from A.L. Carlisle, Ph.D. 
Records from Alan L. Colledge, M.D. 
Records from Jeannee Olsen, P. A. 
Records from Blain Jensen, P A. 
Records from Dr. Paylen 
Records from Glenn L. Momberger, M.D. 
Records from Glenn Etzel, M.D. 
Records from Fred W. Feverstein, M.D. 
Physical therapy notes 
A variety of diagnostic studies 
Records from Castleview Hospital 
Records from St. Mary's Hospital 
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INJURY AND TREATMENT HISTORY 
This case involves an occupational disease claim alleging an inability to work since March 16, 
2000 due to stress, anxiety, and depression. It is alleged that this is the result of exposure to 
stressful conditions in her employment. The statement of the case, Findings of Fact provide 
extensive detail about the work conditions which will not be reproduced here. On page 10, the 
conclusion is reached 
"Thus, taking all of the aspects of the claimant's employment into consideration in 
comparison with the day-to-day stress an average employee experiences in work 
life, the claimant's employment contained an extraordinary amount of mental 
stimulus that would reasonably lead to a person experiencing mental stress. 
Therefore, the claimant has met her burden of proving her employment was the 
legal cause of her mental condition." 
It is further noted that there is no dispute that at least a portion of the petitioner's medical 
condition was caused by her employment but the dispute revolves around a difference of opinion 
of apportionment. 
The panel review with the petitioner was carried out under somewhat difficult circumstances. It 
was very difficult to put the petitioner at ease. Throughout the interview, lasting an hour and a 
half, she exhibited repetitive bouncing of one leg up and down and repetitive movements of one 
hand or the other. She was tearful continuously throughout the interview for the first hour, finally 
able to control her emotions for the last half an hour. 
The petitioner supplied a description of her work situation which parallels that in the Findings of 
Fact. Basically in her work over a period of 20 years of selling ads, writing copy, and collecting 
money, she felt full responsibility for things going wrong and by her account basically had no 
other life except for her work. This included evenings, weekends, and long hours at work. She 
described losing employees and having the remainder of the workload placed on her. She also 
describes quitting work at that radio station on one occasion when her salary was cut in half after 
taking a leave of absence. A few months later she returned to the same job with the original 
salary, but by her account she was not able to handle the increased stress. 
The petitioner was seen by her family practitioner, Dr. Max Morgan, since 1972. The records do 
not include any mention of mental illness or stress/anxiety disorder. On June 10, 1999 she was 
seen with multiple symptoms including headache and insomnia. Again, however, there is no 
mention of anxiety or stress. There was a question of a viral encephalitis on that date. On August 
5, 1999, she complained of decreased memory, extreme fatigue, and inability to function with 
experiencing fatigue. Starting with a note dated April 13, 2000 she complained of headaches and 
the note indicates she had been placed on Prozac by Dr. Monahan. This was for depression. He 
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also comments that at the time she was easily brought to tears. On the 24th of April 2000 Dr. 
Morgan gave her a medical leave of absence due to health reasons of two to four weeks. Also, on 
the 4th of May 2000 she had concerns regarding anxiety and stress for which she had counseling. 
On the 15th of May the note included reference to headaches, sleep disturbance, episodes of crying 
spells, panic disorder, and becoming extremely anxious. It is noted that "She is easily brought to 
tears upon questioning her. She admits to having fear of being in public, fear of driving, fear of 
the job, suddenly awakening in the middle of the night, hyperventilating, becoming exquisitely 
short of breath, rapid heart rate, tachycardia." On that date Dr. Morgan supplied a medical 
restriction from work for at least three to four months. Subsequent notes continue to refer to 
anxiety and depression, fears, and she was to be evaluated by Karl Kraync for psychological 
counseling. 
On the 24th of October 2000 Dr. Morgan supplied a letterl K V\ L * • - • iviia. 
Wood is presently disabled from her own or any occupation due to iuv^  IUIIUv\ xi;i] icasons! major 
anxiety, depression, status post fracture left foot, status post viral encephalitis with residual 
emotional lability, menopausal syndrome." 
On November 14, 2001, Dr. Morgan indicates in a letter "To Whom It May Concern" that "Ms. 
Wood is still disabled from any occupation because of her anxiety disorder and panic attacks. 
This position is in agreement with Karl Kraync of the Division of Rehabilitation that Ms. Wood's 
current emotional circumstance is directly related to her stress from her working environment." A 
further letter dated March 5, 2002 also states "We feel that the stress and anxiety that she has 
suffered has been directly related to and caused by her employment and under such circumstances 
she was advised to undergo a medical leave of absence." By that date she was still unable to 
return to work. 
Therapy review notes were supplied by A.L. Carlisle, Ph.D. beginning on September 27, 2000. 
Apparently Karl Kraync is her Department of Rehabiliation Services counselor. In his initial note, 
Dr. Carlisle indicates the petitioner worked at the radio station for 20 years and developed viral 
encephalitis and Epstein Barr. He reports her as having panic attacks and posttraumatic stress 
disorder. He indicates she was on Prozac and Xanax and cried during most of that session. 
Subsequent therapy review notes indicate crying easily, particularly during sessions, and 
struggling with stress and depression. Panic attacks apparently continued. In a note dated 
November 2, 2001, Dr. Carlisle comments "She was married to her job as much if not more than 
to her husband. She takes great pride in doing well on a job. She talks about training sessions 
she was sent to in which the participants were led to believe that if they do not keep their 
production up at a high level they are failures. I feel that her breakdown came from accumulated 
stress over a period of several years." He felt that she would not ever be able to return to work 
full time unless with a relatively stress-free job. 
000 
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The petitioner was evaluated by George Mooney, Ph.D. on January 7, 2002. This represented an 
independent psychological evaluation. When relating the petitioner's history, Dr. Mooney 
comments, "According to Ms. Wood she has had mental health problems for the past two years 
only and otherwise has not had any mental health conditions or mental health treatment. The 
records actually reflect that she was treated for anxiety on a prolonged basis after her 
hysterectomy. Progress notes from her family doctor indicated that she was regularly taking 
Xanax beginning at least in late 1991." However, he noted there did not otherwise seem to be a 
past history of mental health conditions or mental health treatment. An MMPI-H, Beck 
depression inventory and symptom checklist were tests that were administered. He felt the MMPI 
revealed significant elevations of scales III, I, and II, conforming to the "Conversion V" profile. 
Dr. Mooney comments, "Overall these clinical elevations suggest that Ms. Wood may be a person 
who converts psychological problems into physical complaints, such as headaches. These 
defenses may be somewhat tenuous from a psychological point of view, because they are 
obviously not protecting her from anxiety." The Beck depression inventory gave her a score of 
40 which would ordinarily be found in severely depressed individuals. Dr. Mooney's diagnosis 
was "Axis I: generalized anxiety disorder. Major depressive disorder single episode in partial 
remission. Axis III: back pain, hysterectomy, encephalitis." He concluded that she did not appear 
fit for competitive work or school activities on the basis of her mental health condition. In answer 
to a direct question to consider what portion of her stress is related to her work exposure, Dr. 
Mooney answered, "Ms. Wood's anxiety appears to be multi-factorial in nature and related to 
preexisting anxiety disorder, personality characteristics such as somatization, chronic back pain, 
stress intolerance due to meningitis and routine stresses from work. Of these factors, the routine 
stresses from work are probably only a perecentage of the total cause of her generalized anxiety 
disorder." 
In his summary and impressions, Dr. Mooney concludes: 
"The patient apparently has had personality characteristics of the preexisting 
nature, which resulted in denial of emotional distress on her part and a possible 
conversion of unacceptable psychological distress into physical symptoms such as 
headaches. She also appeared to have a strong need to please other people. In 
particular, she has had somewhat of a paternalistic relationship with her employer. 
The combination of these two factors, including her need to please others and a 
paternalistic relationship with her employer, may have made it difficult for her to 
criticize her work hours or work conditions." 
CURRENT SYMPTOMS 
The petitioner indicates that she becomes stressed very easily and is very often tearful. She 
indicates that she will cry easily but never used to do this. Anytime she talks about her current 
situation or past work experience she will always cry, but otherwise not necessarily under other 
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circumstances. When she quit her work she did so because she could not stop crying. She 
reports that gradually this has lessened so that now she is able to go to town and interact with 
people where she could not do so before. She reports that she will sleep eight hours a night as 
long as she takes Ambien. She reports that she has some forgetfulness and she is not as organized 
as she used to be. She denies suicidal thoughts or past attempts. She denies hallucinations, 
although in her mind she seemed to hear radio station broadcasts for about a year and a half after 
she left work. She denies feeling picked on or paranoid ideation. When she is not under stress 
she believes she does reasonably well. She reports some back pain from time-to-time. She 
indicates that she had no anxiety or depression either in her growing up or young adult years. 
I IS" YiEDICAI , I" "« i IR\, SOCIAL H I S T O R Y , AND FAMILY HIS I OR * 
The petitioner had a hysterectomy in 1986. There is a history of a left foot fracture, sue • i 
hospitalized for her hysterectomy, strep throat, and what was called viral meningitis or 
encephalitis in 1999. She had headaches with normal spinal fluid. She also has been treated for 
hypertension. She has hay fever. Current medications include Prinzide; Valium, she thinks 5 mg 
two at night and two in the morning; amitriptyline, unknown strength; Parafon Forte, a muscle 
relaxant; Prozac; and Ambien 
A review of the petitioner's medical record reveals the following. Glenn Etzel, M.D., saw her on 
August 14, 1989 for vague complaints of fatigue. His appraisal was "Fatigue. Suspect this is 
functional." The notes include symptoms such as diffuse myalgias, headache, and the 1995 back 
injury on February 17, 1995 with an impression of lumbar radiculopathy. Subsequent notes 
indicate such things as complaints of losing control of the right leg and continuing back problems 
with some numbness, dry cough, body aches, diarrhea, swollen glands. 
Of considerable interest is a letter dictated by Glenn L Momberge 
the Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah indicating the petitioner 
needed a lumbar MRI scan. The final paragraph of his letter states, "She is so happy with her job, 
that she thinks she can modify it, as she moves around town, and live with her current situation." 
On October 10, 1996 in a note Dr. Momberger documents that she had been followed for nearly 
two years with a disc herniation at L4-5 and was not getting better by her account. Because of 
continuing pain she was referred to Dr. Alan CoUedge. He saw her on the 22nd of January 1997 
and commented on her continued back and right leg pain. In a note dated May 2, 1997, Dr. 
Colledge comments, "She can no longer live with this pain and wishes to have it addressed in 
some form or fashion including consideration of surgery." 
Dr. Colledge saw her again in March of 2000 with continued low back pain which, by his account, 
over time became progressively worse. "She is in pain 100% of the time in her right leg mostly. 
At its worst her pain is 10/10, averaging 5/10 " 
000 GO 
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EXAMINATION 
A mental status examination was conducted by Dr. Burgoyne and will be reported separately in 
his letter. 
X-RAY REVIEW 
No x-rays were forwarded for review. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Assuming but not deciding that the applicant was involved in circumstances as outlined, and 
acknowledging the stipulation of facts, the panel concludes in terms of reasonable medical 
probability as follows: 
1. What portion of the petitioner's current mental condition was medically caused by her 
industrial exposure and what portion, if any, is the result of non-industrial causes? 
Answer: The panel members agree with George Mooney, Ph.D., that a percentage 
of her current mental condition is attributable to her occupational exposure. There 
were stresses other than her job situation including chronic low back pain which 
Dr. Alan Colledge had characterized as severe and worsening. Her MMPI 
suggests the presence of a personality type which may predispose her to stress and 
anxiety as a result of multiple stressors. She also suffered chronic headaches 
which were an additional stress. Taking this into consideration, the panel members 
agree that 50% of her current mental condition is attributable to the occupational 
exposure. 
ex; 06± 
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Respectfully submitted, 






Psychiatric Evaluation by Dr. Robert H. Burgo> IK; M l> (I'svchuili ml) 
(O.D.E.I.R. 63&64) 
Dated November 12, 2002 
PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION 
PATIE> Nancy Wooc 
DATE: November i" 
This was done as part of a medical panel for an alleged occupational disease with her quitting March 
16, 2002. The administrative law judge has stated that the claimant suffered from extraordinary 
mental stress, which is easily demonstrated by the medical records. I agree with this after I have 
perused the extensive records supplied to us 
Patient has talked about her early life being a fairy tale life and that now she feels she has let people 
down because she had to quit her job due to the stress. Patient said that she doesn't cry because she 
thinks this is a weakness. She said she can't talk about the situation, however, without crying and 
she did cry as she talked with us. In addition, when she first sat down she had gross tremors of her 
legs and hands, but as she continued to answer our questions, this stopped and she calmed down. 
Patient said that she does miss some sleep and she has a hard time getting up now. Patient hasn't 
worked since the above date. 
Patient said she is not suicidal and has never tried to kill herself 
this. Patient said she had hallucinations last year when she was heai, r^ iwo i auio stations. Patient 
doesn't think she is being picked on. She said she wasn't the only one having stress on the job, but 
she said she was reprimanded in front of others. She had to monitor two cell phones all of the time 
and she was on call for 24 hours, Patient said at timeishe wouldn't agree with her boss, but she had 
to do what he said 
Patient could name five immediate past Presidents of the United States. She could name four large 
cities in the United States. She did serial sevens, but only got half way through and had already 
made two mistakes. Patient knew the date. 
Patient said that she gets real frustrated with her memory. She has to keep starting things and then 
forgets. She said she thought she liked her job, but was told it was abusive. 
Patient said that if she stays away from stress now she is okay. She thinks she is pretty heai* 
described her duties on her job and it was a stressful situation, as indicated above. 
The question we have to answer is as follows: "What portion of the petitioner's current mental 
condition was medically caused by her industrial exposure, and what portion, if any, is a result of 
non-industrial causes?" 
The answer to the above is 50/50. There must have been something she experienced in her pre-job 
life, which she called a fairy tale, which permitted her to stay in such a stressful job situation. Most 




However, she apparently thought that to not let people down she had to stay on the job in spite of 
the almost unbearable stress. This early experience in her life situation somehow enabled her to put 
up with a situation that she didn't have to endure. Therefore, the above determination. 






Preliminary Determination ui permanent Uial Disahiir and 
Order of Administrative Law Judge Debbie ! n H 
Dated July 30, 2003. (R. 65-77' 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
ADJUDICATION DIVISION 
P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
Telephone: 801-530-6800 
NANCY M. WOOD, 
Claimant, ELIMINARY DETERMINATION OF 
'MANENT TOTAL DISABILITY AND 
vs. * 
EASTERN UTAH BROADCASTING and/or 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND; 2001208 
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND, 
* 
Respondents. * judge Debbie L Hann 
The above entitled matter came on for hearing before Debbie L Hann, and 
Administrative Law Judge, Utah Labor Commission on March 6, 2002. The claimant was 
present and represented by Bradford Myler, Attorney at Law. The respondents, Eastern Utah 
Broadcasting and Workers Compensation Fund were represented by Floyd Holm, Attorney at 
I aw. The Employers Reinsurance Fund was represented by Sherrie Hayashi, Attorney at Law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
These actions were initiated by three applications for hearing filed by the claimant 
Prior to the hearing, case no. 2001209 was resolved via a compromise settlement of claim of 
disputed validity approved December 18, 2001. At the hearing, the parties agreed that case 
no. 2001210 should be dismissed as it is a duplicate of the claim in 2001209 which has been 
resolved. Thus, the only remaining case for adjudication is 2001208. 
Case no. 2001208 is an occupational disease claim filed by the claimant on February 
26, 2001 alleging the claimant has been unable to work since March 16, 2000 due to stress 
and anxiety as the result of exposure to stressful situations in her employment with the 
respondent, Eastern Utah Broadcasting. The respondents denied liability for the claim alleging 
the claimant does not meet the legal causation requirement of suffering from extraordinary 
mental stress arising predominately from her employment and that such stresses be on the 
objective standard in comparison with contemporary national employment and non-
employment life. On December 26, 2001, the claimant requested the Employers Reinsurance 
Fund be joined in the case and an amended request for answer was issued. The Employers 
Reinsurance Fund filed an answer denying liability for the claim and moved to dismiss the 
Employers Reinsurance Fund from the action because the claimant first suffered disability on 
March 16, 2000 thus, the cause for action did not arise until that day. 
00065 
Wood v. Eastern Utah Broadcasting 
Case No. 2001208, 2001210 
Page 2 
At the hearing, the parties agreed the claimant is disabled and not capable of 
maintaining gainful employment. The only issue raised was whether the claimant's 
employment was the cause of her mental condition and if so, what portion, if any, was non-
industrial. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Interim Order was issued on August 20, 2002, 
referring the issue of apportionment to a Labor Commission medical panel. The panel issued 
its report and it was forwarded to the parties via certified mail on January 21, 2003. No 
objections to entry of the medical panel report were received, therefore the medical panel 
report is admitted into evidence pursuant to Utah Code § 34A-2-601. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The claimant worked for Eastern Utah Broadcasting, located in Price, Utah, from 1980 
through March 16, 2000 as a sales account representative. The claimant was a sales 
representative for the company which operates a radio station broadcasting in eastern Utah. 
In March 2000, the claimant was earning $3500 per month base salary plus commissions that 
at the time she quit were $1000-$1500 per month for a total salary of $4500-$5000 per month. 
The claimant's compensation rate for permanent total disability is the weekly maximum of 
$433.00. 
The claimant is currently unemployed and receives Social Security disability benefits. 
The parties agreed the claimant is disabled and not capable of maintaining gainful 
employment. The claimant is tentatively permanently and totally disabled beginning March 17, 
2000. 
Findings Related to Claimant's Symptoms 
The claimant began experiencing increasing levels of stress over a period of time that 
slowly got worse. The claimant began having anxiety attacks at work because she was scared 
that she was not doing the job as she should. The claimant would often come home from work 
and go to bed because she felt overwhelmed. The claimant would also wake up at night in a 
panic about work. She also had panic attacks, where her heart began racing if she was late to 
a sales meeting. She also began crying over small things at work such as not having 
advertising copy ready for the DJ to review or a sale appointment that had not gone well. The 
claimant usually had panic attacks at work and was able to calm down at home. 
In the months following her breakdown in March 2000, the claimant could not leave her 
house. She has slowly improved to where she is now able to ride in a car and go into stores 
for a brief period. 
Prior to March 2000, the claimant was able to control her symptoms with massage 
therapy, relaxation tapes and Xanax as needed. 
Findings Related to Job Duties and Working Conditions 
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The claimant began as a sales representative in 1980 working 50 sales accounts. In 
1981, there were 4 sales representatives with 50 accounts each. Throughout the claimant's 
employment, sales representatives were hired, trained and the accounts redistributed but they 
usually quit in less than a year, so there was constant hiring, training, and redistribution of 
work. When a sales representative quit, the accounts were usually re-divided between the 
sales representatives, or when the claimant was the only representative left, they were given to 
her to handle. By 1986, there were 2-3 representatives covering about 200 accounts with the 
number of accounts fluctuating with the number of sales representatives. By 1987, there were 
3 representatives working and in 1988, the number went down to 2. By the late 1980s, the 
claimant was the only sales representative in charge of 200 accounts. From 1991 through 
1993, a second sales representative would be hired and the accounts divided but due to very 
high turnover, the claimant was often working by herself. In 1996-97, the claimant was 
promoted to sales manager although she was still handling sales accounts. The turnover was 
still quite high, with sales representatives usually staying for a year or less, and she was often 
the only sales person employed by the respondent. For the first 10 months of 1999, the 
claimant was working alone until another representative was hired in October or November 
1999. By the time she quit in March 2000, there were only 5 employees to handle 2 radio 
stations 
I he claimant worked a minimum of 48 hours per week and it was often closer to 50-55 
hours per week. The claimant was usually to the office or a remote live broadcast by 7-7:30 
Monday through Friday and worked until at least 5:30 p.m. She also worked on account 
billings on the weekends and at home in the evenings. She also prepared memos and did 
computer research at home in the evenings. The claimant carried 2 cell phones, paid for by 
the company, and answered them as early as 5:00 a.m. and as late as 11 p.m.. She 
sometimes did not answer them on the weekend but generally made herself available. The 
claimant traveled and met with outlying customers in Grand Junction and Emery County at 
least once per month. When the claimant became the sales manager in 1997, she went into 
the office early to prepare for the sales representatives' arrival and often stayed late to review 
what had been done that day and to plan foi the next day. The claimant did not have set 
hours but worked the number of hours necessary to get the job done which fluctuated with the 
time of year and number of other employees. 
As a sales representative, the claimant was responsible for selling radio advertising 
which required her to sell the time, gather the information necessary to write the ad, draft the 
text of the ad for the DJ to read, prepare the billing and collect the money due. To sell the ads, 
the claimant met with potential customers and made proposals for advertising. The claimant 
also contacted potential customers by telephone and she was required to make phone contact 
with each account at least once per week. She also managed the shopping show radio 
segment which required her to collects items from merchants for people to listen, call in and 
make a bid. In order to make sales, the claimant researched and prepared promotional ideas 
to sell to customers. She also provided customer services and follow-up and dealt this upset 
or angry customers in the event something went wrong. She also coordinated live broadcasts 
each morning from remote business locations and was present during these shows. In 1997, 
she was also responsible for training and supervising new sales representatives along with 
managing her own accounts. She was also responsible for taking over a representative's 
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sales accounts when one quit. By March 2000, the claimant was selling radio ads to the 
standing accounts, the coupon by computer sales promotion, the table top news promotion 
and the shopping show promotion. The other representative only did the sales accounts and 
the coupon by computer promotion. 
Tom Anderson, the station owner, was the claimant's supervisor. The claimant 
described him as an "intense" person with little patience and a "powerful person." Mr. 
Anderson yelled at the claimant on a regular basis, on average about once every 2 months, in 
front of others. He complimented her work too. He routinely yelled at the other sales 
representatives in her presence. In 1986, the claimant took a medical leave of absence for 3 
weeks to a month, in part because of stress, although the release only specified "health 
reasons." (Medical exhibit 38). As a result, Mr. Anderson cut the claimant's base salary in half 
and would not restore her salary upon her return to work so the claimant quit and eventually 
took a job at another station. Several months later, Mr. Anderson re-hired the claimant at her 
previous salary. The claimant interpreted this action by Mr. Anderson as a demotion for taking 
time off. 
The claimant is not a high school graduate. As part of the claimant's training as a sales 
representative, the station sent her 1-3 times per year to a high pressure sales seminar she 
characterized as "boot camp" from 1981 to 1998 or 1999. This was a 4-5 day training seminar 
held in Grand Junction, Colorado where participants were taught the art of the hard sell. The 
seminar was always led by the same person who ridiculed the claimant in front of others and 
was made an example of what not to do. At these seminars, the claimant was instilled with the 
idea that she was personally responsible for all aspects of the advertising process, including 
those which she had no direct control such as whether the DJ ran the ad correctly, read the ad 
correctly and whether clients paid the bill. The claimant dreaded these seminars and her 
medical leave in 1986 was shortly after her return from a seminar. 
Radio sales are more difficult than other types of advertising sales because the 
merchant has to trust that the ads are running as promised, especially those merchants who 
are outside the listening area of the station. The station was also in a small, rural advertising 
market and she had to repeatedly approach merchants who had not been interested in radio 
advertising. The claimant had to deal with upset or angry customers when something went 
wrong such as an error in the advertising. The claimant experienced increased stress, and the 
claimant became visibly upset at the hearing when testifying about this, when she took over as 
sales manager because she was also responsible for ensuring customers were happy with the 
sales representatives' work. The claimant also expressed to Dr. Carlisle that people would get 
angry at her for "station-related problems" that were not under her control. Medical exhibit 46. 
The claimant had strong feelings of responsibility toward her employment and was 
extremely concerned that the community, her co-workers and supervisor did not perceive her 
as a failure. She also believed that the success or failure of the station was in large part her 
responsibly since income to the station came through the sales department and she was 
often the only person in the sales department. Dr. Carlisle noted in his first session with the 
claimant that "[s]he had personalized her work to the point that it was part of her identity." He 
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also later notes "...the way she appears to have been managed by guilt and fear in her work..." 
Medical exhibit 46. 
In May 1999, the claimant was hospitalized with spinal meningitis. Shortly afterward, 
the station set up a home office with a computer so that she could do work from home. This 
office was in place in her home through March 2000. 
On the morning of March 16, 2000, the claimant began crying and could not stop. She 
did not know why she was crying. The claimant's husband called the station to report the 
claimant would not be coming in to work that day because she was sick. The claimant has not 
been able to return to work since. 
Findings Related to Claimant's Mental Condition and Treatment 
The claimant began taking Xanax for anxiety at least since April 1991. Medical exhibit 
35. The claimant did not take the medication on a daily basis and took it only when she was 
feeling high levels of anxiety or panic. The claimant testified the panic attacks and extreme 
anxiety that lead to taking some Xanax was always related to work. She did not take it daily 
but sometimes would take more than 1 pill in a day depending on her anxiety level and severity 
of the panic attack. She had more panic attacks and anxiety when she was very busy at work 
around holidays, due to the higher number of sales promotions during those times. The 
records reflect refills on November 25, 1991, July 23, 1992, December 17, 1993, October 24, 
1994 and July 2, 1998. Medical exhibit 31-34. The claimant began taking Prozac in January 
2000. 
The claimant currently suffers from an anxiety disorder with panic attacks and 
depression. As a result, the claimant suffered a nervous breakdown in March 2000. Medical 
exhibit 9,11Aand45. 
The claimant has been under Dr. Morgan's care for severe anxiety and depression 
since March 2000 which he believes is directly related to and was caused by the claimant's 
employment with Eastern Utah Broadcasting. Medical exhibit 11 A. The claimant suffers from 
panic attacks which, as of November 14, 2001 prevented her from going out in public. Medical 
exhibit 12. Although the claimant has been undergoing treatment since March 2000, Dr. 
Morgan's opinion is that the claimant cannot return to work because when she contemplates 
such a move, the claimant's anxiety, depression and sleeplessness returns. As a result, Dr. 
Morgan does not believe the claimant is able to return to "...any work at the capacity at which 
she is skilled and trained for." Medical exhibit 11 A. 
The claimant sought therapy for her mental condition from Dr. A.L Carlisle on a regular 
basis from September 2000 through November 2001 through the Division of Rehabilitation 
Services. Dr. Carlisle's opinion is that the claimant's condition is related to her work. Dr. 
Carlisle found the claimant was a very dedicated worker who gave priority to work over family 
and that the stress she felt was caused by her work environment. He noted that other areas of 
the claimant's life such as marriage and relationships with her children had been going fairly 
well and that the only area of her life causing stress was her employment. Medical exhibit 45. 
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This summary is also bourne out by his treatment notes which focus almost exclusively on 
work. Dr. Carlisle noted the claimant is gradually improving largely by staying in stress-free 
environments such as her home. He also noted she cannot come into therapy without 
breaking into tears. He believes the claimant will be unlikely to return to full-tirpe work again 
unless it is employment which causes little stress and possibly only on a part time basis. 
Medical exhibit 48. 
The claimant underwent an independent medical examination by Dr. Mooney. Many of 
the questions asked of Dr. Mooney, such as whether the claimant would meet the criteria for a 
compensable metal stress claim are outside the scope of Dr. Mooney's expertise as a medical 
provider and require a legal conclusion, something reseved for the ALJ. However, with regard 
to medical causation, Dr. Mooney's opinion is that the claimant's mental condition is the result 
of somatization, chronic back pain, stress intolerance due to meningitis and stress from work. 
He notes that work contribution to the claimant's condition is only a percentage of the total 
cause of the anxiety disorder although he did not apportion a specific percentage. Dr. Mooney 
did not believe the claimant was fit for competitive employment due to her mental health 
condition. Medical exhibit 9. 
The claimant currently takes Prozac, Xanax, a muscle relaxer, Amitriptyline, Sonata 
and Lortab for low back pain. 
The claimant suffered extraordinary mental stress. The claimant's employment 
contained an extraordinary amount of mental stimulus that would reasonably lead to a person 
experiencing mental stress. 
The Labor Commission medical panel was comprised of Alvin J. Wirthlin, M.D., a 
neurologist, and Robert H. Burgoyne, M.D., a psychiatrist. The only issue referred to the panel 
was apportionment of non-industrial causes of the claimant's mental condition. The panel was 
supplied with all available medical records and the claimant was examined by the panel 
members. Dr. Burgoyne also performed a psychiatric evaluation. The panel agreed wtih Dr. 
Mooney that a percentage of the claimant's current mental condition is attributable to non-
industrial factors, including a personality type that predisposes her to stress and anxiety as a 
result of multiple stressors. The panel's opinion was that 50% of the claimant's mental 
condition is the result of her work activities with Eastern Utah Broadcasting and 50% from non-
industrial sources. Although Dr. Carlisle is of the opinion all of the claimant's condition may be 
attributed to her work at Eastern Utah Broadcasting, it does not appear Dr. Carlisle performed 
psychological testing, as Dr. Mooney did, and upon which the panel relied to make a full 
assessment of the claimant. Further, Dr. Mooney and the medical panel were also able to 
review all of the claimant's medical records, something Dr. Carlisle was not able to do. Thus, 
Dr. Mooney and the medical panel opinion is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Dr. Mooney apportioned the claimant's condition between industrial and non-industrial sources, 
but he did not break out the percentage, thus, the panel's apportionment of 50% industrial and 
50% non-industrial shall be used as the basis for determining benefits. 
Findings Related to Claimant's Other Medical Conditions 
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The claimant suffered from spinal meningitis in 1999 and was hospitalized for 6 days in 
May 1999. The claimant had headaches before and after this episode although the 
headaches that hospitalized her were the worst she has ever experienced either before or 
after this episode. The claimant had strep throat which turned into a spinal infection. Medical 
exhibit 143-145. 
The claimant had a hysterectomy in 1986 and has been on hormone replacement 
therapy, estrogen, since that time. 
In 1995, the claimant began having headaches that started with nervous tension. She 
sometimes called in sick for several days at a time because she had "collapsed." The claimant 
testified she took Ambien in 1997 and Wellbutrin in 1996 or 1997. 
On February 17, 1995, the claimant suffered a low back injury at work resulting in a 
disc herniation at L4-5. Medical exhibit 85 and 73. The claimant continued to suffer from 
ongoing back pain as a result and on March 20, 2000, Dr. Alan Colledge noted the claimant's 
back condition was deteriorating. Medical exhibit 51. 
Findings Related to Other Possible Causes of Claimant's Mental Condition 
The claimant currently married and has been through the time she was employed by 
Eastern Utah Broadcasting. Her husband suffered an accident at work in approximately May 
1998 and he now receives Social Security Disability benefits. He also recieved some workers 
compensation benefits until he reached medical stability. The claimant considered her 
marriage to be good and not a source of stress in her life. 
The claimant's son is married, and he and his wife and children lived with the claimant 
and her husband. Her son divorced, had custody of the children and remarried and had a third 
child all while living with the claimant. The claimant's son and family moved out in December 
2001. The claimant did take some responsiblity for the grandchildren and watched them from 
time to time. The claimant and her husband did not support their son and he paid for all 
utilities and part of the food expenses. The claimant denied that having her son and his family 
live with her was a source of stress for her. 
PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
A compensable occupational disease is "... any disease or illness that arises out of and 
in the course of employment and is medically caused or aggravated by that employment." 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-103. Utah recognizes claims for mental conditions caused by 
occupational stress in Utah Code § 34A-3-106. That provision states: 
(1) Physical, mental, or emotional diseases related to mental 
stress arising out of and in the course of employment shall be 
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compensable under this chapter only when there is a sufficient 
legal and medical causal connection between the employee's 
disease and employment. 
(2) (a) Legal causation requires proof of extraordinary mental 
stress arising predominantly and directly from employment. 
(b) The extraordinary nature of the alleged mental stress is 
judged according to an objective standard in comparison with 
contemporary national employment and nonemployment life. 
(3) Medical causation requires proof that the physical, mental, 
or emotional disease was medically caused by the mental stress 
that is the legal cause of the physical, mental, or emotional disease. 
(4) Good faith employer personnel actions including 
disciplinary actions, work evaluations, job transfers, layoffs, 
demotions, promotions, terminations, or retirements, may not 
form the basis of compensable mental stress claims under this chapter. 
(5) Alleged discrimination, harassment, or unfair labor 
practices otherwise actionable at law may not form the basis of 
compensable mental stress claims under this chapter. 
(6) An employee who alleges a compensable occupational 
disease involving mental stress bears the burden of proof to 
establish legal and medical causation by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
A cause of action for an occupational disease is considered to arise on "...the date the 
employee first suffered disability from the occupational disease and knew, or in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have known, that the occupational disease was caused by 
employment." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-108 (2)(b). 
The Employers1 Reinsurance Fund has no liability for industrial accidents or 
occupational diseases occurring on or after July 1, 1994. Utah Code § 34A-2-702. 
When an occupational exposure is not the sole cause of disability, liability for 
occupational disease claims may be apportioned for non-industrial causes. Utah Code § 34A-
3-110. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The claimant suffered a compensable occupational disease in the course and scope of 
her employement at Eastern Utah Broadcasting. 
The respondents, Eastern Utah Broadcasting and/or Workers Compensation Fund, are 
liable to the claimant for permanent total disability benefits beginning March 17, 2000 at the 
rate of $216.50 per week. 
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The respondents, Eastern Utah Broadcasting and/or Workers Compensation Fund, are 
liable to the claimant for 50% of reasonable and necessary medical care related to the 
claimant's occupational disease pursuant to the Labor Commission RBRVS schedule. 
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
/. Compensability of Claimant's Occupational Disease Claim 
Utah Code § 34A-3-106 recognizes coverage of mental stress claims based upon 
mental stimulus producing a mental or nervous result. The legal causation standard has two 
elements: the claimant must suffer "extraordinary mental stress" and "the extraordinary nature 
of the stress must be judged in comparison with national employment and non-employement 
life." 
Stress is defined in Schmidt's Attorney's Dictionary of Medicine as "[a] condition of 
strain on one's emotions or a state marked by a series of stimuli of an unpleasant nature which 
tend to distort the normal coordinated physilogical and mental process of the body." Thus, 
stress is a person's reaction to external stimuli, not the stimuli itself. The occupational disease 
statute uses the term "mental stress" both in the context of the stimulus and the result in that it 
requires the claimant to suffer from "extraordinary mental stress" arising predominately and 
directly from employment but then requires the "extraordinary nature" to be judged by an 
objective standard in comparason with national employment. Stress, a person's reaction to 
stimuli, is a subjective reaction and cannot be judged on a national employment standard. 
However, the stimuli causing the stress can be so assessed and thus the ALJ concludes that 
the statute intends the objective analysis of the legal causation standard to be of the stimuli, 
not of the stress reaction to stimuli. Thus, the ALJ concludes the claimant must prove, in 
addition to suffering from extraordinary mental stress, that the stimili she experienced was 
more than the usual stress of everyday work and non-work life generally in the late 20th 
century. This is solely a legal standard and is not a medical determination as the statute sets 
forth that medical causation requires medical evidence, that the mental stress reaction was 
medically caused by the stimuli of the work environment. 
The first element of the legal causation standard, that the claimant suffered from 
extraordinary mental stress is easily demonstrated by the medical records. The claimant 
suffered a nervous breakdown, suffers from an anxiety disorder marked by severe panic 
attacks and depression. This condition was toe vesult of roentel stta\utt experienced by the 
claimant and must be controlled by medication. The claimant, as a result, cannot easily leave 
her home, has difficulty riding in a car and has difficulty handling social interaction with anyone 
but family members. Such a reaction is clearly extraordinary in that the average person does 
not, in the normal course of work, have such a reaction to mental stimuli of working and living 
in late 20th century American society. 
The second element of the legal causation standard, that the stimuli she experienced 
was more than the usual stress of everyday work and non-work life in the late 20th century is 
more difficult. While it is clear the statute recognizes people can suffer from mental disease 
resulting from mental stimuli in the workplace, it is also clear the statute intends that to be 
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compensable, the workplace stimuli must be more than an average workplace. Yet, to say that 
all workplaces are stress inducing would bar any claim and that is clearly not the intent. 
Therefore, the evidence of the workplace environment must demonstrate a situation of 
more than the day to day emotional strain and tension that all employees experience as a 
consequence of engaging in the demands of employment and daily interactions with people 
outside one's immediate family and friends. The workplace stimuli must also be assessed 
objectively to determine whether they were capable of producing mental stress in individuals 
generally. The ALJ disagrees with the respondents that the stimuli must be compared with 
other employment of the same type the claimant was engaged. The statute references 
"contemporary national employment...life" a broader comparison standard than just to other 
employees in the same type of employment. Had the legislature intended a narrower 
comparison, the language of the statute would have so expressed such a standard. The clear 
meaning of the statute is an average, aggregate of employment experience that an average 
American worker experiences in daily work life. 
Significant changes have occured in the late 20th century American work environment 
due to technology and downsizing. It is generally expected that in today's workforce fewer 
employees will handle more tasks with the aid of technology. Technological changes have 
now blurred the once distinct line between work and private life. Computers, the internet and 
remote work network access make it possible for many employees to work from home. Cell 
phones, pagers and e-mail also allow communication outside the confines of the office. 
Despite these changes however, an employer cannot consider an employee to be 
available to work at all hours of the day and night and on weekends, whether the employee is 
salaried or not. Off duty efforts are not generally inherent in work situations and most jobs do 
not require extensive night and weekend preparation on a regular basis to perform the work 
competently. While cell phone make it possible to contact an employee when they are working 
outside the office setting, some parameters of when an employee is expected to answer and 
be available is necessary. An employee cannot be expected to respond during all off hours as 
the effect would be to never truly be off the job. It is still generally accepted that an average 
work day in the United States is 8 hours and that an average work week is 40 hours. 
While employers may experience periods of high employee turnover resulting in other 
employees accepting extra duties on a temporary basis, a constant increase in workload over 
long periods of time is not common to most employment. All employment has busy times but a 
prolonged increase in hours combined with additional job duties is beyond the average 
employment. 
In this case, there are numerous conditions, when taken in combination, exceed the 
average employment experience in contemporary American life that would result in an average 
person experiencing an extraordinary level of mental stress. 
During the 20 years of employment, there was significant employee turnover which 
required the claimant to routinely pick up other employees1 work loads and for some extended 
periods of time, the claimant was solely reponsible for all sales. Because the claimant was a 
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senior employee, when new people were hired, she had to spend extra time helping new 
employees learn the job and this became her official job duty in 1997. The claimant 
experienced consistent extra workload and duties, from employee training and picking up work 
left by employees quitting, rather than intermittant increases. 
The claimant was routinely required to work more than a 40 hour work week, usually 
50-55 hours per week. When the claimant became ill in 1986 and took time off (3-4 weeks) 
she was demoted and had her salary cut in half thus sending a clear message that she was 
not to take time away from work, even for medical reasons. When she became ill and was 
hospitalized in 1999, EUB installed a computer in her home so that she could continue 
working. She also responded to early morning, late night and weekend phone calls from 2 cell 
phones provided by her employer. It is not common in an employment setting to be required to 
respond to 2 cell phones. There was little time when the claimant could be away from her work 
responsiblities. 
The claimant had more than average job duties for a sales representative. She was 
also responsible for preparing the account billing and ensuring accounts were paid, in addition 
to selling the advertising. When she was made a supervisor, she was still in charge of 
significant sales responsiblities in addition to supervising and training new account 
representatives. The promotion added significant job duties to an already full work schedule 
rather than allowing her to delegate servicing accounts to solely concentrate on managerial 
duties of training, supervision, customer relations and development of advertising promotions. 
The claimant's supervisor had a somewhat volitile personality and had no hesitation in 
publicly reprimanding both the claimant and other employees. Although the claimant was 
reprimanded on average of every other month, having to see and hear fellow employees be 
reprimanded caused stress inducing stimili and this was not an uncommon occurance. 
Further, public reprimands in front of less senior account representatives or customers would 
reasonably cause an average person to experience mental stress. In addition to the public 
reprimands she experienced from her employer, the claimant was also sent by EUB to high 
pressure sales seminars, she characterized as "boot camp", where she was humiliated in front 
of others on a regular basis. These seminars took place out of state for several days at a time 
resulting in regular long expsoure to conditions resulting in a stress reaction. 
The claimant also was in a position for taking responsibly for things over which she 
had little or no control. When customers got angry at her for mistakes in the way ad copy was 
read or when a customer did not pay a bill, the claimant was held responsible but these were 
events outside her control to correct or change. The claimant, as often the only sales 
representative was responsible in many ways for the continued existence of the station as 
much of the revenue to run the company depended on her abilities to sell ads and collect 
revenue. 
Thus, taking all of the aspects of the claimant's employment into consideration in 
comparison with the day to day stress an average employee experiences in work life, the 
claimant's employment contained an extraordinary amount of mental stimulus that would 
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reasonably lead to a person experiencing mental stress. Therefore, the claimant has met her 
burden of proving her employment was the legal cause of her mental condition. 
The claimant also has the burden of proving the mental stress that resulted, from stimili 
at her employment is the medical cause of her current condition. There is no dispute that at 
least a portion of the claimant's medical condition was caused by her employment. There was 
a dispute as to apportionment of non-industrial causes. Drs. Morgan and Carlisle believe the 
claimant's employment at EUB is the sole cause of her condition and that no apportionment to 
non-industrial causes is warranted. Dr. Mooney believes only a portion of her condition is the 
result of her employment. Therefore, the issue of apportionment was referred to a medical 
panel for evaluation. The panel agreed that non-industrial factors contributed to the claimant's 
condition and apportioned 50% to non-industrial causes. As stated above, the preponderance 
of evidence supports apportionment and as the panel is the only opinion as to an exact 
amount, the benefits will be reduced accordingly. 
//. Employers' Reinsurance Fund Motion to Dismiss 
The Employers Reinsurance Fund only has liability for those injuries or occupational 
diseases occuring before July 1,1994. Although the claimant's exposure occurred before this 
date, her claim did not arise under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-108 (2)(b) until March 16, 2000 
when she was no longer able to work due to occupational disease. Therefore, the Employers 
Reinsurance Fund has no liability for this claim and is dismissed as a party. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREWITH ORDERED that the respondents, Eastern Utah Broadcasting and/or 
Workers Compensation Fund pay the claimant $38,010.91 for permanent total disability 
compensation covering the period March 17, 2000 through July 29, 2003. This amount is 
accrued and due and payable to the claimant plus interest at the rate of 8% per annum 
purusant to 612-1-5, U.A.C., less $6,726.64 in attorneys fees payable directly to Bradford 
Myler, Attorney at Law plus 15% of accrued interest. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents, Eastern Utah Broadcasting and/or 
Workers Compensation Fund, pay the claimant ongoing weekly permanent total disability 
compensation beginning July 30, 2003 at the rate of $216.50 per week until further order of 
the Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents, Eastern Utah Broadcasting and/or 
Workers Compensation Fund, pay 50% of reasonable and necessary medical care related to 
the claimant's occupational disease. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents, Eastern Utah Broadcasting and/or 
Workers Compensation Fund, 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Employers' Reinsurance Fund is dismissed as a 
party. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that case number 2001210 is dismissed. 
DATED THIS 3®^. day of Uk^Uyc , 2003. of ffi^fc 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
DEBBIE L HANN 
Administrative Law Judge 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication 
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific 
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this 
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review 
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct 
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review 




Order Granting Motion for Review by Commissioner Colleen S. Colton 
Dated October 18,2004 
APPEALS BOARD 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
NANCY M. WOOD, * 
* 
Applicant, * ORDER GRANTING 
* MOTION FOR REVIEW 
v. * 
* 
EASTERN UTAH BROADCASTING, * 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND, * 
and EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND, * Case No. 01-0208 
* 
Defendants. * 
Eastern Utah Broadcasting and its workers compensation insurance carrier, Workers 
Compensation Fund, (jointly referred to as "Eastern") ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor 
Commission to review Administrative Law Judge Hann's preliminary determination that Nancy M. 
Wood is permanently and totally disabled and entitled to benefits under the Utah Occupational 
Disease Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 3, Utah Code Ann.). 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. f63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-3-102(2), Utah Code Ann. f34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. 
CodeR602-2-l.M. 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED 
On February 26, 2001, Mrs. Wood filed an Application For Hearing with the Labor 
Commission to compel Eastern to pay disability compensation for Mrs. Wood's inability to work, 
which Mrs. Wood attributed to employment -related mental stress. Judge Hann held an evidentiary 
hearing on Mrs. Wood's claim on March 6,2002, and then referred the medical aspects of the claim 
to a medical panel. The panel submitted its report on November 12, 2002. On August 20, 2003, 
Judge Hann issued her decision concluding that Mrs. Wood was entitled to a preliminary 
determination of permanent total disability, caused by extraordinary work-related mental stress. 
In its motion for review of Judge Hann's decision, Eastern contends that Judge Hann has 
misapplied §34A-23-106(2) of the Act, defining the requirement of legal causation applicable to 
mental stress claims. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
Having carefully reviewed the evidence in this matter, the Appeals Board enters the 
following findings of fact. 
Mrs. Wood, now 54 years old, has an 11th grade education. Her only work experience has 
been in selling radio advertising in rural eastern Utah. Almost all of that employment was with 
Eastern, where she worked from 1980 until March 16, 2000. 
Mrs. Wood's work at Eastern was demanding. She was responsible for a large number of 
customer accounts, which required calling on clients, writing advertising copy, billing, and collecting 
payments. She worked approximately 50 hours per week. She sometimes received business calls 
and did paperwork and research at home during the evening. 
Mrs. Wood's supervisor, and Eastern's owner, is an intense, "powerful" individual. 
Approximately every two months throughout the period of her employment at Eastern, Mrs. Wood's 
supervisor would "yell" at her for some oversight or error. However, at other times, Mrs. Wood's 
supervisor praised her as being a model employee. There is no evidence that Ms. Wood's 
performance was unacceptable to her employer. However, Eastern experienced a high turnover rate 
among its other advertising salesmen. Mrs. Wood's 20 years of employment with the company was 
therefore unusual. 
Mrs. Wood was paid a base salary of $3,500 per month, plus commission of approximately 
$1,300 per month, for total compensation of $4,800 per month ($57,600 per year). 
Mrs. Wood has a personality type that predisposes her to anxiety and stress, whether from 
work-related experiences or personal factors. In addition to the demands of her work, she has 
experienced various health problems and family problems that can reasonably be viewed as stressors. 
For several years prior to leaving her job at Eastern, Mrs. Wood used prescription medications to 
control her depression, anxiety and insomnia. 
In the period leading up to March 16,2000, Mrs. Wood's mental condition worsened. On 
March 16,2000, she found herself crying uncontrollably. She does not point to any specific incident, 
either work or personal, that triggered this episode. She did not return to work thereafter and has 
been under continuous medical care for depression, anxiety, and other medical problems since then. 
Mrs. Wood is not now capable of returning to gainful employment. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Pursuant to the Utah Occupational Disease Act, Mrs. Wood seeks disability compensation for 
her mental stress disorder. Section 34A-2-104(1) of the Act contains the general requirement for 
compensation in occupational disease cases: 
Every employer is liable for the payment of disability and medical benefits to every 
employee who becomes disabled... by reason of an occupational diseases under the 
terms of this chapter. 
However, when a claim for benefits is based on work-related "mental stress," §34A-3-l 06 of 
the Act imposes more stringent requirements: 
(1) Physical, mental, or emotional diseases related to mental stress arising out 
of and in the course of employment shall be compensable under this chapter only 
when there is a sufficient legal and medical causal connection between the 
employee's disease and employment. 
(2)(a) Legal causation requires proof of extraordinary mental stress arising 
predominantly and directly from employment. 
(b) The extraordinary nature of the alleged mental stress is judged 
according to an objective standard in comparison with contemporary national 
employment and nonemployment life. 
(6) An employee who alleges a compensable occupational disease involving 
mental stress bears the burden of proof to establish legal and medical causation by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
In applying the foregoing provisions to Mrs. Wood's claim, it is necessary to determine what 
is meant by the statute's use of the term "stress." Several different meanings can be ascribed to the 
word. For example, Webster's 9 Collegiate Dictionary defines stress as "a[n] . . . emotional factor 
that causes bodily or mental tension and may be a factor in disease causation," or "a state resulting 
from stress . . . ." Likewise, Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 27th Ed., defines stress as 
either "pressure" or "the biological reactions to such pressure." Thus, the word "stress" can refer to 
either a causative stimulus, or to a response to a stimulus. 
It appears to the Appeals Board that §34A-3-106 uses the term "stress" in the sense of a 
causative stimulus, i.e. a factor that causes tension. This interpretation is consistent with the context 
of the statute and avoids the logical difficulties that would result if "stress" were taken to mean a 
response to pressure. 
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In light of the foregoing, the Appeals Board concludes that Mrs. Wood must prove that the 
mental stress which allegedly caused her illness arose predominantly and directly from her 
employment at Eastern. She must also prove that the stress was extraordinary when objectively 
compared with the normal stress of modern employment and non-employment life. 
The evidence in this case establishes that Mrs. Wood worked for 20 years in the challenging 
and demanding field of radio advertising sales. The record also establishes that Mrs. Wood carried a 
heavy work load and worked substantial hours. Furthermore, her supervisor was "intense" and 
"powerful," apparently given to forceful expressions of both criticism and praise. However, many 
occupations impose demands on a worker's time, as well as pressures for performance. Mrs. 
Wood's own testimony indicates that all radio sales positions involve the same types of demands and 
pressures that she faced. While Mrs. Wood's work involved substantial demands, the Appeals Board 
cannot conclude from the evidence presented that these demands were extraordinary when compared 
to the demands of modem employment and nonemployment life. The Appeals Board concludes that 
Mrs. Wood has failed to meet the requirement of legal causation incorporated in §34A-3-106 of the 
Act. For that reason, she is not entitled to benefits under the Act. 
ORDER 
The Appeals Board hereby grants Eastern's motion for review, sets aside Judge Harm's 
decision, and denies Mrs. Wood's claim for occupational disease benefits. It is so ordered. 
Dated this /ff^day of October, 2004. 
<0jrC4%ri**% 
Colleen S. Colton, Chair 
Patricia S. Drawe 
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DISSENT 
I respectfully dissent. I would affirm Judge Harm's decision with certain clarifications as 
described below. Today's majority opinion, by reversing Judge Hann, has established a legal 
causation standard in emotional distress, occupational disease cases which is so high that, if 
followed, it will be virtually impossible for any employee to ever recover compensation for an 
emotional breakdown, medically caused by his/her employment. The legal causation standard 
established by the Utah Legislature does not mandate this harsh result. 
Before discussing my concerns about the majority's legal causation analysis, I want to 
state that I do agree with the majority's definition of "stress"; i.e. "causation" stimulus. 
The legal causation standard for this case is established by Utah Code Ann. §34A-3-
106(2) which reads as follows: 
(a) Legal causation requires proof of extraordinary mental stress arising 
predominantly and directly from employment. 
(b) The extraordinary nature of the alleged mental stress is judged according to an 
objective standard in comparison with contemporary national employment and 
nonemployment life. 
Our appeal courts have yet to interpret the above language. The cases for other states, 
cited by the employer and its insurance carriers in their memorandum, are of little value in this 
matter since the affected states have adopted different legal causation standards than Utah. 
There is no argument that the Utah Legislature has adopted a tough legal standard for 
emotional stress occupational disease cases. The Legislature created a two-prong standard. First, 
the "extraordinary medical stress" must arise "predominantly and directly from employment." 
This prong of the legal causation test does not require the stress to come exclusively from 
employment. Additionally, this legal causation test must be a "subjective" test, as opposed to the 
"objective". All humans have some stress in their lives from non-employment factors. In all 
emotional distress/occupational disease cases, it is incumbent upon the Court to subjectively 
weigh the various employment and non-employment stress factors in the injured employee's life. 
In reviewing the record, I would affirm Judge Harm's conclusion that the employment-related 
stress was a predominate cause of Mrs. Wood's injury. 
The second prong of the legal causation standard is that the extraordinary stress must be 
compared with stress normally faced by employees in "national employment and non-
employment life". The majority compared the stress Mrs. Wood received on the job at her radio 
station employer with radio station sales jobs in general. The majority should have compared 
Mrs. Wood's employment related stress with national working life, in general. Using any type of 
objective standard as required by the statute - Mrs. Wood's radio station job was extremely 
stressful. 
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I believe the record demonstrates that Mrs. Wood proved by the preponderance of the 
evidence that the stress she received from her radio station sales job was the legal cause of her 
emotional distress/occupational disease claim. 
I would have affirmed. 
Josfe^ h E. Hatch 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this 
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days 
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals 
by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the 




Utah Code Ann §34A-2-702. 
Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid. 
UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 34A-2-702 
(1) (a) There is created an Employers' Reinsurance Fund for the purpose of making payments 
for industrial accidents or occupational diseases occurring on or before June 30, 1994. The 
payments shall be made in accordance with this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease 
Act. The Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall have no liability for industrial accidents or 
occupational diseases occurring on or after July 1, 1994. 
(b) The Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall succeed to all monies previously held in the 
"Special Fund," the "Combined Injury Fund," or the "Second Injury Fund." 
(c) The commissioner shall appoint an administrator of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
(d) The state treasurer shall be the custodian of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, and the 
administrator shall make provisions for and direct its distribution. 
(e) Reasonable costs of administering the Employers' Reinsurance Fund or other fees may be 
paid from the fund. 
(2) The state treasurer shall: 
(a) receive workers' compensation premium assessments from the State Tax Commission; 
and 
(b) invest the Employers' Reinsurance Fund to ensure maximum investment return for both 
long and short term investments in accordance with Section 51-7-12.5. 
(3) The administrator may employ, retain, or appoint counsel to represent the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund in proceedings brought to enforce claims against or on behalf of the fund. If 
requested by the commission, the attorney general shall aid in representation of the fund. 
(4) The liability of the state, its departments, agencies, instrumentalities, elected or appointed 
officials, or other duly authorized agents, with respect to payment of any compensation benefits, 
expenses, fees, medical expenses, or disbursement properly chargeable against the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund, is limited to the cash or assets in the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, and they 
are not otherwise, in any way, liable for the operation, debts, or obligations of the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund. 
(5) If injury causes death within a period of 312 weeks from the date of the accident, the 
employer or insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses of the deceased as provided in Section 
34A-2-418, and further benefits in the amounts and to the persons in accordance with 
Subsections (5)(a) through (c). 
(a) (i) If there are wholly dependent persons at the time of the death, the payment by the 
employer or its insurance carrier shall be 66 2/3% of the decedent's average weekly wage at the 
time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the 
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time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a 
dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years, up to a 
maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not exceeding the average weekly wage of 
the employee at the time of the injury, and not exceeding 85% of the state average weekly wage 
at the time of the injury per week. 
(ii) Compensation shall continue during dependency for the remainder of the period between 
the date of the death and the expiration of 312 weeks after the date of the injury. 
(iii) The payment by the employer or its insurance carrier to wholly dependent persons during 
dependency following the expiration of the first 312-week period described in Subsection 
(5)(a)(i) shall be an amount equal to the weekly benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons 
during that initial 312-week period, reduced by 50%> of any weekly federal Social Security death 
benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons. 
(iv) The issue of dependency shall be subject to review by an administrative law judge at the 
end of the initial 312-week period and annually after the initial 312-week period. If in any review 
it is determined that, under the facts and circumstances existing at that time, the applicant is no 
longer a wholly dependent person, the applicant may be considered a partly dependent or 
nondependent person and shall be paid such benefits as the administrative law judge may 
determine under Subsection (5)(b)(iii). 
(v) For purposes of any dependency determination, a surviving spouse of a deceased 
employee shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for a 312-week period from the 
date of death of the employee. This presumption shall not apply after the initial 312-week period 
and, in determining the then existing annual income of the surviving spouse, the administrative 
law judge shall exclude 50% of any federal Social Security death benefits received by that 
surviving spouse. 
(b) (i) If there are partly dependent persons at the time of the death, the payment shall be 66 
2/3%o of the decedent's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, but not more than a 
maximum of 85%> of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not 
less than a minimum of $45 per week. 
(ii) Compensation shall continue during dependency for the remainder of the period between 
the date of death and the expiration of 312 weeks after the date of injury as the administrative 
law judge in each case may determine. Compensation may not amount to more than a maximum 
of $30,000. 
(iii) The benefits provided for in this subsection shall be in keeping with the circumstances 
and conditions of dependency existing at the date of injury, and any amount awarded by the 
administrative law judge under this subsection shall be consistent with the general provisions of 
this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
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(iv) Benefits to persons determined to be partly dependent under Subsection (5)(a)(v) shall be 
determined by the administrative law judge in keeping with the circumstances and conditions of 
dependency existing at the time of the dependency review and may be paid in an amount not 
exceeding the maximum weekly rate that partly dependent persons would receive if wholly 
dependent. 
(v) Payments under this section shall be paid to such persons during their dependency by the 
employer or its insurance carrier. 
(c) If there are wholly dependent persons and also partly dependent persons at the time of 
death, the administrative law judge may apportion the benefits as the administrative law judge 
considers just and equitable; provided, that the total benefits awarded to all parties concerned do 
not exceed the maximum provided for by law. 
(6) The Employers' Reinsurance Fund: 
(a) shall be: 
(i) used only in accordance with Subsection (1) for: 
(A) the purpose of making payments for industrial accidents or occupational diseases 
occurring on or before June 30, 1994, in accordance with this section and Section 34A-2-703; 
and 
(B) payment of: 
(I) reasonable costs of administering the Employers' Reinsurance Fund; or 
(II) fees required to be paid by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund; 
(ii) expended according to processes that can be verified by audit; and 
(b) may not be used for: 
(i) administrative costs unrelated to the fund; or 
(ii) any activity of the commission other than an activity described in Subsection (6)(a). 
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APPENDIX 8 
Utah Code Ann. §34A-3-106. 
Physical, mental, or emotional diseases related to mental stress 
arising out of and in the course of employment. 
34A-3-106. Mental stress claims. 
(1) Physical, mental, or emotional diseases related to mental stress arising out of and in the 
course of employment shall be compensable under this chapter only when there is a sufficient 
legal and medical causal connection between the employee's disease and employment. 
(2) (a) Legal causation requires proof of extraordinary mental stress arising predominantly 
and directly from employment. 
(b) The extraordinary nature of the alleged mental stress is judged according to an objective 
standard in comparison with contemporary national employment and nonemployment life. 
(3) Medical causation requires proof that the physical, mental, or emotional disease was 
medically caused by the mental stress that is the legal cause of the physical, mental, or emotional 
disease. 
(4) Good faith employer personnel actions including disciplinary actions, work evaluations, 
job transfers, layoffs, demotions, promotions, terminations, or retirements, may not form the 
basis of compensable mental stress claims under this chapter. 
(5) Alleged discrimination, harassment, or unfair labor practices otherwise actionable at law 
may not form the basis of compensable mental stress claims under this chapter. 
(6) An employee who alleges a compensable occupational disease involving mental stress 
bears the burden of proof to establish legal and medical causation by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
History: C. 1953, 35-2-104.1, enacted by L. 1995, ch. 309, § 2; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 
240, § 196; renumbered by L. 1997, ch. 375, § 154. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which 
formerly appeared as § 35A-3a-106, and made no change in the language of the section. 
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Opinion 
Opinion by: DURHAM 
{729 P.2d 17} Claimant Robert A. Allen seeks a review from the Industrial Commission's denial of his 
motion for review of an administrative law judge order denying him compensation for a back injury 
sustained at work. For the reasons stated below, we reverse and remand. 
On November 23, 1982, the claimant, aged 36, was employed as night manager of Kent's Foods. The 
claimant testified to the following version of events at a hearing before an administrative law judge. 
The claimant was working in a confined cooler in the store stacking crates, containing four to six 
galionsl of milk, from the floor onto a cooler shelf. While lifting one crate to about chest level, he 
suddenly felt a sharp pain in his lower back. He immediately set down the crate and asked another 
employee to continue stocking the shelves. The claimant completed the one-half hour remaining in his 
shift doing desk work. That night the pain increased, and by morning his left leg felt numb. Four or five 
days later, he saw Dr. Ivan Wright about his back problem. Initial doctor visits during December were 
followed through with the prescribed treatment of bed rest and medication. A myelogram finally 
revealed a herniated disc, and the claimant spent ten days in traction in the hospital in early January. 
He did not return to work. 
The claimant also testified he had a history of prior back injuries, including a fall from a telephone pole 
at age fourteen which required him to wear a back brace for several months, a back injury in 1977 
while lifting sand bags for the Logan School District, and another fall while working for that employer 
when he slipped on a slick concrete ramp and broke his coccyx. None of the prior injuries resulted in 
prolonged absences from work. 
The testimony from other sources varied slightly from the report given by the claimant. The employer's 
report of injury describes the accident as "picking up freight and stocking it on shelves, lifting boxes 
and stacking them from truck." No specific event was mentioned in the employer's report. The medical 
records of treating physicians described the claimant's previous injuries, but omitted any reference to 
a specific incident in the cooler. Dr. Hannan, who examined the claimant on December 31,1982, 
wrote, "He does not remember any distinct episode as having precipitated his current problem, 
however." And in a letter from Dr. Bryner to Dr. Wright dated January 13, 1983, the claimant's history 
was related as follows: "About six weeks ago, however, he was lifting material at work, and recalls no 
© 2005 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to 
the restrictions and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement. 
specific injury or stress but developed discomfort in his left groin area which ultimately extended into 
his big toe." 
The administrative law judge found that the claimant's injury to his back on November 23,1982, was 
not "an injury by accident arising out of or in the course of employment." It is apparent that the 
administrative law judge, using a specific episode analysis, concluded there was no "accident" 
because there was no identifiable {729 P.2d 18} event that caused the injury and because lifting the 
crates of milk was a routine and common-place exertion expected of the job. The administrative law 
judge analogized the facts of this case to Farmers Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah 
1980), where a gradually developed back injury was held to be not compensable where the condition 
worsened without the intervention of any external occurrence or trauma. 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the claimant, who had suffered preexisting back problems and 
was injured as the result of an exertion usual and typical for his job, was injured "by accident arising 
out of or in the course of employment" as required by the Workers Compensation Act, U.C.A., 1953, § 
35-1-45 (Supp. 1986). That Act, in pertinent part, provides: 
Every employee . . . . who is injured . . . . by accident arising out of or in the course of his 
employment.... shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury 
Id. This statute creates two prerequisites for a finding of a compensable injury. First, the injury 
must be "by accident". Second, the language "arising out of or in the course of employment" 
requires that there be a causal connection between the injury and the employment. See Pittsburgh 
Testing Laboratory v. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367, 1370 (Utah 1983). Prior decisions by this Court have 
often failed to distinguish the analysis of the accident question from the discussion of causation 
elements.2 As a result, this Court and the Commission are faced with confusing and often 
inconsistent precedent. For this reason we now undertake a fresh look at the policy and historical 
background of the workers compensation statute in an attempt to provide a clear and workable 
rule for future application by the Commission. 
The term "by accident" is not defined in the workers' compensation statutes. The most frequently 
referenced authority for the definition of "by accident" is the case of Carting v. Industrial Commission, 
16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965), where the term was defined as follows: 
[An accident] connotes an unanticipated, unintended occurrence different from what would 
normally be expected to occur in the usual course of events . . . . This is not necessarily restricted 
to some single incident which happened suddenly at one particular time and does not preclude the 
possibility that due to exertion, stress or other repetitive cause, a climax might be reached in such 
manner as to properly fall within the definition of an accident as just stated above. However, such 
an occurrence must be distinguished from gradually developing conditions which are classified as 
occupational diseases... . 
Id. at 261-62, 399 P.2d at 203 (citing Jones v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 616, 244 
P.2d 640, 642 (1952), and Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 
(1949)). Some confusion has developed as to whether "by accident" requires proof of an unusual 
event. This issue frequently arises when the employee suffers an internal failure3 brought about 
by exertions in the {729 P.2d 19} workplace. It is clear, however, that our cases have defined "by 
accident" to include internal failures resulting from both usual and unusual exertions. See Schmidt 
v. Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1980). 
This Court first discussed the term "by accident" in Tintic Milling Co. v. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 
14, 206 P. 278 (1922), Where an accident was said to be "something out of the ordinary, unexpected, 
and definitely located as to time and place." 60 Utah at 22, 206 P. at 281. This definition was used to 
distinguish injuries which occurred gradually and were covered under statutory provisions for 
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occupational disease. Id. The Court in Tintic Milling also acknowledged that where the claimant 
suffers an internal failure the "unexpected result" rule of the seminal English case of Fenton v. 
Thorley, [1903] A.C. 443, 72 LJ.K. 789, 5 W.C.C. 1, is appropriate. The Court in Tintic Milling 
observed: 
"Since the case of Fenton v. Thorley, nothing more is required than that the harm that the plaintiff 
has sustained shall be unexpected . . . . It is enough that the causes, themselves known and 
usual, should produce a result which on a particular occasion is neither designed nor expected. 
The test as to whether an injury is unexpected, and so, if received on a single occasion, occurs ' 
by accident,' is that the sufferer did not intend or expect that injury would on that particular 
occasion result from what he was doing." 
60 Utah at 26, 206 P. at 282 (quoting Bohlen, A Problem in The Drafting of Workmen's 
Compensation Acts, 25 Harv. L. Rev. 328 (1912) (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the Court in 
Tintic affirmed a finding that the employee, whose previous respiratory problems were aggravated 
by entering a roasting flue, had suffered a compensable accident. 
After Tintic Milling, the Court temporarily rejected the "unexpected result" definition of Fenton v. 
Thorley in internal failure cases on the ground that the definition of "by accident" required an unusual 
occurrence or exertion. In Bamberger v. Industrial Commission, 66 Utah 203, 240 P. 1103 (1925), the 
Court denied compensation to a worker who unexpectedly suffered a heart attack while manually 
unloading a railroad car of coal on the ground that no overexertion occurred during the work. 66 Utah 
at 208, 240 P. at 1104. That decision was apparently overruled, however, when the Court embraced 
the "unexpected result" rule and awarded compensation to an employee who suffered a heart attack 
after overexertions while routinely cleaning the weirs to a city reservoir. Hammond v. Industrial 
Commission, 84 Utah 67, 87, 34 P.2d 687, 695 (1934) (Moffat, J., concurring). Hammond was 
followed in Columbia Steel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 92 Utah 72, 66 P.2d 124 (1937), where a 
unanimous Court held that the employee, who had suffered a ruptured aorta from riding a caterpillar 
tractor over rough ground, suffered an injury "by accident" since the result was "an unusual, 
unforeseen, and unexpected event or occurrence" and definite as to time and place. Id. at 92, 66 P.2d 
at 134. And, in Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n. v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 61, 138 
P.2d 233 (1943), the Court sustained an award of benefits to a claimant who had suffered from heart 
disease and experienced a heart attack shortly after moving 52 boxes weighing 50 to 100 pounds and 
28 sacks of fire clay - work that was unusually heavy and greatly in excess of his ordinary duties. The 
Court pointed out, in dicta, that the English common law would have awarded compensation even if 
the exertions were ordinary and usually required as part of the job. 104 Utah at 67-71, 138 P.2d at 
235-39. Quoting from the Bohlen article, supra, the Court observed: 
{729 P.2d 20} "Nothing more is required than that the harm that the plaintiff has sustained shall 
be unexpected . . . . The element of unexpectedness inherent in the word 'accident' is sufficiently 
supplied . . . . if, though the act is usual and the conditions normal, it causes a harm unforeseen 
by him who suffers it." 
104 Utah at 70, 138 P.2d at 237. 
Six years later in Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949), this 
Court explicitly adopted the English rule for the definition of an accident and awarded benefits to a 
claimant who unexpectedly injured his back while stepping on the brake pedal of a delivery truck - a 
usual and ordinary activity. See 115 Utah at 14-20, 201 P.2d at 967-70. After summarizing early Utah 
cases interpreting "by accident" the Court concluded that "since 1922 this court has uniformly held that 
an unexpected internal failure meets the requirements of ["by accident"] and the legislature by failing 
to amend has acquiesced in that construction." 115 Utah at 15, 201 P.2d at 968. 
The holding of Purity Biscuit also squarely embraced the concept that an ordinary or usual exertion 
that results in an unexpected injury is compensable. See 115 Utah at 18-19, 201 P. at 969-70. After 
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carefully considering the legislative purpose of the workers' compensation statute, prior precedent, 
and public policy, the Court rejected the requirement that proof of an unusual activity or exertion be a 
required element of the "by accident" definition. 115 Utah at 14-20, 201 P.2d at 967-70. The Court 
concluded that "there is nothing in the statute which would justify a holding that an injury is 
compensable where overexertion is shown but is not compensable where only ordinary exertion is 
shown, provided that in both cases it is shown, that the exertion causes the injury. "4 115 Utah at 19, 
201 P.2d at 970. 
{729 P-2d 21} Since Purity Biscuit, numerous cases have held that an internal injury may be 
compensable if it results from either a usual or unusual exertion in the course of employment. See, 
e.g., Champion Home Builders v. industrial Commission, 703 P.2d 306 (Utah 1985) (perforated ulcer 
caused by lifting an unusually heavy beam); Pittsburg Testing Laboratories v. Keller, 657 P.2d at 1367 
(unforeseen and unanticipated heart attack resulting from exertion while inspecting roof structure); 
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981) (back injury resulting from shoveling coal 
compensable despite usualness of activity and presence of preexisting conditions); Painter Motor v. 
Ostler, 617 P.2d 975 (Utah 1980) (back injury resulting from moving heavy boxes and installing 
electrical equipment); Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980) (back injury 
resulting from carrying steel plates compensable despite prior history of back disorders and ordinary 
activity); United States Steel Corp. v. Draper, 613 P.2d 508 (Utah 1980) (heart attack resulting from 
exertion while rushing to drowning accident); IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828 (Utah 1978) 
(heart attack resulting from heavy lifting); Nuzum v. Roosendahl Construction & Mining Corp., 565 
P.2d 1144 (Utah 1977) (truck driver suffered heart attack after repeatedly climbing long steps); 
Residential & Commercial Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 529 P.2d 427 (Utah 1974) (back 
injury resulting from moving lumber); Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740 
(1967) (heart distress occurring over a period of several months compensable despite preexisting 
conditions); Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (1965) (back injury 
resulting from filing papers in lower drawer compensable). 
Despite the strong precedential support for applying the "unexpected result" rule of Purity Biscuit to 
internal failure cases, a separate line of opposing authority has developed which requires overexertion 
or an unusual event to prove an injury occurred "by accident." Typically, these cases denied 
compensation because the claimant's ordinary work duties precipitated the injury. Consequently, there 
were no events or exertions that were unusual or extraordinary to qualify as "by accident." See, e.g., 
Billings Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1983) (compensation for knee injury denied 
where circumstances precipitating the injury were commonplace and usual); Sabo's Electronic Service 
v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982) (back injury from loading box of twelve radios into van not 
compensable); Farmers Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah 1980) (back injury to 
claimant with preexisting condition resulting from delivery of 100-pound sacks not compensable since 
the activity was not unusual or unexpected); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial 
Commission, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979) (back injury suffered by janitor upon standing up not 
compensable without evidence that activities were unusual); Redman Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial 
Commission, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 (1969) (back injury precipitated by sitting and driving a 
moving van not compensable without proof of an unusual event). These cases will not be collectively 
referred to as the Redman line of cases. 
We are now convinced that the Redman line of cases has misconstrued the historical and logical 
definition of "by accident." The Redman line of cases relied on the following abridged version of the 
definition of an accident found in Carling v. Industrial Commission: "[Accident] connotes an 
unanticipated, unintended occurrence different from what would normally be expected to occur in the 
usual course of events." 16 Utah at 261, 399 P.2d at 203 (emphasis added;omitted). In Redman, the 
highlighted phrase was interpreted to require an unusual event before there can be an accident. This 
interpretation misconstrues the Carling decision itself and is inconsistent with the English definition of 
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"by accident" used by this Court since 1922. The key requirement of an accident under the Carling 
{729 P.2d 22} decision, as well as prior decisions, was that the occurrence be unanticipated, 
unplanned and unintended. The highlighted phrase emphasized that where either the cause of the 
injury or the result of an exertion was different from what would normally be expected to occur, the 
occurrence was unplanned, unforeseen, unintended and therefore "by accident." 
Policy considerations also militate in favor of rejecting the notion that the phrase "by accident" requires 
an unusual event. There is nothing in the term "accident" that suggests that only that which is unusual 
is accidental. See Robertson v. Industrial Commission, 109 Utah at 33, 40, 163 P.2d at 335, 338 
(Wade, J., concurring; Wolfe, J., dissenting). An accident does not occur simply because a worker is 
injured during an unusual activity. This argument is illustrated by Professor Larson in his treatise on 
workmen's compensation with the following example: 
If an employee intentionally and knowingly undertakes to lift an unusual load, the cause (i.e., the 
lifting) is no more accidental than if he deliberately lifted a normal load. Or if a gardener 
deliberately continues to mow the lawn in the rain, a passerby observing him would not say that he 
was undergoing an accident merely because it is unusual to mow lawns in the rain. 
Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 38.62, at 7-162 (1986) (footnotes omitted). 
Larson also criticizes the usual-unusual distinction as being unworkable in practice. Realistically, it is 
impossible to determine what are the usual and normal requirements of a job. People work in good 
weather and bad, lift heavy items as well as light ones, and work for long hours as well as short ones. 
None of these activities may be unusual or unexpected. Id. § 38.63 at 7-164 to -168. 
The unworkability of the usual-unusual event requirement is further evidenced by comparing 
seemingly irreconcilable decisions by this Court. Compare Kaiser Steel v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 
(back injury to miner with previous back problems held to be a compensable accident despite being 
caused by shoveling coal in the usual course of employment), with Farmers Grain Cooperative v. 
Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (no accident where worker with previous back problems sustained back injury 
while delivering 100-pound bags of whey); compare Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 2d 141, 
405 P.2d 613 (compensable accident for back injury resulting from filing paper in lower drawer) with 
Billings Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104 (no accident where worker sustained knee injury 
resulting from bending to pick up small parts). 
We believe that the Court's real concern in the Redman line of cases was the presence or absence of 
proof of causation to support an award of compensation. See generally Church of Jesus Christ ol 
Latter-Day Saints, 590 P.2d at 332 (Wilkins, J., dissenting). As will be discussed in the next section, 
the Court has developed two parallel lines of authority on the causation issue, one of which requires 
an unusual event in order to meet the statutory causation requirement. Although proof of an unusual 
event may be helpful in determining causation, it is not required as an element of "by accident" in 
section 35-1-45. "The basic and indispensable ingredient of 'accident' is unexpectedness." Schmidt, 
617 P.2d, at 696 (Wilkins, J., concurring) (quoting 1B Larson Workmans Compensation, at 7-5 (1980). 
We therefore reaffirm those cases which hold that an accident is an unexpected or unintended 
occurrence that may be either the cause or the result of an injury. We thus necessarily abandon the 
analysis of "by accident" in the Redman line of cases which predicates the "accident" determination 
upon the occurrence of an unusual event. 
II. 
The second element of a compensable accident requires proof of a causal connection between the 
injury and the worker's employment duties. Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory v. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367, 
1370 (Utah 1983). In workers' compensation {729 P.2d 23} cases involving internal failures, the key 
issue is usually one of causation. Ordinarily, causation is proved by the production and interpretation 
of medical evidence either alone or together with other evidence. See Keller, 657 P.2d at 1367, 1370; 
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Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1980). Because of the difficulties of 
diagnosis of internal failures and because of the possibility that a preexisting condition may have 
contributed to the injury, special causation rules have been developed for internal failure cases. See 
Larson, supra, § 38.81, at 7-269; Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 20-21, 201 
P.2d 961, 970-71 (Wolfe, J., concurring specially). 
This Court initially responded to the problem of causation in internal failure cases by suggesting that 
the Commission use a clear and convincing evidence standard when an internal failure was caused by 
an exertion in the workplace.5 See Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n. v. Industrial 
Commission, 104 Utah 61, 74, 138 P.2d 233, 238 (1943). The clear and convincing evidence standard 
was rejected, however, in Lipman v. Industrial Commission, 592 P.2d 616, 618 (Utah 1979), with the 
rationale that such a standard would make workers' compensation benefits nearly impossible to 
recover where the deceased suffered from a preexisting condition. Accordingly, the standard to prove 
causal connection is preponderance of the evidence. Id. 
The second method that has been used to ensure causal connection in internal failure cases is to 
require proof that an unusual event or activity precipitated the injury. Presumably, this requirement 
was used to prevent compensating a person predisposed to internal failure where the preexisting 
condition contributed more to the injury than his usual work-activity. The following internal failure 
cases illustrate that evidence of an unusual event or activity is necessary to prove causation. Billings 
Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104, 106-07 (Utah 1983); Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo, 
642 P.2d 722, 726 n.12 (Utah 1982); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial 
Commission, 590 P.2d 328, 329 (Utah 1979); IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828, 829 (Utah 
1978); Nuzum v. Roosendahl Construction & Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah 1977); Jones 
v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640 (1952); Robertson v. Industrial Commission, 
109 Utah 25, 163 P.2d 331 (1945); Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n v. Industrial Commission, 
104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d at 233; see Schmidt, 617 P.2d at 697-99 (Crockett, J., dissenting); Farmers 
Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237, 238-39 (Utah 1980); Mellen v. Industrial Commission, 19 
Utah 2d 373, 374, 431 P.2d 798, 799 (1967); Purity Biscuit, 115 Utah at 30, 201 P.2d at 975 (Latimer, 
J., dissenting). Defendants argue that any rule that awards compensation based on usual exertion will 
open the floodgates for payment of benefits for all internal injuries that coincidentally occur at work. 
They claim that the unusual exertion requirement is necessary to prevent the employer from becoming 
a general insurer. They argue that without the unusual exertion rule, employment opportunities for 
persons with a history or indication of physical disability or handicap will be reduced. 
Despite precedent supporting the "unusual exertion" rule, the claimant urges us to follow a separate 
line of authority that awards compensation for injuries that occur during usual and ordinary workplace 
activity. These cases typically award compensation where the claimant was engaged in a workplace 
activity and where there is adequate evidence of medical causation. See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. 
Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981) (award for compensation affirmed for a coal miner's back injury 
despite absence of unusual incident); Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d at 695 
(compensation awarded for {729 P.2d 24} back injuries arising from ordinary duties upon proof of 
medical causal connection between workplace exertions and the injury); Residential and Commercial 
Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 529 P.2d 427 (Utah 1974) (carpenter's back injury from 
lifting, bending, and twisting in the ordinary course of work compensable); Powers v. Industrial 
Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740, 742 (1967) (awarding compensation to fireman for 
exertions in the normal course of employment - the Court rejecting the unusual exertion test in favor 
of ordinary exertion); Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (1965) (back 
injury from filing papers in lower drawer of cabinet compensable); Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949). Although the usual exertion rule was questioned in 
Mellen v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d at 375-76, 431 P.2d at 800, that decision failed to 
explicitly overrule the usual exertion line of cases. Moreover, Residential and Commercial 
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Construction Co., Schmidt, and Kaiser Steel have awarded compensation for usual workplace activity 
after the Mellen decision. Clearly, the usual exertion rule is not simply an aberration in Utah law. 
When read in chronological sequence, our opinions demonstrate an inconsistent and confused 
approach to determining when an accident arose out of or in the course of employment. Much of this 
confusion can be traced to fundamental problems stemming from the use of the usual-unusual 
distinction as a means of proving causation. Larson criticizes the unusual exertion requirement by 
itself as a "clumsy and ill-fitting device with which to ensure causal connection." Larson, supra, § 
38.81, at 7-270. The problems in determining what activities were usual or unusual were recognized 
as long ago as 1949 when Justice Wolfe wrote that a "Pandora's box of difficulties may be 
opened by the refinements between usual and unusual, exertion and overexertion, ordinary and 
extraordinary exertion measured by the individual involved or by the industrial function performed by 
him or both." Purity Biscuit, 115 Utah at 23, 201 P.2d at 972 (Wolfe, J., concurring specially). The 
contents of the Pandora's box feared by Justice Wolfe are now evident in the plethora of our cases 
struggling with a definition of a compensable accident based upon the usualness or ordinariness of an 
activity. 
Professor Larson has also criticized the usual-unusual distinction because the ordinariness of the 
activity fails to consider that some occupations routinely require a usual exertion capable of causing 
injury. Likewise, other occupations, such as deskwork, require so little physical effort that an "unusual 
exertion" may be insufficient to prove that the resulting accident arose out of the employment. Larson, 
supra, § 38.81, at 7-270. 6 
Because we find the present use of the usual-unusual distinction unhelpful and our prior precedent 
inconsistent, we take this opportunity to examine an alternative causation analysis that may better 
meet the objectives of the workers' compensation laws. We are mindful that the key question in 
determining causation is whether, given this body and this exertion, the exertion in fact contributed to 
the injury. Id. § 38.82, at 7-271; Purity Biscuit, 115 Utah at 23, 20 P.2d at 972 (Wolfe, J., concurring 
specially). 
The language "arising out of or in the course of his employment" found in U.CA, 1953, § 35-1-45 
(Supp. 1986), was apparently intended to ensure that compensation is only awarded where there is a 
{729 P.2d 25} sufficient causal connection between the disability and the working conditions. The 
causation requirement makes it necessary to distinguish those injuries which (a) coincidentally occur 
at work because a preexisting condition results in symptoms which appear during work hours without 
any enhancement from the workplace, and (b) those injuries which occur because some condition or 
exertion required by the employment increases the risk of injury which the worker normally faces in his 
everyday life. See Bryant v. Masters Machine Co., 444 A.2d 329, 337 (Me. 1982). Only the latter type 
of injury is compensable under U.CA., 1953, § 35-1-45. There is no fixed formula by which the 
causation issue may be resolved, and the issue must be determined on the facts of each case. 
Professor Larson has suggested a two-part causation test which is consistent with the purpose of our 
workers ' compensation laws and helpful in determining causation. We therefore adopt that test. 
Larson suggests that compensable injuries can best be identified by first considering the legal cause 
of the injury and then its medical cause. Larson, supra, § 38.83(a), at 7-273. "Under the legal test, the 
law must define what kind of exertion satisfies the test of arising out of the employment'... . [then] 
the doctors must say whether the exertion (having been held legally sufficient to support 
compensation) in fact caused this [injury]."7 Larson, supra, § 38.83(a), at 7-276 to -277. 
1. Legal Cause - Whether an injury arose out of or in the course of employment is difficult to 
determine where the employee brings to the workplace a personal element of risk such as a 
preexisting condition. Just because a person suffers a preexisting condition, he or she is not 
disqualified from obtaining compensation. Our cases make clear that "the aggravation or lighting up of 
a pre-existing disease by an industrial accident is compensable . . . . " Powers v. Industrial 
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Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140, 143-44, 427 P.2d 740, 743 (1967) (footnote omitted). To meet the legal 
causation requirement, a claimant with a preexisting condition must show that the employment 
contributed something substantial to increase the risk he already faced in everyday life because of his 
condition. This additional element of risk in the workplace is usually supplied by an exertion greater 
than that undertaken in normal, everyday life. This extra exertion serves to offset the preexisting 
condition of the employee as a likely cause of the injury, thereby eliminating claims for impairments 
resulting from a personal risk rather than exertions at work. Larson, supra, § 38.83(b), at 7-278. 
Larson summarized how the legal cause rule would work in practice as follows: 
{729 P.2d 26} If there is some personal causal contribution in the form of a [preexisting condition], the 
employment contribution must take the form of an exertion greater than that of nonemployment life . . . 
If there is no personal causal contribution, that is, if there is no prior weakness or disease, any 
exertion connected with the employment and causally connected with the [injury] as a matter of 
medical fact is adequate to satisfy the legal test of causation. 
Id. Thus, where the claimant suffers from a preexisting condition which contributes to the injury, 
an unusual or extraordinary exertion is required to prove legal causation. Where there is no 
preexisting condition, a usual or ordinary exertion is sufficient.8 
We also accept Larson's suggestion that the comparison between the usual and unusual exertion be 
defined according to an objective standard. "Note that the comparison is not with this employee's 
usual exertion in his employment but with the exertions of normal nonemployment life of this or any 
other person." Larson, supra, § 38.83(b), at 7-279 (emphasis in original). See also Johns-Manville 
Products v. Industrial Commission, 78 III. 2d 171, 178, 399 N.E.2d 606, 610, 35 III. Dec. 540 (1979) 
(compensation denied where the risk of the employment activity "is no greater than that to which he 
would have been exposed had he not been so employed"); Strickland v. National Gypsum Co., 348 
So., 2d 497, 499 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977) (employment risk must be ma danger or risk materially in 
excess of that to which people not so employed are exposed . . . . ' " Quoting from City of Tuscaloosa v. 
Howard, 55 Ala. App. 701, 705-06, 318 So. 2d 729, 732 (1975)). But see Market Food Distributors, 
Inc. v. Levenson, 383 So. 2d 726, 727 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (subjective test: "the employment 
must involve an exertion greater than that normally performed by the employee during his 
non-employment life"). Thus, the precipitating exertion must be compared with the usual wear and 
tear and exertions of nonemployment life, not the nonemployment life of the particular worker. 
We believe an objective standard of comparison will provide a more consistent and predictable 
standard for the Commission and this Court to follow. In evaluating typical nonemployment activity, the 
focus is on what typical nonemployment activities are generally expected of people in today's society, 
not what this particular claimant is accustomed to doing. Typical activities and exertions expected of 
men and women in the latter part of the 20th century, for example, include taking full garbage cans to 
the street, lifting and carrying baggage for travel, changing a flat tire on an automobile, lifting a small 
child to chest height, and climbing the stairs in buildings. By {729 P„2d 27} using an objective 
standard, the case law will eventually define a standard for typical 'nonemployment activity" in much 
the way case law has developed the standard of care for the reasonable man in tort law. 
2. Medical Cause - The second part of Larson's dual-causation test requires that the claimant prove 
the disability is medically the result of an exertion or injury that occurred during a work-related activity. 
The purpose of the medical cause test is to ensure that there is a medically demonstrable causal link 
between the work-related exertions and the unexpected injuries that resulted from those strains. The 
medical causal requirement will prevent an employer from becoming a general insurer of his 
employees and discourage fraudulent claims. 
With the issue being one primarily of causation, the importance of the . . . . medical panel 
becomes manifest. It is through the expertise of the medical panel that the Commission should be 
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able to make the determination of whether the injury sustained by a claimant is causally 
connected or contributed to by the claimant's employment. 
Schmidt, 617 P.2d at 697 (Wilkins, J., concurring). Under the medical cause test, the claimant 
must show by evidence, opinion, or otherwise that the stress, strain, or exertion required by his or 
her occupation led to the resulting injury or disability. In the event the claimant cannot show a 
medical causal connection, compensation should be denied.9 
III. 
We now undertake to apply the foregoing analysis to the case before us. In reviewing findings of fact 
of the Industrial Commission, we determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the 
Commission's findings. Champion Home Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703 P.2d 306, 307 (Utah 
1985). 
We have previously stated that the key element of whether an injury occurred "by accident" is whether 
the injury was unexpected. After reviewing the record, we find no substantial evidence that the injury 
was not unexpected. It is clear from the uncontradicted testimony of the claimant that he experienced 
an unexpected and unanticipated injury to his back as he lifted a crate of milk in the cramped area of 
the cooler. Although the claimant had injured his back on prior jobs, he had not complained of pain or 
limitations at his job with Kent's Foods. There is no evidence which indicates that this injury was 
predictable or that it developed gradually as with an occupational disease or progressive back 
disorder. While the employer's report of injury and the medical records do not corroborate that a 
sudden and identifiable injury occurred in the cooler, the reports are unhelpful in determining whether 
the injury was unexpected. 
It appears that the administrative law judge applied the "unusual event or trauma" rule in defining an 
accident. We have rejected that test in lieu of a test based on unexpectedness. Moreover, the 
administrative law judge's emphasis on prior injuries is not determinative of whether an accident 
occurred. We have previously held that the aggravation or "lighting up" of a preexisting condition by an 
internal failure is a compensable accident. Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140, 143, 
427 P.2d 740, 743 (1967). We conclude therefore that the decision of the Commission that the 
claimant's injury was not "by accident" was not based on the evidence, and that decision is, therefore, 
erroneous. 
The key issue in this case, like most internal failure cases, is whether the injury "arose out of or in the 
course of {729 P.2d 28} employment." Since the claimant had previous back problems, to meet the 
legal causation requirement he must show that moving and lifting several piles of dairy products 
weighing thirty to fifty pounds in the confined area of the cooler exceeded the exertion that the 
average person typically undertakes in nonemployment life. The evidence presented by the claimant 
was insufficient for us to make a determination regarding legal causation. It is unclear from the record 
how many crates were moved by the claimant, the distance the crates were moved, the precise weight 
of the crates, and the size of the area in which the lifting and moving took place. Because the claimant 
did not have the benefit of the foregoing opinion, we remand for further fact-finding on this issue. 
Moreover, the record is insufficient to show medical causation. It is unclear from the medical reports 
whether the doctors were aware of the specific incident in the cooler. Further, the case was not 
submitted to a medical panel for its evaluation. Without sufficient evidence of medical causation, we 
are unable to determine whether there is a medically demonstrable causal link between the lift in the 
cooler and the injury to the claimant's back. We therefore remand to the Industrial Commission for 
additional evidence and findings on the question of medical causation. 
The decision of the Commission is vacated and remanded. 
WE CONCUR: Richard C. Howe, Justice, Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice. 
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Concur 
Concur by: HALL 
Dissent 
Dissent by: HALL; STEWART 
HALL, Chief Justice: (Concurring and Dissenting). 
I concur in remanding this case to the Commission for the purpose of determining whether the work 
incident aggravated a preexisting condition such as would warrant an award of compensation. 1 
However, I do not join the Court in adopting an "unexpected result" standard to be applied in 
determining the existence of a compensable accident. 
I do not believe that this Court has "misconstrued the historical and logical" definition of "by accident" 
in the bulk of its recent cases concerning the issue at bar. The majority's reliance upon Purity Biscuit 
Co. v. Industrial Commission! is misplaced. The holding th.erein is without precedential value because 
it has been simply ignored.3 The only case in which this Court followed Purity Biscuit is Schmidt v. 
Industrial Commission^ which support is similarly without precedential value because it has also been 
ignored beginning with Painter Motor Co. v. Ostlert5 the very next accident case handed down. In that 
case, the Court cited and relied upon Carling v. Industrial Commission6 and again defined "accident" 
as an unanticipated, unintended occurrence different from what would normally be expected to occur 
in the usual course of events. In my view, Purity Biscuit and Schmidt emerge as aberrations in our 
post-war case law. 
The majority opinion holds that henceforth an injury by accident "is an unexpected or unintended 
occurrence that may be either the cause or the result of an injury." (Emphasis in original.) However, 
the legislature, whose prerogative it is to establish policy, has chosen wording which precludes such 
an interpretation. The reasoning of Justice Latimer's dissent in Purity {729 P.2d 29} Biscuit illustrates 
the shortcomings of the majority's interpretation. The word "accident," when viewed in isolation, may 
be used to denote both an unexpected occurrence which produces injury as well as an unexpected 
injury. The word "injury," on the other hand, denotes a result and not a cause. Had the legislature only 
used the word "injury" in section 35-1-45 (U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 (Repl. Vol. 4B, 1974 ed., Supp. 
1986)), then that statute would cover all results regardless of the cause. Had the legislature only used 
the word "accident," then I would agree with the majority's holding today that the legislature intended 
to cover both the cause and the result. In fact, however, the legislature has used both words "injury" 
and "accident." It follows that the word "accident" must be interpreted as focusing upon the cause and 
not the result. In short, the majority's interpretation writes the word "injury" out of the statute. Such a 
decision is unwarranted in my view. 
The legislature recently amended section 35-1-45,7 but chose to leave intact the standard which limits 
the payment of compensation to those injured "by accident arising out of or in the course o f . . . . 
employment."8 Moreover, the singular "injury by accident" standard has not been altered or amended 
since its inception in 1917.9 The legislature thus being satisfied with the Court's interpretation of the 
term "accident" in the long line of cases beginning with Carling v. Industrial Commission,!!) I decline to 
embark upon a new effort to redefine that term. 
STEWART, Justice: (Dissenting). 
I dissent The majority defines the statutory term "accident" to mean "unexpected result," regardless of 
whether it is produced by a usual or an unusual event. The majority also defines the term "arising out 
of or in the course of employment" to impose legal and medical causation requirements. See U.C.A., 
© 2005 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. AH rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to 
the restrictions and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement. 
1953, §35-1-45. 
Curiously, the requirement of "legal causation" has two different meanings, depending upon the 
physical condition of the worker at the time he is injured. A worker having no preexisting medical 
condition or handicap need only prove that the accident was caused by a "usual or ordinary exertion." 
But for congenially handicapped persons and for persons who have suffered preexisting industrial 
injuries (which presumably have left the worker with some physical weakness or deterioration), legal 
causation has a different meaning. Such a worker may receive compensation only if the "employment 
contribution" to the internal breakdown is "greater than that of nonemployment life." According to the 
majority, such a worker must now prove that his internal breakdown was caused by "an unusual or 
extraordinary exertion'1 in order to establish the requisite legal causation, even though the majority 
opinion itself criticizes at length the "usual-unusual distinction as a means of proving causation." How 
the majority can reject that standard for persons having no preexisting condition, yet embrace that 
standard for persons with preexisting conditions, is baffling. 
Furthermore, the difference between the "unusual or extraordinary exertion" which a worker with a 
preexisting condition must demonstrate and the "usual exertion" which a person with no preexisting 
condition must demonstrate is far from clear. The latter standard is to be judged with respect to the 
"'normal nonemployment life of this or any other person."'The Court emphasizes that the 
"precipitating exertion must be compared with the usual wear and tear and exertions of 
nonemployment life, not the nonemployment life of the particular worker." What the term "usual wear 
and tear and exertions of nonemployment" means is not defined by the {729 P.2d 30} majority. The 
few examples set out do little to explain the concept aimed at, other than to suggest that the term 
means something more than simple, life-sustaining activities. 
I wholly fail to understand why persons who have a preexisting condition should be placed in the 
disadvantaged position, indeed the near-remediless position, that the majority opinion imposes upon 
them. The purpose of the Second Injury Fund is to provide compensation for workers who have 
preexisting medical conditions and therefore run a greater risk of injury when they expose themselves 
to the hazards of the work place. But the law should encourage such persons to work rather than 
encouraging them to abandon the work force for some kind of unearned support. 
This Court has repeatedly stated that the Second Injury Fund was designed to encourage employers 
to hire persons with preexisting conditions by spreading the risk throughout the industry to assure 
such persons that their injuries will be cared for without imposing extraordinary liabilities on the 
employers who hire them. Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano, 610 P.2d 334, 337 (Utah 1980); 
McPhie v. United States Steel Corp., 551 P.2d 504, 505 (Utah 1976). Society certainly ought to favor 
those policies which encourage people to work, rather than policies that deter employers from offering 
gainful employment to those who have a higher risk of work-related injury. There is little personal or 
social benefit from a policy that tends to discourage persons from working because of prior injuries or 
disabilities. 
Further, it is fundamentally unfair and flatiy inconsistent with the basic purposes of the workmen's 
compensation laws to impose higher standards for compensation on those with preexisting medical 
conditions than on those without. Tort law generally does not do so. A defendant in a negligence 
action is required to take the victim as the defendant finds him; whatever unusual vulnerabilities the 
victim may have are disregarded. That principle should not be, and until now has not been, different in 
workmen's compensation law, which is really a substitute for tort law remedies. In short, handicapped 
or previously injured persons who are injured by an industrial accident are simply discriminated 
against by having to meet the majority's rigorous legal cause requirement. 
I am also unable to understand how an administrative law judge, the Industrial Commission, or an 
appellate court is supposed to determine what "typical nonemployment activities" are "in today's 
society," as they now must do for the purpose of determining legal causation for workers with 
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preexisting medical conditions. Does that mean what a typical sixty-five-year-old does or a typical 
twenty-one-year-old does during his or her nonemployment activities? Is it what a professional football 
player does in his leisure time or what a ballet dancer does? Is it what a sedentary worker does in his 
or her off-hours or what a forest ranger does? 
Instead of defining a meaningful standard, the majority provides examples which supposedly illustrate 
the unarticulated principle. The examples "include taking full garbage cans to the street, lifting and 
carrying baggage for travel, changing a flat tire on an automobile, lifting a small child to chest height, 
and climbing the stairs in buildings." These few examples, which I find to be arguable in any event 
since they reflect only what some people may do from time to time, do not substitute for a legal 
standard. I seriously wonder whether changing a flat tire on an automobile is a typical activity in 
today's society, and I do not know how much luggage the "typical" individual lifts or how far he or she 
carries it. The point is that the majority has not set forth a workable standard at all. In fact, I have 
serious doubt that such an artificial construct as "typical nonemployment activities" will produce more 
fair and rational decisions than our past cases. The majority simply assumes a "typical" individual for 
the purpose of establishing a rational standard. Unfortunately, disabilities happen to real people, not to 
"average" people, and the law has always recognized {729 P.2d 31} as much. In short, I do not think 
that the majority's newly established standard will produce decisions one whit more consistent or 
rational than those produced in the past.1 
The majority also holds that an injured person must prove that the disability is "medically the result of 
an exertion or injury that occurred during a work-related activity." With a degree of hope that I think is 
unwarranted, the majority states that "the medical causal requirement will prevent an employer from 
becoming a general insurer of his employees and discourage fraudulent claims." I am fearful that that 
hope is seriously misplaced. 
Certainly Professor Larson, largely the source of the Court's new standards and analysis, is highly 
acclaimed in this field of law, but there is much to be said for the case-by-case approach in 
hammering out legal doctrine, even if it does on occasion produce inconsistencies. I readily concede 
that present law needs to be rationalized and that some cases should be overruled because they are 
hopelessly inconsistent with other cases, but I do not believe that the law needs to be revolutionized in 
such a manner as to defeat those humane policies intended to allow for the injuries of workers who 
come to the work place in an impaired condition. 
I also join the Chief Justice's dissent. 
Footnotes 
Footnotes 
1 We take judicial notice that liquid milk weighs about the same as liquid water or approximately 8 
1/3 pounds per gallon. Thus, four gallons of milk weigh about 33 pounds without the containers and 
crate. Six gallons of milk weigh approximately 50 pounds without the containers and crate. 
2 We note that many of our prior opinions so intermingled the causation and accident analyses that 
it is impossible to segregate them and determine the basis for the Court's decision. For example, the 
opinion in Sabo's Bee. Serv. v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982), mixes the accident and causation 
elements in the following language: "It appears to be mere coincidence that defendant's injury . . . . 
occurred at work. Defendant bears the burden of showing otherwise. Proof of the causal relationship 
of duties of employment to unexpected injury is simply lacking . . . . The Commission's conclusion that 
an accident occurred is without any substantive support in the record." Id. at 726 (footnotes omitted). 
See also Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Comm'n, 590 P.2d 328, 329-30 
(Utah 1979); Pintar v. Industrial Comm'n, 14 Utah 2d 276, 382 P.2d 414 (1963). For an example of an 
opinion which does separate the accident and causation analysis, see Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Comm'n, 590 P.2d 328, 330-31 (Utah 1979) (Wilkins, J., dissenting). 
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3 An "internal failure" refers to a category of injuries that arise from general organ or structural 
failure brought about by an exertion in the workplace. Internal failure claims evaluated by this Court 
include heart attacks, hernias, and back injuries. See generally, Note, Schmidt v. Industrial 
Commission and Injury Compensability under Utah Worker's Compensation Law: A Just Result or 
Just Another "Living Corpse"?, 1981 Utah L Rev. 393. 
4 The holding of Purity Biscuit was questioned in Mellen v. Industrial Comm'n., 19 Utah 2d 373, 431 
P.2d 798 (1967), where the opinion erroneously stated that Purity Biscuit "has never been cited by this 
or any other court to support the law of that case." 19 Utah 2d at 375, 431 P.2d at 799. In fact, by 
1967 Purity Biscuit had been relied upon in decisions from the courts of nine other states. Alabama 
Textile Prods. Corp. v. Grantham, 263 Ala. 179, 183-84, 82 So. 2d 204, 208 (1955) (finding of unusual 
strain or exertion unnecessary to support conclusion that claimant suffered injury by accident); Bryant 
Stave & Heading Co. v. White, 227 Ark. 147, 151-52, 296 S.W.2d 436, 439-40 (1956) (Purity Biscuit 
cited as stating majority position that usual exertion causing an internal failure may be by accident); 
Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n., 231 Cal. App. 2d 111, 41 Cal. Rptr. 628, 635 (1964) 
(relying upon causation rule of Purity Biscuit); Spivey v. Battaglia Fruit Co., 138 So. 2d 308, 314 (Fla. 
1962) (back herniation from rupture of intervertebral disc satisfies statutory requirement of 
suddenness); Roman v. Minneapolis St. Ry, 268 Minn. 367, 380, 129 N.W.2d 550, 559 (1964) (calls 
Purity Biscuit "a well-considered workmen's compensation case" that supported an award where 
many factors led to the disability); Murphy v. Anaconda Co., 133 Mont. 198, 208, 321 P.2d 1094, 1100 
(1958) (quoting favorably the reliance on Purity Biscuit in Bryant Stave, 227 Ark. at 151-52, 296 
S.W.2d at 439-40, and holding that a usual exertion may lead to a compensable injury where the 
causal relationship is established); Neylon v. Ford Motor Co., 10 N.J. 325, 327-28, 91 A.2d 569, 570 
(1952) (Purity Biscuit cited in support of rule that internal failure from ordinary or usual exertion is an 
"injury by accident"); Olson v. State Indust Accident Comm'n., 222 Ore. 407, 416-17, 352 P.2d 1096, 
1101 (1960) (O'Connell, J., specially concurring) (dissent to Purity Biscuit quoted); Cooperv. Vinatieri, 
73 S.D. 418, 424, 43 N.W.2d 747, 750-51 (1950) (Purity Biscuit cited as an example of the divergent 
viewpoints for defining a compensable accident). 
In addition, the decision in Purity Biscuit was relied upon by the majority in three Utah cases. See 
Jones v. California Packing Co., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640, 642; Carling v. Industrial Commission, 
16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202; Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740. 
Despite this support for the decision in Purity Biscuit, the Court in Mellen concluded without further 
discussion that "the Purity Biscuit decision certainly needs a healthy reappraisement." 19 Utah 2d at 
376, 431 P.2d at 800. Two years later in Redman Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n., 22 Utah 
2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 (1969), the Court again questioned the Purity Biscuit decision in a superficial 
analysis that concluded: "Purity enjoys the unique and doubtful distinction of being a living corpse." 22 
Utah 2d at 403, 454 P.2d at 286. After considering those cases from Utah and other jurisdictions that 
have relied on Purity Biscuit, we now cannot agree that it was a "living corpse." Moreover, even if 
Purity Biscuit lay dormant, it was resurrected by Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693, 695 
(Utah 1980). 
5 In Nebraska, an enhanced standard of proof is still used where the employee suffers from a 
preexisting condition. See Mann v. City of Omaha, 211 Neb. 583, 592, 319 N.W.2d 454, 458 (1982). 
6 Larson's observation is consistent with this Court's rationale for rejecting the unusual exertion 
requirement in Purity Biscuit, 115 Utah at 16, 201 P.2d at 968: 
If [overexertion] is the test no one will ever know what this court will consider sufficient 
overexertion. Also under that test if the work usually required by the job is so great that it would 
break the strongest man even he will not be able to recover. But if it is more than usual exertion 
which causes the injury the employee can recover no matter how light the work is which causes 
the injury. 
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Id. 
7 Cases from other jurisdictions which have accepted the dual-causation standard suggested by 
Larson include: Market Foods Distribs., Inc. v. Levenson, 383 So. 2d 726 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) 
(claimant with preexisting spinal disease denied compensation where injury could have been triggered 
at any time during normal movement and exertion at work not greater than typical nonemployment 
exertion); Guidry v. Sline Indus. Painters, Inc., 418 So. 2d 626 (La. 1982) (claimant granted 
compensation where injury resulted from stress, exertion, and strain greater than that in everyday 
nonemployment life); Bryant v. Masters Mach. Co., 444 A.2d 329 (Me. 1982) (claimant with 
preexisting condition awarded compensation for back injury resulting from fall from his stool at work 
because of increased risk of falling where employees moved around him at work); Barrett v. Herbert 
Eng'g, Inc., 371 A.2d 633 (Me. 1977) (claimant with preexisting back condition denied compensation 
for injury resulting from working at normal gait since there was no work-related enhancement of 
personal risk); Mann v. City of Omaha, 211 Neb. 583, 319 N.W.2d 454 (1982) (policeman with history 
of heart disease awarded compensation for heart attack at home where claimant's physician testified 
that attack was caused by stress of police work rather than personal risk factors); Sellens v. Allen 
Prods. Co., 206 Neb. 506, 293 N.W.2d 415 (1980) (claimant with preexisting heart problems denied 
compensation for heart attack suffered while unloading 28-pound cases from truck trailer despite 
sedentary nonworking lifestyle using objective standard of average worker in nonemployment life); 
Couture v. Mammoth Groceries, Inc., 116 N.H. 181, 355 A.2d 421 (1976) (claimant with no preexisting 
heart problems awarded benefits upon proof that lifting beef medically caused the fatal heart attack). 
8 Larson highlights the difference between the unusual-usual exertion test with the rule we today 
adopt with the following examples of extreme cases in the heart attack area: 
Suppose X's job involves frequent lifting of 200-pound bags, and one such 200-pound lift medically 
produces a heart attack. Under the old unusual-exertion rule there would be no compensation, 
regardless of previous heart condition. Under the suggested rule there would be compensation, even 
in the presence of a history of heart disease, because people generally do not lift 200-pound weights 
as a part of nonemployment life, and therefore this episode cannot be ascribed to the ordinary wear 
and tear of life. 
Suppose Y's job involves no lifting. Suppose he lifts a 20-pound weight on the job, and suppose there 
is medical testimony that this lift caused his heart attack. Under the old test, exclusively concerned 
with the comparison between this employee's usual exertions and the precipitating exertion, there 
would be compensation. Under the suggested rule the result would depend on whether there was a 
personal causal element in the form of a previously weakened heart. If there was not, compensation 
would be awarded, since the employment contributed something and the employee's personal life 
nothing to the cause of the collapse. If there was [a previously weakened heart], compensation would 
be denied in spite of the medical causal contribution, because legally the personal causal contribution 
was substantial, while the employment added nothing to the usual wear and tear of life - which 
certainly includes lifting objects weighing 20 pounds such as bags of golf clubs, minnow pails, and 
step ladders. 
Larson, supra, § 38.83, at 7-280-81 (footnote omitted). 
9 Evidence of the ordinariness or usualness of the employee's exertions may be relevant to the 
medical conclusion of causal connection. Where the injury results from latent symptoms with an 
illness such as heart disease, proof of medical causation may be especially difficult. Larson's treatise 
cites many examples of cases where compensation claims were defeated because of inadequate 
proof of medical causation. See Larson, supra, § 38.83(i), at 7-319 to 321. Compare Guidry v. Sline 
Indus. Painters, Inc., 418 So. 2d 626 (La. 1982) (heart attack triggered by stress, exertion, and strain 
greater than sedentary life of average worker compensable). 
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1 Powers v. Industrial Comm'n., 19 Utah 2d 140, 143-44, 427 P.2d 740, 743 (1967). 
2 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949). 
3 Emery Mining Corp. v. DeFriez, 694 P.2d 606 (Utah 1984); Giles v. Industrial Comm'n., 692 P.2d 
743 (Utah 1984); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Jacobs, 689 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1984); Billings Computer Corp. v. 
Tarango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1983); Sabo's Sec. Sen/, v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982); Kaiser 
Steel v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981); Farmers Grain Co-op v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah 
1980); Church of Jesus Christ ofLatter-Day Saints v. Industrial Comm'n., 590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979); 
Redman Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n., 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 (1969); Carting v. 
Industrial Comm'n., 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965). 
4 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980). 
5 617 P.2d 975 (Utah 1980). 
6 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965). 
7 Act of Jan. 27, 1984, ch. 75, § 1,1984 Utah Laws 610, 610. 
8 U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 (Repl. Vol. 4B, 1974 ed., Supp. 1986). 
9 Act of March 18, 1917, ch. 100, § 52a, 1917 Utah Laws 306, 322-23. 
10 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965). 
1 In my view, the decisions of this Court are generally reconcilable with only a few glaring 
exceptions and most of them prior to 1980. That there are more inconsistencies the further back one 
goes in our body of law is not particularly unexpected. In any event, I doubt that the new approach will 
produce unwavering consistency over the years. 
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Hart v.S.L. County. 
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E. Tweedy, John Does 1 through 10, Utah Department of Transportation, and State of Utah, j 
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Third District, Salt Lake Department. Division I. The Honorable Tyrone E. Medley. 
Disposition Affirmed in part but reversed and remanded for the exclusive 
purpose of properly calculating postjudgment interest and costs incurred on appeal, which 
should then be added to the $ 250,000 judgment owed by the County to Hart. 
Counsel Douglas R. Short and Patrick F. Holden, Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Evan A. Schmutz and Lance N. Long, Provo, for Appellee. 
Judges: Before Michael J. Wilkins, Associate Presiding Judge. WE CONCUR: James Z. Davis, Presiding 
Judge, Judith M. Billings, Judge. 
Opinion 
Opinion by: MICHAEL J. WILKINS 
{945 P.2d 127} OPINION 
WILKINS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Salt Lake County Commission (the County) appeals from the trial court's final judgment, which was 
entered following a jury trial in which the jury found the County negligent and liable for damages 
sustained by Richard S. Hart. The County also appeals the adverse post-trial orders entered by the 
trial court which, among other things, denied the County's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, denied the County's motion for relief from the judgment, granted Hart's motion to strike an 
affidavit, and denied the County's motion for a new trial. 
Hart cross-appeals. Hart appeals the final order of judgment entered because it reduced the portion of 
the jury award for which the County was responsible to $ 250,000, including interest and costs, 
pursuant to section 63-30-34 of the Utah Code. 
We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part. 
{945 P.2d 128} BACKGROUND 
In December 1986, Robert E. Tweedy, an unlicensed, drunk driver, collided with Hart in an automobile 
accident on Wasatch Boulevard. Robert L. Tweedy is the father of Robert E. Tweedy and the owner of 
the car involved in the collision. 
In June 1987, Hart filed a complaint against the Tweedys. In January 1989, Hart was allowed to 
amend his complaint to add additional defendants, including the County. In his amended complaint, 
Hart argued the County was negligent in the following five ways: (1) failing to properly design, 
engineer, and construct Wasatch Boulevard near the area where the collision occurred; (2) failing to 
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properly maintain the road; (3) failing to install adequate warning devices; (4) allowing the road to" 
remain in its dangerous condition after the County knew or should have known of the dangerous 
condition; and/or (5) failing to properly maintain the intersection in a reasonably safe condition. Hart 
argued that the shoulder of the road where he was driving at the time of the accident was not wide 
enough, and that had the shoulder been wider, he would have been able to avoid the collision. In 
February 1989, the County filed its answer and raised governmental immunity as a defense. 
In December 1991, the County moved for summary judgment against Hart on the grounds of 
governmental immunity and causation. During oral arguments on the County's motion, the County 
opted not to argue that it was protected from liability by governmental immunity. In March 1992, the 
trial court granted the County's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the accident was 
caused solely by Tweedy's intervening negligence. Hart appealed the trial court's decision. In June 
1993, this court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 
Meanwhile, Hart and the Tweedys entered into a settlement agreement. Consequently, in March 1992, 
the trial court ordered a judgment against Robert E. Tweedy and dismissed Robert L. Tweedy from 
the case. 
The trial of Hart's case against the County began at the end of August 1994 and lasted four days. At 
the end of the trial, the jury was given a special verdict form. The jury found the County to be fifty-one 
percent negligent and Robert E. Tweedy to be forty-nine percent negligent. The jury also found the 
damages, including special and general damages, to be $ 1,330,000. 
In September 1994, the County filed a motion to limit the amount of judgment in accordance with 
section 63-30-34 of the Utah Code, which Hart opposed. The trial court granted the County's motion in 
December 1994, limiting the County's portion of the judgment to the sum of $ 250,000, including costs 
and prejudgment and postjudgment interest. The trial court then entered a judgment on the jury's 
verdict in January 1995, by which the court ordered the County to pay Hart $ 250,000 and ordered 
Robert E. Tweedy to pay Hart forty-nine percent of $ 1,330,000. 
Several post-trial motions were filed following the trial court's order of judgment. First, the County filed 
a motion requesting judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a new trial, and remittitur. In its 
memorandum supporting this motion, the County argued, among other things, that the County was 
entitled to a new trial under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because the trial court 
abused its discretion in two ways: (1) it did not specifically include Hart on the special verdict form as a 
party to whom the jury could apportion fault, and (2) it denied the County's motion for a mistrial after 
allowing Hart to comment on the amount of the settlement agreement between Hart and the Tweedys. 
Hart opposed this motion. 
In March 1995, the County filed the affidavit of Michael E. Postma, the County's trial attorney in the 
case, in support of its Rule 59 motion for a new trial. The affidavit described the alleged 
circumstances surrounding (1) the trial court's decision to exclude Hart from the special verdict form 
and (2) the trial court's denial of the County's motion for mistrial after Hart referred to the settlement 
amount agreed to by Hart and the Tweedys. 
Hart moved to strike Postma's affidavit in March 1995. Then, in May 1995, the County filed a Motion 
for Relief from Judgment or {945 P.2d 129} Order/or Addendum to J.N.O.V. Among the arguments 
made in the memorandum supporting this motion, the County argued it was entitled to relief under 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because the Utah Supreme Court's decision Keegan 
v. State, issued in March 1995, represented an intervening change in appellate law regarding the 
issue of governmental immunity. Attached as an addendum to the memorandum supporting the 
motion was Tosh Kano's affidavit, in which Kano testified to the way in which the County decides 
whether to widen or not widen road shoulders. Hart again opposed this motion. 
Following oral argument on the County's motions, in September 1995, the trial court entered its 
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findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order regarding the County's motions requesting judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, a new trial, and remittitur. Among its conclusions, the trial court concluded 
the following: (1) the County both abandoned and waived its governmental immunity argument and 
failed to introduce any evidence to support it; (2) Keegan v. State did not represent a change in law, 
so the County's Rule 60(b) motion should be denied; and (3) the County's Rule 59 motion was 
procedurally defective and should be denied on procedural grounds. The trial court therefore denied 
all the County's motions. 
In September 1995, following entry of the trial court's findings, conclusions, and order, Hart filed a 
motion for reconsideration of the trial court's decision to limit the judgment against the County. That 
same month, the County filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, arguing that 
the County was immune from suit and that immunity is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction. The next 
month, Hart moved to strike Kano's affidavit. 
Finally, in a December 1995 minute entry, the trial court denied Hart's motion requesting that the trial 
court reconsider limiting the amount of the judgment against the County, denied the County's motion 
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and granted Hart's motion to strike Kano's affidavit. 
Both the County and Hart appeal. 
ANALYSIS 
The County makes three main arguments on appeal: (1) it did not owe a duty to Hart; (2) 
governmental immunity shielded it from liability; and (3) the trial court erroneously denied its motion for 
a new trial. Hart makes two main arguments on cross-appeal: (1) the trial court erred in capping the 
damages owed by the County to Hart under the damages cap statute because that statute is 
unconstitutional, and (2) the trial court erred by including interest and costs within the judgment 
reduced by the damages cap statute. We review each of these arguments in turn. 
A. The County's Duty to Hart 
We first address the County's argument that it did not owe a duty to Hart. 
To establish negligence, a plaintiff must first establish that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of 
care. See Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156,1159 (Utah 1991) ('"One essential element of a 
negligence action is a duty of reasonable care owed to the plaintiff by defendant.... Absent a 
showing of a duty, [the plaintiff] cannot recover."' (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); see also 
Lamarrv. Utah State Dep'tofTransp., 828 P.2d 535, 537 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (listing all four 
elements of negligence). On appeal, the County argues that under the public duty doctrine, it did not 
owe a duty to Hart. Therefore, the County argues, because it did not owe Hart a duty, it cannot be 
liable for negligence. 
However, Hart counters the County's argument by asserting that the County did not preserve this 
issue for appeal. Therefore, before we consider whether the County owed Hart a duty, we first 
address whether the County preserved this issue for appeal. 
To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must first raise the issue before the trial court. See 
West One Bank, Utah v. Life Ins. Co., 887 P.2d 880, 882 n.1 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). "'A matter is 
sufficiently raised if it is submitted to the trial court, and the court is afforded an opportunity to rule on 
the issue.'" State v. Starnes, {945 P.2d 130} 841 P.2d 712, 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citation 
omitted). For a court to be "afforded an opportunity to rule on the issue," several requirements must 
be met. First, the issue must be raised in a timely fashion. This court has explained: 
"To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must timely bring the issue to the attention of 
the trial court, thus providing the court an opportunity to rule on the issue's merits. 'Issues not 
raised in the trial court in timely fashion are deemed waived, precluding [the appellate court] from 
considering their merits on appeal.'" 
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Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill, 849 P.2d 602, 604 n.1 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citations omitted). 
Second, the issue must be specifically raised, see State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 820-21 (Utah 
1989), such that the issue is sufficiently raised to a "level of consciousness" before the trial court, 
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 802 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Third, the party must introduce to the 
trial court "supporting evidence or relevant legal authority" to support its argument. Tolman v. 
Winchester Hills Water Co., 912 P.2d 457, 461 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citation omitted); see also 
West One Bank, 887 P.2d at 882 n.1 ("The mere mention of an issue in the pleadings . . . is 
insufficient to raise an issue at trial and thus insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.'" (quoting 
LeBaron&Assocs., Inc. v. Rebel Enters., Inc., 823 P.2d 479 482-83 (Utah Ct. App. 1991))). 
The County argues it preserved this issue for appeal by objecting to jury instruction 23 at trial. 1 That 
instruction stated: 
In this case the plaintiff claims the defendant was negligent in the following respects: 
1. Defendant failed and neglected to properly design, engineer and construct Wasatch Boulevard 
at the site of the collision; 
2. Defendant failed and neglected to properly maintain Wasatch Boulevard at the site of the 
collision; 
3. Defendant failed and neglected to install adequate warning and protective devices or features, 
including but not limited to appropriate escape lanes; 
4. Defendant allowed Wasatch Boulevard at the site of the collision to remain in a dangerous and 
hazardous condition after it knew or should have known of Wasatch Boulevard's dangerous and 
hazardous condition; 
5. Defendant failed and neglected to properly maintain Wasatch Boulevard in a reasonably safe 
condition for use by the public, including plaintiff and other motorists. 
To return a verdict for the plaintiff, you must find by a preponderance of the evidence that: 
1. The defendant was negligent in one or more of the particulars alleged by the plaintiff; and 
2. The defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries. 
If you find in favor of the plaintiff on those two questions, you must then decide the amount of 
damages suffered by the plaintiff. 
The County objected to this instruction in the trial court "on the grounds that there had been no 
evidence submitted that Salt Lake County designed, engineered or constructed Wasatch 
Boulevard." The County also specifically objected to subsection three of the instruction because 
"there [was] no evidence as to Salt Lake County's negligence in failing to install adequate warning 
and protective devices or features, including but not limited to appropriate escape lanes." 
Thus, the County did not object to jury instruction 23 on the grounds that the County did not owe Hart 
a duty. Instead, it objected to the instruction on the basis of {945 P.2d 131} insufficient evidence. Such 
an objection is not sufficiently specific to raise the County's argument that it did not owe Hart a duty 
because such an objection would not raise the issue '""to a level of consciousness such that the trial 
judge [could] consider it.""" State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citations 
omitted).2 The record does not reveal any other attempt by the County to preserve this issue for 
appeal. Therefore, we conclude the County did not preserve this issue for appeal and decline to 
further address it.3 
B. Governmental Immunity 
We next address the County's argument that it is shielded from liability in this case by 
© 2005 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to 
the restrictions and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement. 
governmental immunity. 
Both parties acknowledge that the Utah Legislature has waived governmental immunity for injuries 
caused by the type of conditions that contributed to causing the accident Hart alleges existed on 
Wasatch Boulevard where the car accident occurred. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1993) (waiving 
governmental immunity for injuries caused by "a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any 
highway, road, [or] street"). However, both parties also acknowledge that this waiver of governmental 
immunity is subject to certain statutory exceptions. The County argues on appeal that one of these 
statutory exceptions, the discretionary function exception, applies to this case and shields the County 
from liability with governmental immunity. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (1993) (providing 
exception to waiver of governmental immunity for "the exercise or performance or the failure to 
exercise or perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused"). However, the 
trial court made several findings and concluded that the County waived and abandoned its 
governmental immunity argument at trial.4 {945 P.2d 132} Therefore, before we address whether the 
County is protected by governmental immunity in this case under the discretionary function exception, 
we first examine whether the County waived that argument at trial, which would preclude the County 
from now raising it on appeal. 
1. Waiver of Governmental Immunity 
The County argues that the trial court erred in concluding it waived its governmental immunity 
argument. The County argues that governmental immunity cannot be waived because 
governmental immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction. We review the trial court's findings 
of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law for correctness. See generally State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). 
We have reviewed the County's argument that governmental immunity is a jurisdictional issue and 
reject it because both the Utah Supreme Court and this court have made several clear statements 
characterizing governmental immunity as an affirmative defense. For example, just last year, a 
unanimous Utah Supreme Court stated, "Immunity is an affirmative defense which must be proved by 
the defendant." Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 1996); see also CT. v. Martinez, 
845 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah 1992) ("Sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense."). This court has 
echoed this characterization of governmental immunity. See Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130, 135 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("If the employee acted or failed to act through malice or fraud, the employee 
cannot successfully invoke governmental immunity as an affirmative defense" (emphasis added)). 
In addition, the supreme court has explained that because governmental immunity is an affirmative 
defense, courts should employ a specific way of examining tort cases involving governmental 
immunity. In Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989), the supreme court explained: 
Sovereign immunity... is an affirmative defense and conceptually arises subsequent to the question ol 
whether there is tort liability in the first instance. There is sound reason and a desirable simplicity in 
analyzing and applying negligence concepts before deciding issues of sovereign immunity.... 
Conceptually, the question of the applicability of a statutory immunity does not even arise until it is 
determined that a defendant otherwise owes a duty of care to the plaintiff and thus would be liable in the 
absence of such immunity. 
Id. at 152-53 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Both the supreme court and this court have 
since reiterated this concept. See C.T., 845 P.2d at 247 ("Sovereign immunity is an affirmative 
defense which arises conceptually after the determination of tort liability."); Smith v. Weber County 
Sch. Dist, 877 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("Normally, an appellate court will treat the 
traditional tort liability question before analyzing governmental immunity because 'sovereign 
immunity is an affirmative defense which arises conceptually after the determination of tort 
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liability.'" (citations omitted)); cf. Ambus v. Utah State Bd. ofEduc, 858 P.2d 1372, 1378 (Utah 
1993) ("Because it is an affirmative defense, the issue of qualified immunity arises after the 
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case under § 1983."). Thus, the supreme court and this court 
have continued to characterize governmental immunity specifically as an affirmative defense that 
is generally examined in tort cases only after the plaintiff has proven a duty of care. 
This characterization of governmental immunity contradicts the County's characterization of 
governmental immunity as a component of subject matter jurisdiction. If governmental immunity were 
an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, a court would be required to examine governmental immunity 
before rather than after tort liability simply because if the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, it 
would lack the authority to impose a legal decision. See Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 852 
(Utah 1994) {945 P.2d 133} ("Subject matter jurisdiction is 'the authority and competency of the court 
to decide the case.'" (citation and emphasis omitted)); Glezos v. Frontier Invs., 896 P.2d 1230, 1233 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) ('""Subject matter jurisdiction goes to the very power of a court to entertain an 
action.""' (citations omitted)). Therefore, based on the supreme court's and this court's statements that 
specifically characterize governmental immunity as an affirmative defense that is generally examined 
after the question of tort liability, we reject the County's argument that governmental immunity is an 
issue of subject matter jurisdiction. 
In addition to characterizing governmental immunity as an affirmative defense, the supreme court has 
specifically stated that the defendant has the burden of proving that it is shielded from liability by 
governmental immunity. See Nelson, 919 P.2d at 574. Thus, in this case, the County had the burden 
of proving that the discretionary function exception, which would provide it with governmental 
immunity, applied to this case. 
However, the County wholly failed to both argue governmental immunity at trial and to produce any 
evidence supporting that argument. On the contrary, governmental immunity was not even addressed 
at trial. As such, the County failed to meet its burden of proving governmental immunity as an 
affirmative defense. 
Moreover, after specifically telling the trial court in a pre-trial motion that it had decided not to pursue 
its argument of governmental immunity "at that time," the County, consistent with that statement, 
failed to argue governmental immunity until six months after the trial ended, which was over three 
years after it had told the trial court that it had decided not to pursue its governmental immunity 
argument. This course of inaction further emphasizes the County's failure to actively meet its burden 
of proving that it is shielded by governmental immunity in this case. 
As a result of the County's inaction and failure to meet its burden at trial, we will not disturb the trial 
court's findings or conclusion that the County waived its affirmative defense of governmental 
immunity. Moreover, because we conclude that governmental immunity is an affirmative defense and 
that the County both waived that defense and failed to prove it at trial, we do not reach the issue of 
whether the County would be immune in this case under the discretionary function exception. 
2. Rule 60(b) Motion 
Despite its failure to argue and prove its governmental immunity defense at trial, the County has 
subsequently attempted to preserve this defense. Several months after trial, the County filed a 
motion for relief from the final judgment. One of the arguments brought under this motion was that 
the County was entitled to relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure because the Utah Supreme Court's decision Keegan v. State, 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 
1995), issued in March 1995, represented an intervening change in appellate law regarding 
governmental immunity. Attached as an addendum to the memorandum supporting this motion 
was Tosh Kano's affidavit. The trial court denied the County's motion because it concluded that 
Keegan did not represent a change of law sufficient to grant the County relief under Rule 60(b). 
The trial court also, upon Hart's motion, struck Kano's affidavit from the record. The County now 
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challenges the trial court's denial of its Rule 60(b) motion and grant of Hart's motion to strike the 
affidavit. To succeed with its argument, the County must show the trial court's decision to deny its 
Rule 60(b) motion was an abuse of discretion. See State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041,1045 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994). 
Rule 60(b) provides: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 
59(b); (3) fraud . . . , misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse {945 P.2d 134} party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally served upon the 
defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in said action; (5) the 
judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). The County argues that it is entitled to relief from the judgment under Rule 
60(b)(7) because a change in law qualifies as "any other reason justifying relief from the operation 
of the judgment." 
Whether a change of law qualifies as a reason justifying relief under subsection (b)(7) has not been 
decided by Utah courts. However, we need not reach this issue because the County's argument fails 
for another reason. 
The County's argument is that Keegan contradicted dicta in Sanford v. University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 
285, 488 P.2d 741 (Utah 1971), in which the supreme court stated that section 63-30-10 was not 
intended to modify sections 63-30-8 and -9.5 See Sanford, 488 P.2d at 745. The County argues that 
the significance of this dicta is that it meant the discretionary function exception does not apply to 
cases, such as this one, involving the negligent maintenance and construction of public roads. The 
County bolsters its argument that Keegan represents a change of law by examining the line of cases 
leading up to Keegan to show that they were in disagreement about whether the discretionary function 
exception applied to public road maintenance. For example, the County argues that the court in 
Sanford stated that section 63-30-10 did not apply to sections 63-30-8 and -9, see Sanford, 488 P.2d 
at 745, while the court in Velasquez v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 24 Utah 2d 217, 469 P.2d 5 (1970), 
found section 63-30-10 did apply to an action brought under section 63-30-8, see Velasquez, 469 P.2d 
at 6. 
However, the Utah Supreme Court has already squarely answered the County's argument in the 
negative. In Keegan, the court specifically stated that Keegan is distinguishable from Sanford, and 
thus does not represent a change in governmental immunity law. The supreme court stated as 
follows: 
Keegan's reliance on this language [in Sanford] is misplaced: first, because the cited language is 
merely dictum, and second, because Sanford is readily distinguishable from the present case. In 
the case at bar, Keegan brought an action based on negligence, squarely raising the issue of 
whether section 63-30-10 applies to section 63-30-8 in the negligence context, whereas Sanford 
involved the interrelation of those two sections in a cause of action sounding in nuisance. In 
Sanford, the plaintiff brought a nuisance action against the University of Utah, alleging that it was 
liable for damages caused by a construction project which redirected the flow of surface water in 
such a manner that Sanford's home was flooded during a rainstorm. The University argued that 
for immunity to be waived under section 63-30-8, Sanford had to first demonstrate negligence on 
the part of a University employee pursuant to the terms of section 63-30-10. Sanford responded 
© 2005 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to 
the restrictions and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement. 
that her nuisance claim was allowed by the waiver of immunity in sections 63-30-8 and -9 and that 
a showing of negligence was not required by these sections under the facts of her case. Thus, the 
issue in that case was not whether a claim under section 63-30-8 was subject to the exceptions to 
waiver contained in section 63-30-10, but rather whether a claim sounding in nuisance, without 
any showing of negligence, could be brought under the Governmental Immunity Act. This court 
held that in a nuisance action brought under sections 63-30-8 and -9, negligence need not be 
shown and no part of section 63-30-10 should be applied to that claim. As a result, the {945 P.2d 
135} University's secondary defense, that it was immune because of the discretionary function 
exception, was not allowed because section 63-30-10 was not implicated in the action. . . . 
Moreover, in Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980), this court recognized the unique 
nature of nuisance and specifically limited Sanford to its facts. 
Keegan, 896 P.2d at 622. This language from Keegan expressly states that Keegan did not 
represent a change in the law established by Sanford. 
This court is bound by the doctrine of stare decisis to follow supreme court decisions. See State v. 
Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 n.3 (Utah 1994); Beltran v. Allan, 926 P.2d 892, 898 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996), cert, denied, 936 P.2d 407 (Utah 1997). This case, like Keegan, is an action based on 
negligence. Therefore, according to Keegan, Sanford is distinguishable from this case and the County 
may not be excused from its failure to argue the discretionary function exception based on its 
erroneous interpretation of Sanford and other case law. Consequently, we hold that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion by denying the County's Rule 60(b) motion.6 
C. Rule 59 Motion for New Trial 
We next address the County's final argument that the trial court erred by denying its motion for a 
new trial. We review the trial court's decision to deny the County's motion for a new trial under an 
abuse of discretion standard. See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 804 (Utah 1991). 
On February 1, 1995, the County moved for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The County argued it was entitled to a new trial for several reasons. Two of those reasons 
were that the trial court had abused its discretion (1) by denying the County's motion for a mistrial after 
Hart's attorney commented on the amount of Hart's settlement with the Tweedys and (2) by ruling the 
County was not entitled to have Hart included on the special verdict form for the purpose of fault 
apportionment. The trial court, however, denied the motion because it concluded the County's motion 
was procedurally defective because the County had not attached a supporting affidavit to the motion 
at the time the motion was filed. The County now appeals the trial court's conclusion and denial of its 
motion for a new trial. 
Rule 59 provides, in relevant part: 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or any of the 
parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or 
abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial. 
(7) Error in law. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made under Subdivision (a)(1).. . it 
shall be supported by affidavits. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall 
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be served with the motion 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1), (a)(7), (c) (emphasis added). We review the trial court's decision to deny 
the County's motion for a new trial by examining, in turn, the County's two arguments that (1) the 
trial court abused its discretion by denying the County's motion for a mistrial after Hart's attorney 
commented on Hart's settlement with the Tweedys and (2) the trial court erred by ruling the 
County was not entitled to have Hart included on the special verdict form for the purpose of fault 
apportionment. 
{945 P.2d 136} 1. Denial of Motion for Mistrial 
A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for a mistrial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See 
First Gen. Servs. v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480, 485 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("We will not overturn the trial 
court's decision to grant or deny a motion for a mistrial absent an abuse of discretion."' (quoting 
Rasmussen v. Sharapata, 895 P.2d 391, 394 (Utah Ct. App. 1995))); see also Watkins & Faberv. 
Whiteley, 592 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1979). Therefore, the part of the County's Rule 59 motion that was 
based on the trial court's denial of the County's motion for a mistrial was brought under Rule 59(a)(1), 
which governs motions for new trials brought due to an abuse" of discretion. Because this part of the 
County's motion falls within Rule 59(a)(1), the County was required to follow the affidavit requirement of 
Rule 59(c), which requires that Rule 59(a)(1) motions be supported by an affidavit that is filed with the 
motion. See Utah R. Civ. P. 59(c). 
The County does not argue that it submitted an affidavit with its motion. Instead, it argues "an affidavit 
was unnecessary as all of the relevant facts were contained in the record." However, the language of 
subsection (c) is mandatory. A motion for a new trial premised on the trial court committing an abuse 
of discretion "shall" be supported by an affidavit, which "shall be served with the motion" See id. 
(emphasis added). The County did not follow that procedure in this case. Therefore, as the trial court 
concluded, the County's motion for a new trial based on its argument that the trial court abused its 
discretion by denying its motion for a mistrial was procedurally defective because it was not 
accompanied by a supporting affidavit. Consequently, we affirm the trial court's denial of the portion of 
the County's motion for a new trial that was based on the trial court's denial of the County's motion for 
a mistrial. 
2. Denial of Request for Hart to be on Special 
Verdict Form for Purposes of 
Fault Apportionment 
Although it submitted that part of its Rule 59 motion based on the trial court's failure to include 
Hart on the special verdict form as an abuse of discretion Rule 59(a)(1) motion, the County now 
argues that this issue actually is a Rule 59(a)(7) motion because it involves whether the trial court 
made an erroneous conclusion of law rather than whether the trial court abused its discretion. We 
agree. A special verdict form is a jury instruction, and determining the propriety of jury instructions 
presents a question of law we review for correctness. See Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 471 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). Therefore, that part of the County's Rule 59 motion which was based on the 
trial court's failure to include Hart on the special verdict form for purposes of apportioning fault fell 
within Rule 59(a)(7) and did not require an attached, supporting affidavit. As such, the trial court 
erred when it concluded that this part of the County's motion was procedurally defective because 
it was not accompanied by an affidavit. 
However, our examination of the trial court's decision regarding the County's Rule 59 motion does not 
end here. Although the basis of the trial court's decision to deny the County's Rule 59 motion was 
incorrect, we may affirm the trial court's decision on any proper ground. See Buehner Block Co. v. 
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UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988) (stating appellate courts "may affirm trial court 
decisions on any proper ground(s), despite the trial court's having assigned another reason for its 
ruling"). Consequently, because we conclude the County waived this argument by not specifically 
objecting on the record to the instruction at trial, we affirm the trial court's denial of the County's 
motion. 
Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part: 
If the instructions are to be given in writing, all objections thereto must be made before the 
instructions are given to the jury; otherwise, objections may be made to the instructions after they 
are given to the jury, but before the jury retires to consider its verdict. No party may assign as 
error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he [or she] objects {945 P.2d 137} 
thereto. In objecting to the giving of an instruction, a party must state distinctly the matter to which 
he [or she] objects and the grounds for [the] objection. 
"If an objection is not made regarding the failure to give a jury instruction, the issue is deemed waived on 
appeal." Anderson v. Sharp, 899 P.2d 1245, 1248 (Utah Ct App. 1995), cert, denied, 910 P.2d 426 
(1995). The party claiming error, in this case the County, bears.the responsibility for making sure that "the 
grounds for any objection to the failure to give a jury instruction . . . be distinctly and specifically stated on 
the record." Id. This requirement "ensures that the trial court will understand the basis for the objection 
and have an opportunity to correct any error before the case goes to the jury." Id. 
The County has failed to show us where, in the record, it specifically objected to Hart's absence on the 
special verdict form. Our review of the record has not revealed any such objection nor any mention by 
the County to the trial court of the grounds upon which it would object to Hart's absence from the form. 
The County has attempted to salvage this argument by submitting Postma's affidavit, in which Postma 
testified that in an off-record conference in chambers with the trial court, the County requested that 
Hart be included on the special verdict form submitted to the jury, which request was denied by the 
trial court. However, the submission of this affidavit, although it proves the County did request that 
Hart be included on the special verdict form, is not enough to meet the County's requirement to timely 
make a specific objection on the record before the jury retired to consider its verdict. In addition, the 
affidavit does not specify whether the County stated the legal grounds for its request to the trial court. 
Thus, we conclude the County's failure to specifically and timely object on the record to Hart's 
absence from the special verdict form precludes the County from raising this issue on appeal. See id.; 
cf. Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111 at 118. Accordingly, we do not reach the issue of whether the trial 
court should have granted the County a new trial based on its alleged error of not including Hart on the 
special verdict form. 
In summary, we reject each of the County's challenges to the trial court's orders. We next address the 
arguments Hart raises on cross-appeal. 
D. Damages Cap 
Both of Hart's arguments on appeal challenge the trial court's imposition of the damages cap, 
which reduced the amount of damages owed by the County to Hart. The trial court reduced the 
damages to $ 250,000, including interest and costs, in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-34(1) (1993). That statute provides: 
(1)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (2), if a judgment for damages for personal injury against 
a governmental entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity has a duty to indemnify, 
exceeds $ 250,000 for one person in any one occurrence, or $ 500,000 for two or more persons in 
any one occurrence, the court shall reduce the judgment to that amount. 
(b) A court may not award judgment of more than $ 250,000 for injury or death to one person 
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regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the injury is characterized as governmental. 
Id. § 63-30-34(1 )(a), (b). On cross-appeal, Hart argues that the damages cap violates several 
Utah constitutional provisions and that, in any case, the reduced judgment should not include 
interest and costs. 
1. Constitutional Arguments 
We first address Hart's argument that the damages cap statute violates several Utah 
constitutional provisions. Specifically, Hart argues that applying the damages cap to him violates 
article I, sections 1, 7,10, 11, and 24, and article VI, section 26. 
We may initially dispose of several of Hart's arguments because they have previously been rejected 
by the Utah Supreme Court. In McCorvey v. Utah State Department of Transportation, 868 P.2d 41 
(Utah 1993) (plurality opinion), the trial court, following the statutory damages cap, had reduced a jury 
verdict from $ 1,517,800 to $ 250,000 in a personal injury action brought by McCorvey, a motorist, 
against the Utah {945 P.2d 138} Department of Transportation (UDOT). On appeal, McCorvey 
challenged the constitutionality of the damages cap, arguing that imposition of the cap violated his 
rights under article I, sections 7, 10, 11, and 24 of the Utah Constitution. See id. at 47. The supreme 
court rejected McCorvey's arguments and affirmed the trial court's order reducing UDOT's damages 
to the $ 250,000 statutory limit under section 63-30-34(1). See id. at 48. The court's decision in 
McCorvey was reaffirmed three years later by a unanimous supreme court in Bott v. DeLand, 922 
P.2d 732 (Utah 1996). In examining the constitutionality of subsections 63-30-34(1 )(a) and (b) as 
applied to the case, the court in Bott stated, citing to McCorvey, "We have already held that these 
subsections are constitutional under article I, sections 7, 10, 11, and 24 of the Utah Constitution as 
applied to judgments for injuries resulting from a governmental entity's failure to maintain safe road 
conditions." Id. at 743. This court is obligated under the doctrine of stare decisis to accept the rulings 
of the supreme court. See Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399 n.3; Beltran, 926 P.2d at 898. Therefore, 
because the supreme court has specifically rejected the same arguments Hart raises under article I, 
sections 7, 10, 11, and 24 of the Utah Constitution, we reject those constitutional arguments. 
Hart also argues that the damages cap statute infringes upon the "fundamental right" guaranteed by 
article I, section 1 of the Utah Constitution that "all men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy 
and defend their lives and liberties." Utah Const, art. I, § 1. Specifically Hart argues that capping his 
damages award from the County denies him of his ability to enjoy his life and liberty. 
However, Hart has failed to explain how his situation involves a liberty interest, or how his right to 
enjoy life has been infringed upon by the damages cap statute.7 In addition, we find ourselves in 
agreement with the plurality opinion in Condemarin v. University Hospital, lib P.2d 348 (Utah 1989) 
(plurality opinion), that "there is no fundamental right to recover unlimited damages from government 
entities performing governmental functions." Id. at 352. 8 After carefully considering Hart's argument, 
we conclude that Hart has not described to us an interest that rises to the level of a fundamental life or 
liberty interest protected by this constitutional provision. We therefore reject Hart's {945 P.2d 139} 
article I, section 1 challenge to the damages cap statute. 
Finally, we also acknowledge that Hart argues the damages cap violates article VI, section 26 of the 
Utah Constitution, which provides, "No private or special law shall be enacted where a general law can 
be applicable." In support of this argument, Hart's brief states only, "A 'special law' applies only 'to 
persons . . . though not particularized, [that] are separated by any method of selection from the whole 
class to which the law might, but for such legislation, be applied."' (Citation omitted.) No further 
analysis or citation to legal authorities is made to support this argument. "It is well established that this 
court will decline to consider an argument that a party has failed to adequately brief. Because of the 
inadequate analysis, we decline to address [Hart's article VI, section 26] claim on appeal." State v. 
Vigil, 922 P.2d 15, 28 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citations omitted). 
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In conclusion, we reject all Hart's constitutional challenges to the damages cap statute.9 
2. Inclusion of Interest and Costs in Damages Cap 
Hart also challenges the trial court's decision to include prejudgment and postjudgment interest 
and costs in the total reduced judgment amount of $ 250,000. Hart argues that the statutory 
damages cap of section 63-30-34(1 )(a), especially when read in conjunction with other statutes, 
does not limit the amount of interest and costs. This argument requires us to review the trial 
court's interpretation of section 63-30-34(1 )(a), a question of law we review for correctness. See 
S.H. v. Bistryski, 923 P.2d 1376, 1379 (Utah 1996). 
""The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature in light of 
the purposes the statute was meant to achieve,""' De Baritault v. Salt Lake City Corp., 913 P.2d 743, 
746 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted), and the "best evidence of the legislature's intent is the plain 
meaning of the statute," Cache County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 922 P.2d 758, 767 (Utah 1996) 
(citation omitted). Therefore, to properly interpret section 63-30-34(1 )(a), we look to the plain language 
of the statute and the language of the statutes comprising the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to -38 (1993), and construe them according to their plain meaning. See Carlie v. 
Morgan, 922 P.2d 1, 3-4 (Utah 1996). 
Section 63-30-34(1 )(a) provides: 
Except as provided in Subsection (2), if a judgment for damages for personal injury against a 
governmental entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $ 
250,000 for one person in any one occurrence, or $ 500,000 for two or more persons in any one 
occurrence, the court shall reduce the judgment to that amount. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34(1 )(a) (1993) (emphasis added). Thus, the plain language of the 
statute requires the trial court to reduce "the judgment" to $ 250,000 in a personal injury action 
involving one person, as in this case. 
Hart argues, citing Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44 (1996), 10 that 
prejudgment {945 P.2d 140} interest is separate from the judgment. We disagree. Although section 
78-27-44 both allows the plaintiff to claim prejudgment interest on special damages and requires the trial 
court to add that interest to the special damages, subsection (2) plainly states that the prejudgment 
interest is to be "included . . . in the judgment." Id. § 78-27-44(2). In other words, prejudgment interest is a 
part of, rather than separate from, the judgment. Although Hart has given us no statutory basis for his 
costs argument, our research indicates that costs incurred before a judgment is entered, like prejudgment 
interest, are included in, rather than treated separate from, a judgment. CI, e.g., id. § 77-31 a-101 (21) 
(Supp. 1996) (recodified as id. § 78-45f-101(21) (Supp. 1997)); id. § 77-32a-3 (1995). Therefore, because 
section 63-30-34(1 )(a) required the trial court to reduce the County's portion of the judgment to $ 250,000, 
and because prejudgment interest and prejudgment costs are statutorily treated as a part of a judgment, 
we conclude the trial court did not err by including prejudgment interest and prejudgment costs in the $ 
250,000 reduced judgment. 
However, postjudgment interest, unlike prejudgment interest and costs, is not a part of a judgment, 
but is instead added to a judgment at a specified rate. See id. § 15-1-4(2) (1996). As the plain 
language of section 15-1-4(2) provides, judgments rendered in actions other than contractual actions 
"shall bear interest at the federal postjudgment interest rate as of January 1 of each year, plus 2%." Id. 
Thus, the postjudgment interest statute plainly describes postjudgment interest as interest which 
accrues on the judgment, and is therefore separate from the judgment. As such, we conclude the trial 
court erred by including postjudgment interest in the reduced $ 250,000 judgment. 
Our conclusion is also supported by public policy. Postjudgment interest is imposed on liable parties to 
induce them to timely pay their just debts. Public entities, like others, should timely pay their debts 
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and, like others, may need the added incentive of postjudgment interest to do so. Thus, after a public 
entity has been found liable and a judgment has been entered against it, it can best protect the public 
coffers by promptly paying the owed judgment rather than incurring unnecessary postjudgment 
interest. 
The same policy applies to postjudgment costs incurred by doing such things as collecting the 
judgment. Rather than running the risk of incurring unnecessary postjudgment costs, a public entity 
can best protect the public coffers by cooperatively paying an owed judgment. Therefore, we also 
conclude that any postjudgment costs, like the postjudgment interest, should not be included in the $ 
250,000 reduced judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
We reject each of the County's arguments. The County failed to preserve for appeal its argument that 
it did not owe a duty to Hart. The County also waived its governmental immunity argument, an 
affirmative defense, by wholly failing to argue and prove it at trial and by specifically telling the trial 
court it had decided not to pursue this defense during a pre-trial motion, and then by not again 
mentioning that argument for over three years. In addition, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
denying the County's Rule 60(b) motion for relief because, as the Utah Supreme Court has already 
stated, Keegan v. State did not represent a change in governmental immunity case law. Finally, the 
trial court also did not abuse its discretion by denying the County's Rule 59 motion for a new trial 
because the County failed both to file an attached affidavit to support its Rule 59(a)(1) motion and to 
specifically {945 P.2d 141} object on the record to the trial court's failure to include Hart on the special 
verdict form. 
We also reject most of Hart's arguments. We reject all Hart's constitutional arguments because they 
have already been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court, they were inadequately briefed, or because 
Hart failed to describe to us an interest that rose to the level of receiving the requested constitutional 
protection. We also reject Hart's argument that the trial court erred by including prejudgment interest 
and prejudgment costs in the judgment because statutory language plainly describes prejudgment 
interest and prejudgment costs as a part of a judgment, and the damages cap statute plainly requires 
the trial court to reduce "the judgment" to $ 250,000. 
However, we conclude the trial court erred in one respect. Statutory language plainly describes 
postjudgment interest as interest which accrues on, and is therefore separate from, a judgment. In 
addition, public policy supports the requirement that public entities, like others, timely pay owed 
judgments. Therefore, the trial court erred by including postjudgment interest and any postjudgment 
costs in the $ 250,000 reduced judgment. 
We affirm in part but reverse and remand for the exclusive purpose of properly calculating 
postjudgment interest and costs incurred on appeal, which should then be added to the $ 250,000 
judgment owed by the County to Hart. 11 
Michael J. Wilkins, Associate Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Presiding Judge 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Footnotes 
Footnotes 
1 . The County also argues it preserved this issue for appeal by orally arguing the issue in a 
post-trial motion. However, "raising an issue in a post-trial motion . . . does not preserve that issue for 
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appeal." Estate of Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In addition, ftie 
record reflects that the trial court never ruled on this issue after the County orally raised it in its 
post-trial motion, and that the County failed to fulfill its responsibility to call to the trial court's attention 
its failure to rule on the issue. Therefore, we address only the County's argument that it preserved the 
issue of duty by objecting to jury instruction 23 at trial. 
2 . Furthermore, the County did not object to other jury instructions dealing with the County's duty, 
and it made statements in a post-trial memorandum which at least indirectly contradict its argument 
on appeal that it did not owe Hart a duty. For example, jury instruction 30, which the County submitted 
to the trial court, states, "The duty owed by the defendant, Salt Lake County Commission, to the 
plaintiff is a duty to exercise due care in maintaining Wasatch Boulevard in a reasonably safe 
condition for travel." Moreover, in a post-trial motion, the County admitted to the trial court that "in the 
present case, Salt Lake County had a duty to exercise due care in maintaining Wasatch Boulevard in 
a reasonably safe condition for travel." 
3 . The County argues that even if this court concludes it did not preserve this issue for appeal, this 
court should examine the issue of whether the County owed Hart a duty under the plain error 
exception. However, the County makes no effort to meet the requirements of the plain error exception 
by showing (1) an error exists, (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the 
error is harmful. See State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied, 931 P.2d 146 
(Utah 1997). Consequently, the County has not met its burden under the plain error exception, so we 
decline to further address this argument. 
4 . The trial court found: 
2. In its answer, Defendant raised the affirmative defense of governmental immunity. 
3. On December 12, 1991, Defendant filed a Motion [for] Summary Judgment on three specific 
grounds, including governmental immunity. 
4. On March 9, 1992, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was argued to the Honorable 
James Sawaya, District Court Judge. During the course of oral argument of Defendant's motion, 
and in open court, Defendant, through its counsel of record, waived and abandoned the 
governmental immunity defense. 
5. In all further proceedings in this action, through the conclusion of trial and the jury verdict, 
Defendant did not attempt to raise the governmental immunity defense. The case proceeded to 
trial on the factual issues of negligence and causation. 
6. This case was tried to a jury for four days, commencing August 30,1994 and concluding 
September 2, 1994. 
7. During the pretrial conferences and trial of the case, Defendant did not raise the issue of 
governmental immunity by way of motion, argument, proffered jury instruction, evidence or any 
other means. 
9. During the trial of this action, Defendant did not introduce competent or substantial evidence on 
the factual considerations critical to the question of whether the Defendant's conduct fell within the 
scope of its discretionary governmental functions. 
The trial court then concluded: 
5. Defendant Salt Lake County Commission voluntarily and knowingly waived and abandoned any 
defenses it may have had based on governmental immunity by (1) abandoning the defense in 
open court during argument on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, (2) failing to raise the 
issue of governmental immunity in any subsequent argument, motion or pleading to the court, and 
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(3) failing to introduce evidence on the issue of the discretionary function exception during the trial 
of the case. 
5 . Sections 63-30-8 and -9 were both amended in 1991 to specifically apply the exceptions 
outlined in section 63-30-10. However, because this case arose before 1991, we examine the law as it 
existed before the 1991 amendments were made. 
6 . In addition, Kano's affidavit was merely submitted with the County's Rule 60(b) motion as a part 
of that motion. Because we have affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the Rule 60(b) motion lacked 
merit, that motion, including Kano's affidavit submitted in support of it, has been evaluated and 
rejected. Therefore, we need not reach the County's argument that the trial court erred by striking 
Kano's affidavit. 
7 . The only law Hart cites to support his argument is Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732 (Utah 1996), 
which did not follow an article I, section 1 analysis. Bott involved a prisoner who sued because he 
received inadequate medical care that resulted in severe damages. The prisoner prevailed at trial, but, 
as in this case, his damages were reduced to $ 250,000 pursuant to the statutory damages cap. On 
appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that the damages cap, as applied to that case, violated the 
prisoner's article I, section 9 right to be free of unnecessarily rigorous treatment. See id. at 744. We 
conclude that Bott is distinguishable from this case, and therefore not applicable, because it not only 
involved a completely different constitutional provision, but also because the factual situation was 
sufficiently distinct. 
8 . Furthermore, in McCorvey v. Utah State Department of Transportation, 868 P.2d 41 (Utah 
1993), another plurality opinion, Justice Hall explained, while engaging in an analysis of the Utah open 
courts provision, that no common law right existed to sue the government for lack of maintenance on 
public roads. Justice Hall stated: 
The government activity in question here is the maintenance of public roads. At common law, both the 
municipalities and the state were immune from lawsuits based on the negligent maintenance of public 
roads. Such activity traditionally has been considered governmental. Hence, there was no right at 
common law to recover for injury resulting therefrom. 
Under the Act, governmental entities performing government functions are immunized from suit under 
the general grant of immunity contained in section 63-30-3 (1989). However, section 63-30-8 waives 
immunity for injury caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any state highway. The 
Act then limits that liability to $ 250,000 under section 63-30-34(1). Under our statutory scheme, the 
legislature actually created, rather than abrogated, a limited right of recovery against the state for 
negligent maintenance of its roadways. 
Id. at 47-48 (plurality opinion) (footnotes omitted); see also Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah 
573, 577, 111 P.2d 800, 802 (1941) ("The duty to repair or construct streets . . . is a governmental 
one and . . . in the absence of a statute no liability devolves on a municipality for the defective 
condition of its streets."). 
9 . Hart also argues that the County is barred from relying on the damages cap statute because it 
waived and abandoned its governmental immunity argument at trial. However, because this argument 
was raised for the first time in Hart's reply brief, we decline to address it. See State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 
851, 854 n.1 (Utah 1992) (explaining why court will not address argument raised for first time in reply 
brief); Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1169 n.6 (Utah 1988) (explaining that, as general rule, 
court will not consider an issue raised for first time in reply brief); Broadbent v. Board ofEduc. of 
Cache County Sch. Dist, 910 P.2d 1274, 1277 n.4 (Utah Ct. App.) (declining to address issue raised 
for first time in reply brief), cert, denied, 917 P.2d 556 (Utah 1996). 
10 Section 78-27-44 provides: 
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(1) In all actions brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by any person, resulting 
from or occasioned by the tort of any person, corporation, association, or partnership, whether by 
negligence or willful intent of that other person, corporation, association, or partnership, and whether 
that injury shall have resulted fatally or otherwise, the plaintiff in the complaint may claim interest on 
the special damages actually incurred from the date of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the 
cause of action. 
(2) It is the duty of the court, in entering judgment for plaintiff in that action, to add to the amount of 
special damages actually incurred that are assessed by the verdict of the jury, or found by the court, 
interest on that amount calculated at the legal rate, as defined in Section 15-1-1, from the date of the 
occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action to the date of entering the judgment, and to 
include it in that judgment 
(3) As used in this section, "special damages actually incurred" does not include damages for 
future medical expenses, loss of future wages, or loss of future earning capacity. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44 (1996) (emphasis added). 
11 . We note that both parties have raised issues on appeal that we have not addressed because 
they lack merit. See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989). 
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Addendum 3 
3 
Hurley v. Board of Review. 
767 P.2d 524 (Utah 1988) 
Richard Barry HURLEY, et al., Petitioners, v. BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, Respondent. Mike K. 
LUND, et al., Petitioners, v. BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, Respondent. Steve M. RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner, v. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, Respondent. Mike D. POULSEN, Petitioner, v. BOARD OF REVIEW OF 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 
Respondent 
Supreme Court of Utah 
767 P.2d 524; 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 20; 1988 Utah LEXIS 122 
Nos. 20828, 20892, 20931, 21045 
December 12,1988, Filed 
Editorial Information: Prior History 
Original Proceeding in this Court. 
Counsel Waine Riches, Salt Lake City, for Petitioners. 
K. Allan Zabel, Salt Lake City, for Respondent. 
Judges: I. Daniel Stewart, Justice, Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice, Richard C. Howe, Associate Chief 
Justice, Christine M. Durham, Justice, Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice, concur. 
Opinion 
Opinion by: STEWART 
{767 P.2d 525} The petitioners seek reversal of an order of the Board of Review of the Utah Industrial 
Commission denying them certain benefits under the Trade Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1978, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101 
-2487 (1982), as amended. 
The Trade Act provides financial assistance (TRA benefits) to workers who are laid off by companies 
whose operations are adversely affected by foreign competition. TRA benefits are to assist in helping 
qualified employees to retrain and to find other jobs. To be eligible for TRA benefits, a claimant must 
establish that (1) the discharge from employment occurred no more than one year prior to certification 
of the claimant's employer by the Secretary of Labor as adversely affected by foreign trade, within the 
two-year certification period, and before the certification is terminated by the Secretary of Labor; (2) 
the claimant worked 26 of the 52 weeks prior to separation; and (3) the claimant was entitled to and 
exhausted unemployment insurance benefits. 19 U.S.C. § 2291 (a)(1)-(3) (1982). 
The four petitioners were employed by Kennecott Minerals Corporation (Kennecott) and had been 
initially laid off during the summer of 1982. They received regular state unemployment insurance 
benefits {767 P.2d 526} while unemployed. In October, 1982, Kennecott rehired petitioners Lund and 
Rodriguez, and in June, 1983, Kennecott rehired petitioners Hurley and Poulsen. In July, 1984, all four 
were laid off a second time due to the adverse effects of foreign competition on Kennecott's 
operations. On January 13, 1983, the Department of Labor certified Kennecott under the Trade Act as 
an employer adversely affected by foreign competition pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 2273 (a) (1982) and 
approved TRA benefits for Kennecott employees laid off on or after January 1, 1982. 
After exhausting their individual entitlements to regular state unemployment compensation and federal 
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supplemental compensation, the petitioners filed for TRA benefits. The Board denied the petitioners' 
applications on the ground that they had failed to apply for benefits within 52 weeks after their first 
termination from employment. At the time the petitioners filed their claims for TRA benefits, § 
2293(a)(2) of the Trade Act provided that the payment of TRA benefits was limited to a 52-week 
period (a 78-week period if a claimant was enrolled in approved training) commencing with the time 
that the claimant had exhausted his or her unemployment insurance "that is regular compensation."1 
The Board adopted the findings and conclusions of the administrative law judge, who stated: 
Sections 635.3(r) & (s) of Federal Regulations talk about the first benefit period and the first 
exhaustion of unemployment insurance. Those sections clearly indicate the first claim filed must 
be the claim used in computing the 52-week time limit. This time limit begins with the week the 
claimant first exhausted his entitlement to regular unemployment compensation on the first claim 
filed after being separated from the trade affected employer. 
At the time critical to this case, the language of 19 U.S.C. § 2293 (a)(2) was: 
A trade readjustment allowance shall not be paid for any week after the 52-week period beginning 
with the first week following the first week in the period covered by the certification with respect to 
which the worker has exhausted (as determined for purposes of section 2291(a)(3)(B)) all rights 
to that part of his unemployment insurance that is regular compensation.2 
Thus, the Board ruled that a benefit application had to be filed within the 52-week period referred to in 
§ 2293(a)(2) and that the period began to run with the petitioners first discharge from Kennecott and 
continued to run even if the petitioners had returned to work and were working when the period 
expired. 
The issue before the Court is whether the Board erred in holding that the 52-week period should be 
computed from the petitioners' first lay-off or their second lay-off. 
We turn first to a determination of the appropriate scope of judicial review of the Board's order. There 
are essentially three standards that determine the scope of judicial review of agency action. See 
generally Utah Dep't of Admin. Sen/, v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 608-12 (Utah 1983). The 
correction-of-error standard applies to agency rulings on issues of law and extends no deference to 
agency rulings. An agency's findings of fact, however, are accorded substantial deference and will not 
be overturned if based on substantial evidence, even if another conclusion {767 P.2d 527} from the 
evidence is permissible.3 As to questions of mixed law and fact, a reviewing court usually accords an 
agency decision some deference, i.e., an agency's decision will not be set aside unless the agency's 
conclusion is unreasonable. 
The Board argues that the Court should apply the reasonable basis standard of review because the 
issue is one of mixed fact and law. The petitioners argue, on the other hand, that the question of 
whether the 52-week period should run from their first or second termination from Kennecott is solely 
a matter of statutory interpretation and solely a question of law and therefore no deference should be 
accorded the Board's decision. 
Issues of mixed law and fact are often illuminated by an agency's expertise, and special technical 
knowledge may be of particular help in determining whether the facts fall within the meaning of 
statutory terms. When that is the case, the decision should be judged on a reasonableness standard. 
Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv., 658 P.2d at 609-12. See, e.g., Logan Regional Hosp. v. Board of Review, 
723 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1986) (Board's interpretation of "just cause" to require fault); Barney v. 
Department of Employment Sec, 681 P.2d 1273, 1275 (Utah 1984) (Department's interpretation of "in 
employment"); Gray v. Department ol Employment Sec, 681 P.2d 807, 810-11 (Utah 1984) 
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(Department's interpretation of "good faith in an active effort to secure employment"); Pinter Constr. 
Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d 305, 307 (Utah 1984) (Industrial Commission's interpretation of "employee"); 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Confer, 674 P.2d 632, 636 (Utah 1983) (Industrial Commission's interpretation 
of "impairment"); Vance v. Fordham, 671 P.2d 124,128 (Utah 1983), cert, denied, 465 U.S. 1025, 104 
S. Ct. 1280, 79 L Ed. 2d 684 (1984) (Department of Registration's interpretation of "unprofessional 
conduct"); Clearfield City v. Department of Employment Sec, 663 P.2d 440, 443-44 (Utah 1983) 
(Department's interpretation of "deliberate, willful or wanton" language in statute to require intent). See 
also Savage Bros. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 723 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1986) (Commission's 
interpretation of "dry chemicals" and "barite" in certificate of public conveyance and necessity). 
The correction-of-error standard of judicial review applies to agency decisions involving statutory 
interpretations which an appellate court is as well suited to decide as the agency. In Bennett v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 726 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1986), the Court stated: 
We do not defer to the Commission when construing statutory terms or when applying statutory 
terms to the facts unless the construction of the statutory language or the application of the law to 
the facts should be subject to the Commission's expertise gleaned from its accumulated practical, 
first-hand experience with the subject matter. 
The correction-of-error standard also applies when the-issue is one of basic legislative intent. In 
Big K Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 689 P.2d 1349, 1353 (Utah 1984), we held that no deference 
was due agency construction of "statutory or case law" or of its organic statute unless it is clear 
that the agency is in a superior position by virtue of expertise to give effect to "the regulatory 
objective to be achieved." Id. Cf. Williams v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 763 P.2d 796, 93 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3(1988). 
A correction-of-error standard also governs the construction of ordinary statutory terms in the organic 
statute of an administrative agency. See, e.g., Bennett, 726 P.2d at 429 (coverage of workers' 
compensation statute to subcontractor's employee); Dean Evans Chrysler Plymouth v. Morse, 692 
P.2d 779, 782 (Utah 1984) (applicable limitations period under workers' compensation act); Big K 
Corp., 689 P.2d at 1353 (proper construction of statutory "deficiency of service" standard); 
Kearns-Tribune v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 682 P.2d 858, 859 (Utah 1984) (PSC authority to impose a 
tagline requirement on utility's advertisement). 
{767 P„2d 528} The facts here are not in dispute. Nor is there dispute about the application of the law 
to the facts. The real dispute is solely, what does the law require? Specifically, the issue is, when does 
the 52-week eligibility period begin to run under 19 U.S.C. § 2293 (a)(2)? That is a straightforward 
issue of statutory construction. Resolution of the issue would not be aided by agency expertise, and 
no term of art is at issue. Indeed, it is the courts that have expertise in matters of this nature, not an 
administrative agency. See Dean Evans Chrysler Plymouth, 692 P.2d at 782. Of course, the statute 
and regulations, once properly construed, must be applied to the facts of the case, but that does not 
make the issue one of mixed law and fact. There is, in short, no reason to accord the Board a zone of 
reasonableness in its construction of the law. The Board either read the statute and regulations 
correctly, or it did not. 
We turn next to the merits of the dispute. An analysis of § 2293(a) does not support the Board's 
position. That provision limits the amount payable to a qualifying employee but does not establish 
additional qualifications for receiving TRA benefits. 19 U.S.C. § 2293 (a)4 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
Nothing in the language of either § 22915 or § 2293 requires commencement of the 52-week eligibility 
period with a claimant's first separation from work. That was the law before Congress amended the 
Act in 1981 and remained the law after the amendment.6 Skrundz v. Review Bd. oflnd. Employment 
Sec, 444 N.E2d 1217 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Claim of Walter, 103 A.D.2d 265, 479 N.Y.S.2d 918 
(1984). 
The pertinent federal regulations are directed more specifically to the issue at hand. Proposed Rule 
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635.11(a)(2), as it appeared in 48 Fed. Reg. 9450 (1983), 7 initially referred to a claimant's "first " 
separation" as the time for commencing the running of the eligibility period, but the language actually 
adopted in 20 C.F.R. § 617.11(a)(2) (1988)8 refers to the "first qualifying separation" (emphasis 
added), and section 617.3(t) defines that phrase as the "first total or partial separation on the 
basis of which the individual qualifies for TRA." (Emphasis added.) 
The petitioners' first qualifying separations from employment were their second separations from 
Kennecott. They did not qualify for TRA benefits after their first separation because they returned to 
work before they had exhausted their right to regular unemployment compensation benefits, {767 
P.2d 529} a necessary condition to qualification for TRA benefits under the statute, 19 U.S.C. § 2291 
(a)(3)(B) (1982). 
Moreover, 29 C.F.R. § 91.7(b) (1986) specifically refers to a claimant's "last" separation^ which is 
defined in 29 C.F.R. § 91.3(a)(20) (1986)10 as a claimant's most recent separation prior to application 
for TRA benefits. Unlike 20 C.F.R. § 617, which was relied upon by the Board, 29 C.F.R. § 91 was 
codified in the Code of Federal Regulations at the time the petitioners filed their claim. See, e.g., 29 
C.F.R. § 91 (1981). The Board plainly erred in relying on the language of proposed rules that were 
later modified before their adoption as final rules. 
The Board also relies on the following language in 20 C.F.R. § 617.3(p) (1988) in support of its 
argument that the petitioners' unemployment benefit periods continued to run even though they had 
returned to work: 
(p) "Exhaustion of Ul" means exhaustion of all rights to Ul in a benefit period by reason of: 
(1) Having received all Ul to which an individual was entitled under the applicable State law or Federal 
unemployment compensation law with respect to such benefit period; or 
(2) The expiration of such benefit period. 
(Emphasis added.) The Board contends that the expiration of the benefit period under the Act and 
the expiration of the period governing the right to receive unemployment benefits are treated 
separately within the regulation and are not necessarily coterminous. Therefore, the Board 
contends, the benefits period may expire even though a claimant fails to exhaust unemployment 
insurance benefits during that period. Even if the Board's assertion is correct, that does not 
support its conclusion that the benefits period continues to run after the claimant returns to work. 
To rule otherwise would be to undermine the remedial purpose of the statute by allowing benefits 
to be forfeited at a time when a worker could not qualify for them. 
The Board's interpretation of 19 U.S.C. §§ 2291 and 2293 of the Trade Act of 1974 and the 
implementing regulations was erroneous. 
Reversed and remanded. Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice, Richard C. Howe, Associate Chief Justice, 
Christine M. Durham, Justice, Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice, concur. 
Footnotes 
Footnotes 
1 In addition to the 52 weeks of benefits provided by 19 U.S.C. § 2293 (a)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 2293 
(a)(3) (1982) provides that "payments may be made as trade readjustment allowances for up to 26 
additional weeks . . . . in order to assist the adversely affected worker to complete [vocational] training 
.. .." Because petitioners Lund, Rodriguez, and Poulsen were involved in vocational training, their 
claims involve a 78-week period rather than the 52-week period set forth in § 2293(a)(2). That does 
not affect, however, the basic issue of when the TRA benefit period begins to run. For simplicity, we 
refer throughout this opinion to the 52-week period only. 
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2 The 52-week period referred to in § 2293(a)(2) was extended to 104 weeks in 1986. See 19 
U.S.C. § 2293 (a)(2) (Supp. IV 1986). 
3 In some cases, however, less deference is given to factual determinations. For example, a court 
may exercise greater scrutiny when constitutional rights are at stake. 
4 See text, supra p. 5. 
5 19 U.S.C. § 2291, in relevant part, provides that an eligible worker qualifies for assistance if: 
(1) Such worker's last total or partial separation before his application under this part occurred-
(A) on or after the date, as specified in the certification under which he is covered, on which total or 
partial separation began or threatened to begin in the adversely affected employment, and 
(B) before the expiration of the 2-year period beginning on the date on which the determination under 
section 2273 of this title was made, and 
(C) before the termination date (if any) determined pursuant to section 2273(d) 
6 The amendments are found in Title XXV of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. 
L. 97-35. 
7 The Board cites frequently to "20 C.F.R. § 635." A review of title 20 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations for the years 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, and 1988 indicates that § 635 contains regulations 
for "Veterans' Employment Programs under Title IV, Part C of the Job Training Partnership Act," not 
regulations for administering trade readjustment allowances. The language actually quoted by the 
Board appears in the Proposed Rules in 48 Fed. Reg. 9450 (1983). The language in those proposed 
rules later appears in 20 C.F.R. § 617 (1988). The Board cites the proposed rules in a way that 
incorrectly suggests they had been codified at the time the parties filed their briefs. 
8 20 C.F.R. § 617.11(a) (1988) elaborates upon the basic qualifying requirements for entitlement to 
TRA benefits under 19 U.S.C. § 2291. Section 617.11(a)(2) details the separation requirement as 
follows: 
Separation. The individual's first qualifying separation before application for TRA must occur: 
(i) On or after the impact date 
(ii) Before the expiration of the two-year period beginning on the date of the certification; and 
(iii) Before the termination date, if any, of the certification. 
9 29 C.F.R. § 91.7 (1986) sets forth the following qualifying requirements for TRA benefits: 
To qualify for a trade readjustment allowance an individual must meet each of the following 
requirements. 
(a) Certification. The individual must be an adversely affected worker covered by a certification. 
(b) Separation. The individual's last separation must occur: 
(1) On or after the impact date; 
(2) Before expiration of the 2 year period following the date of the certification; 
(3) Before the termination date, if any, of the certification; 
(4) Not more than one year before the date of the petition on which certification was granted, except 
as provided in section 246(b) of the Act; and 
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(5) Not before October 3,1974, except as provided in section 246(b) of the Act. 
(c) Wages and employment In the 52 weeks preceding the individual's last separation the individual 
must have at least 26 weeks of employment at wages of $ 30 or more a week in adversely affected 
employment with a single firm or subdivision of a firm. Evidence that an individual meets this 
requirement shall be obtained as stated in § 91.8. 
10 29 C.F.R. § 91.3(a)(20) (1986) provides: 
"Last separation" means the total or partial separation from adversely affected employment most 
recently preceding an individual's application for trade readjustment allowances as to which it is 
determined that the individual qualifies under § 91.7. 
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Whitear v. Brown & Root 
973 P.2d 982 (Utah App. 1998) 
(Haven M. Whitear, Petitioner, v . Labor Commission; Brown & Root, Inc.; 
1 Employers1 Reinsurance Fund, Respondents. 
973 P.2d 982; 
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Original Proceeding in this Court. 
Disposition Affirmed. 
Counsel Hans M. Scheffler, Salt Lake City, for Petitioner. 
Stuart L. Poleman "and Dori K. Petersen, Salt Lake City, for 
Respondent Brown & Root, Inc., and Highlands Insurance Company. 
Alan Hennebold, Salt Lake City, for Respondent Labor 
Commission. 
Erie V. Boorman, Salt Lake City, for Respondent Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund. 
Judges: Michael J. Wilkins, Associate Presiding Judge. I CONCUR: Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge. Gregory K. Orme, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
Opinion 
Opinion by: WILKINS 
{973 P.2d 983} OPINION 
WILKINS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Petitioner Haven M. Whitear appeals a decision of the Utah Labor Commission (Commission) denying 
him permanent total disability workers' compensation benefits for an industrial accident. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
On March 10, 1987, petitioner was injured in an industrial accident while employed by Brown & Root, 
when a toxic chemical known as Fyrquel 220 spilled on him. Petitioner pursued medical treatment for 
asthma and depression which he attributed to the accident. Petitioner filed an application for a hearing 
on April 22, 1987, in which he sought a declaration of Brown & Root's liability for workers' 
compensation benefits arising out of the accident. However before the hearing, the parties notified 
Administrative Law Judge, Timothy C. Allen, that Brown & Root accepted liability for the accident and 
agreed to pay all of petitioner's outstanding medical expenses. While Judge Allen accepted 
petitioner's claim as a compensable accident, he found that insufficient evidence existed at that time 
to support petitioner's claim of temporary total disability and possible permanent partial impairment as 
a result of the accident. Accordingly, Judge Allen dismissed the claim pending further medical 
evaluation. 
On February 15, 1993, petitioner filed a second application for a hearing, claiming entitlement to 
permanent partial disability benefits. Petitioner amended the application to include a claim for 
permanent total disability. In its answer, Brown & Root denied all liability. Judge Allen held a hearing 
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on February 22, 1994. Following the hearing, Judge Allen issued his Preliminary Findings of Facfand 
referred the claim to a medical panel for its evaluation of the medical issues. The medical panel, 
consisting of three licensed physicians, determined that the sole cause of petitioner's asthma was the 
industrial accident and gave petitioner a 10% whole person permanent impairment rating. The medical 
panel further reported that the industrial accident was not the cause of petitioner's depression. 
Judge Allen entered an Interim Order on April 20,1995, rejecting the panel's finding that petitioner's 
depression was unrelated to the industrial accident. In doing so he adopted the opinion of petitioner's 
treating psychologist, that a causal connection existed between the industrial accident and the 
depression. Thereafter, Judge Allen entered a tentative finding of permanent total disability. Brown & 
Root objected to the Interim Order and filed a Motion for Review. The Commission granted Brown & 
Root's motion and instructed Judge Allen to conduct a hearing on the medical panel's report, 
specifically {973 P.2d 984} focusing on the cause of petitioner's depression. 
Subsequently, this case was reassigned to Administrative Law Judge Donald L George. Judge 
George held a hearing on February 7, 1996, at which time two members of the medical panel were 
present and testified. Following the hearing, Judge George accepted the panel's conclusion that 
petitioner's depression was not caused by the industrial accident and consequently dismissed 
petitioner's claim for permanent total disability benefits on-that ground. Also, Judge George 
determined that petitioner was not medically disabled from work as a result of his asthma and 
therefore, denied permanent total disability benefits based upon the asthma injury. Judge George 
requested that Brown & Root's counsel prepare proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and an 
order. 
Petitioner filed a Motion for Review on August 16, 1996. On December 19, 1997, the Commission 
affirmed the dismissal of petitioner's claim. Petitioner now seeks review of the Commission's decision 
denying him permanent total disability benefits. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Petitioner raises four issues on appeal. First, petitioner challenges the Commission's factual findings 
that he is not permanently and totally disabled due to asthma, that his depression is not a result of the 
industrial accident, and that he is not a credible witness. Second, petitioner asserts that he was denied 
a hearing on his claim for permanent total disability compensation, in violation of his due process 
rights under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) and the Utah Constitution. Third, 
petitioner argues the Commission erred in ordering a hearing on the medical panel's report. Finally, 
petitioner contends the Commission erred in approving Judge George's request that Brown & Root's 
attorney draft proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
The applicable standard of review for a formal adjudicative hearing is determined by UAPA. See Utah 
Code Ann § 63-46b-16 (1997). In reviewing the Commission's factual findings, we will affirm them 
whenever they are "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before 
the court." Id. § 63-46b-16(4)(g). Such findings will "not be overturned if based on substantial 
evidence, even if another conclusion from the evidence is permissible." Hurley v. Board of Review of 
Indus. Comm'n, 767 P.2d 524, 526-27 (Utah 1988). A party seeking to overturn the Commission's 
factual findings "must marshall [sic] all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite 
the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not 
supported by substantial evidence." Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 776 P.2d 
63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
We apply an intermediate standard of review to the Commission's order requiring a medical panel 
hearing because the Legislature has explicitly delegated discretion to the Commission to apply the law 
in this area. See Utah Code Ann. § 35-1- 77(2)(e) (1994); Landerv. Industrial Comm'n, 894 P.2d 552, 
555 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Under this standard, we will affirm the Commission's decision so long as it 
falls within "the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." Smith v. MityLite, 939 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 
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Ct. App. 1997) (citation omitted). 
We review petitioner's claim that the Commission erred in refusing to find that Judge George violated 
the UAPA by instructing Brown & Root's attorney to draft proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 
law under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(e) (1997). This section allows us to grant relief to an 
individual who has been substantially prejudiced because "the agency has engaged in an unlawful 
procedure or decisionmaking process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure." Id. Under this 
section, we review the Commission's decision for correctness, with no deference given to the 
Commission's expertise. See Krantz v. Utah Dep't of Commerce, 856 P.2d 369, 370 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
ANALYSIS 
1. Findings of Fact 
We turn first to petitioner's challenge to the Commission's factual findings. Specifically, {973 P.2d 
985} petitioner assails the Commission's determination that he is not permanently and totally 
disabled as a result of his asthma, that the industrial accident did not cause his depression, and 
that he lacks credibility as a witness. However, petitioner has failed to marshal all evidence 
supporting the Commission's findings or to establish that the findings are clearly erroneous. 
Petitioner ignores the medical panel's determination that he is not totally disabled as a result of his 
asthma and disregards the fact that four medical doctors found no direct causal relationship 
between the industrial accident and his depression. Also, petitioner fails to discuss the numerous 
factors in his life, which the panel determined, contributed to his depression. Finally, petitioner 
overlooks the Commission's findings that his testimony was exaggerated and that psychological 
testing indicated that he lacks credibility. 
Instead, petitioner merely states those facts most favorable to his position and ignores the contrary 
evidence. This is not adequate. See South Cent Tel. Ass'n v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 951 P.2d 218, 
226 (Utah 1997); Intermountain Health Care v. Industrial Comm'n, 839 P.2d 841, 844 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). When a party fails to marshal the evidence, we assume the record supports the Commission's 
findings. See Intermountain Health, 839 P.2d at 844. We have shown no reluctance to affirm when the 
petitioner has failed to meet its marshaling burden. See, e.g., Turnbaugh v. Anderson, 793 P.2d 939, 
944 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Therefore, we decline to consider petitioner's challenge to the 
Commission's findings of fact. 
2. Due Process 
Petitioner argues that the Commission violated his due process rights under the UAPA and the 
Utah Constitution by denying him a hearing on his claim for permanent total disability benefits as it 
relates to his asthma injury. In other words, petitioner maintains that by limiting the hearing to the 
issue of the causation of his depression, the Commission denied him the opportunity to have his 
permanent disability claim for asthma determined. However, petitioner failed to present this issue 
to the Commission for review. Petitioner's Motion for Review to the Commission merely states that 
Judge George's decision denying his claim for asthma related permanent total disability 
compensation was "a clear abuse of discretion." In fact, petitioner never mentioned the UAPA or 
Utah Constitution nor did he assert a violation of his due process rights. It is well settled that 
issues not raised before the Commission are waived on appeal. See Gibson v. Board of Review 
of Indus. Comm'n, 707 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah 1985); Pease v. Indus. Comm'n, 694 P.2d 613, 616 
(Utah 1984); Ashcroftv. Indus. Comm'n, 855 P.2d 267, 268-69 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The 
rationale is that by raising an issue at the administrative level, "either the administrative law judge 
or the Commission could have adjudicated the issue." Pease, 694 P.2d at 616. Here, the 
Commission was not given the opportunity to resolve this issue because the issue was not 
brought to its attention. Therefore, we do not address this argument further. 
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3. Medical Panel 
Petitioner urges us to declare that the Commission erred in ordering a hearing on the medical 
panel's report. As support for this proposition, petitioner contends that Brown & Root waived its 
right to object to the panel's report by failing to act within the prescribed time limits. This argument 
is without merit. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77(2)(c) (1987)1 allows a party to file a written objection to a medical panel 
report within fifteen days of its issuance. Once filed, the Commission may schedule a hearing to 
determine the issues and facts involved. See id. § 35-1-77(2)(e) In this case, Brown & Root never 
contested the panel's report because it was favorable to their position. Instead, Brown & Root filed a 
timely Motion to Review Judge Allen's decision to reject the panel's finding that petitioner's depression 
resulted {973 P.2d 986} from factors other than the industrial accident. Because Brown & Root 
challenged Judge Allen's decision and not the panel's findings, the time limitations contained in 
section 35-1-77 do not apply. 
Furthermore, the Commission is the ultimate fact finder and section 35-1-77 grants the Commission 
broad discretion to determine whether a medical panel hearing will aid it in this process. See Lander, 
894 P,2d at 556; Ashcroft, 855 P.2d at 269. In this case, Judge Allen initially referred the case to a 
medical panel which determined that petitioner's depression was not caused by the industrial accident. 
However, the panel's report failed to provide a detailed explanation for this conclusion. The 
Commission felt that without such an explanation any final disability determination could be flawed. 
Therefore, the Commission ordered a further hearing on the panel's report to obtain additional 
information regarding the causation of petitioner's depression. 
In Hackford v. Industrial Comm'n, 12 Utah 2d 250, 364 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1961), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that "it is both the privilege and the duty of the Commission to have before it all 
of the competent evidence having a material bearing on the issues necessary to consider in making 
the award." In vacating an order of the Commission because of a deficiency in the evidence 
supporting a medical panel report, the Hackford court noted that "upon remand it was the prerogative 
of the Commission either to make a determination upon the evidence . . . or if it deemed the interests 
of justice to so require, to order and hold a supplemental hearing to allow the parties to present 
additional evidence." Id. Regarding petitioner's claim for disability compensation, the key issue in this 
case was the cause of his depression. Certainly, the Commission was entitled to know why the panel 
believed that petitioner's depression was not caused by the industrial accident. Without this additional 
information the Commission could not make an informed decision. In fact, it may have been an abuse 
of discretion if the Commission failed to refer the case back to the panel because of the uncertainty of 
the causal connection between the industrial accident and petitioner's depression. See Willardson v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 904 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah 1995); Champion Home Builders v. Industrial Comm'n, 
703 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1985). The Commission's attempt to obtain additional information from the 
panel concerning their report was neither irrational nor unreasonable. Thus, we hold the Commission 
was within the bounds of reasonableness and rationality in ordering a hearing on the medical panel's 
report. 
4. Findings Prepared by Prevailing Party 
Finally, petitioner contends that the Commission erred in sanctioning Judge George's request that 
Brown & Root's attorney draft proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The law is well 
settled that a trial court may ask counsel-typically the prevailing counsel-to submit findings to aid 
the court in making these necessary determinations. See BoyerCo. v. Lignell, 567 P.2d 1112, 
1113-14 (Utah 1977); State v. James, 858 P.2d 1012, 1015 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Hoth v. White, 
799 P.2d 213, 218 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). While that practice is more common in the trial courts of 
this state than it is with our administrative law judges, the Utah Supreme Court has approved of 
this practice in administrative proceedings. In Erkman v. Civil Sen/ice Commission, 114 Utah 228, 
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198 P.2d 238, 242 (Utah 1948) the supreme court stated that it is the custom of courts of lawr at 
least in this jurisdiction, for the court to ask counsel for the prevailing party to draw proposed 
findings of fact. That practice is so general as to be said to be the universal practice in this 
jurisdiction.... There is no good reason why the same procedure should not be followed by 
[administrative agencies]. 
Other jurisdictions comport with this practice. See Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 694 
(9th Cir. 1949) (explaining that "even in adjudications, there is no constitutional prohibition against the 
findings and conclusions being drawn by the successful party at the direction . . . [of the] 
administrative hearing officer"); Rudin v. Nevada Real Estate Advisory Comm'n, 86 Nev. 562, 471 
P'.2d 658, 660 (Nev. 1970) (stating {973 P.2d 987} that "in court litigation the findings and judgment 
routinely are prepared by counsel for the prevailing party. We see no reason for denouncing that 
practice in administrative agency matters"); Nunez v. Smith's Management Corp., 108 N.M. 186, 769 
P.2d 99, 101 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) (finding no error in ALJ's verbatim adoption of prevailing party's 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law). 
Furthermore, there is no indication from the record that Judge George failed to adequately guide 
defense counsel in counsel's preparation of the proposed decision. At the end of the hearing, Judge 
George explained both the factual and legal basis for his decision. Also, he specifically retained the 
right to accept, reject, or modify the proposed decision. Most importantly, the order issued by Judge 
George is consistent with his oral decision announced at the end of the hearing and bears his 
signature. Therefore, we find no merit in petitioner's contention that the Commission erred in 
approving Judge George's request that Brown & Root's attorney draft proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.2 
CONCLUSION 
Because petitioner failed to properly marshal the evidence in support of the Commission's factual 
findings, we decline to disturb those findings. Further, we conclude that petitioner's due process 
challenge was improperly raised for the first time on appeal. Also, we hold that the Commission's 
decision to order a hearing on the medical panel's report was reasonable and rational in light of the 
uncertainty surrounding the source of petitioner's depression. Finally, we find no error in the 
Commission's decision to approve Judge George's request that Brown & Root's attorney prepare 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the 
Commission denying petitioner's Motion for Review. 
Affirmed. 
Michael J. Wilkins, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge (In Part) 
Concur 
Concur by: GREGORY K. ORME (In Part) 
Dissent 
Dissent by: GREGORY K. ORME (In Part) 
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ORME, Judge (dissenting in part): 
I concur fully in the court's opinion, except that I must dissent from the majority's ringing endorsement 
of the administrative law judge's delegation to prevailing counsel of the important task of drafting 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. As far as I am aware, this has not been the contemporary 
practice of law-trained administrative law judges in this state. 1 On the contrary, Utah ALJs 
generally-and those adjudicating workers compensation cases in particular-have routinely prepared 
their own findings and conclusions. Their work product has, with rare exceptions, been excellent, not 
only because findings prepared by the actual fact finder are inherently better than those prepared by a 
nonneutral delegee one step removed from decisional responsibility^ see {973 P„2d 988} generally 
United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656 & n.4, 84 S. Ct. 1044, 1047 & n.4, 12 L. 
Ed. 2d 12 (1964), but also because continual feedback from the Industrial Commission and from this 
court, as well as the skill that comes with repetition and practice, help insure findings that are 
sufficiently detailed and otherwise "more helpful to the appellate court." Id. at 656, 84 S. Ct. at 1047. 
While it is true that custom, workload, and lack of staff have combined to make delegation to counsel 
more the norm in the district courts of this state, this approach is more a necessary evil than a model 
to be emulated. See generally Automatic Control Prods. Corp. v Tel-Tech, Inc., 780 P.2d 1258, 
1263-64 (Utah 1989) (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result). 
Indeed, whether due to increased availability of law clerks, providing judges with personal 
computers, a change in the local legal culture, or some combination of factors, we are seeing 
increasing numbers of cases where the findings of fact are simply included in a memorandum 
decision prepared by the trial judge. Especially given this commendable trend, it would be a 
shame if ALJs for state administrative boards and agencies were to reverse direction and begin 
regularly delegating the responsibility to counsel. Hopefully Judge George's delegation here was 
only a fluke or an experiment. In any event, I, for one, would not wish to encourage any expansion 
of the practice. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
Footnotes 
Footnotes 
1 Section 35-1-77 was subsequently amended and recodified at Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601 
(1997). However, both parties agree that the 1987 version of section 35-1-77 governs this 1987 claim. 
2 The majority notes with caution the separate opinion of J. Orme. Contrary to his strongly 
expressed views, the majority feels that the evolving practice of having counsel assist an 
administrative law judge, or any other judicial officer for that matter, in the preparation of draft findings 
of fact, conclusions of law, and orders, is a reasonable practice. Such proposed documents are 
always subject to the review of opposing parties and the judicial officer. The ALJ or judge retains the 
obligation to carefully consider the proposed documents, and to revise them as needed to accurately 
reflect the decision. However, having so done, nothing significant is gained by insisting that the judge 
or ALJ personally draft each word. 
1 In this regard, it should be noted that the Erkman case, cited in the main opinion as approving an 
administrative body's delegation to counsel of the responsibility for preparing findings of fact, involved 
a local administrative board whose members were not law-trained. See Erkman v. Civil Sen/. Comm'n 
ofProvo, 114 Utah 228, 236, 198 P.2d 238, 242 (1948) ("The commissioners, generally being laymen, 
are not ordinarily skilled in preparing papers of this kind, and when the drawing of findings of fact by 
counsel for the prevailing party might be a relatively simple matter, the same matter might be 
extremely difficult for members of the commission."). 
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2 Judge J. Skelly Wright, in rather passionate terms, identified "the primary purpose" for having trial 
judges prepare their own findings, while at the same time staking out his view of the import of Rule 52 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure : 
Who shall prepare the findings? Rule 52 says the court shall prepare the findings. "The court shall find 
the facts specifically and state separately its conclusions of law." We all know what has happened. 
Many courts simply decide the case in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant, have him prepare the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and sign them. This has been denounced by every court of 
appeals save one. This is an abandonment of the duty and the trust that has been placed in the judge 
by these rules. It is a noncompliance with Rule 52 specifically and it betrays the primary purpose of 
Rule 52-the primary purpose being that the preparation of these findings by the judge shall assist in 
the adjudication of the lawsuit. 
United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656 n.4, 84 S. Ct. 1044, 1047 n.4, 12 L. 
Ed. 2d 12 (1964) (quoting Seminars for Newly Appointed United States District Judges 166 
(1963)). 
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